What next for Myanmar’s Rohingya?

From the Economist:

There are no good solutions for the conundrum faced by the world’s largest group of stateless people

Open Future

Aug 2nd 2018

by R.C.

IT HAS been nearly a year since Myanmar’s army started driving the Rohingya people out of their villages in Rakhine state, in what the UN called a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”. Some call it genocide. In all, about 700,000 Rohingya fled across the border to nearby Bangladesh, bringing the total numbers of Rohingya in the country to about 1m. Most of those who fled now eke out a meagre existence in the world’s largest and most densely populated refugee camp, Kutupalong, near Cox’s Bazar (see map). About half a million Rohingya remain in Rakhine state, but many continue to flee, swelling the numbers in Bangladesh.

In recent months the monsoon rains have reduced Kutupalong to a muddy mess. Makeshift shacks have been swept away by floods and landslides, forcing some to move farther afield. Aid agencies, the Bangladeshi authorities and the Rohingya have been coping heroically. But what happens next? The world’s largest population of stateless people cannot be allowed to rot away in Kutupalong for much longer.

Unfortunately, the immediate options are neither appealing nor practical. The vast majority of the Rohingya would like to return to their homes and villages in Rakhine state. On paper, at least, the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh have agreed to a repatriation programme. But in practice the Rohingya have little or nothing to return to.  

Many burnt-out villages have since been bulldozed, and surviving buildings demolished, by the Myanmar authorities. “They seem intent on erasing any trace of the Rohingya villages. Some of it is just a moonscape,” says one observer who recently flew over Rakhine state. 

Consequently, almost no Rohingya have yet returned. This will not change unless the political situation in Myanmar improves dramatically. This is unlikely. One UN official in Rakhine state reports that there is “no meaningful progress in improving relations between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities in the state…if anything, quite the reverse”. 

If the Rohingya cannot return to Myanmar in safety, what then? Some years ago the Bangladeshi authorities said that they could set aside an island in the Bay of Bengal as a more permanent home. This idea has recently been resurrected, and work has begun on Bhasan Char island to make it more habitable. But aid workers doubt this is a long-term solution: Bhasan Char only emerged from the silt 30km off the mainland about 20 years ago and is prone to flooding. It is also too small to provide space for all the Rohingya. 

An alternative would be to establish a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) around Kutupalong. This would be to borrow an idea from Jordan, which has had to absorb at least 650,000 refugees from Syria. SEZs for refugees seek to attract investment to the area by offering tax concessions and other inducements. They create jobs for both the refugees, who get work permits, and for the host population, thus reducing the risk that local Bangladeshis might come to resent the hundreds of millions dollars’ worth of aid pouring in to help the Rohingya. This is important because Kutupalong is already one of the poorest parts of a very poor country. Uganda has also experimented with this approach, allowing around half a million refugees, mainly from South Sudan, to work.  

The Jordanian SEZ remains controversial, not least because such a scheme encourages more refugees to come in. The Bangladeshi authorities, generous as they have been, are nervous about appearing to accept a permanent Rohingya presence. A more settled SEZ, supported by donors, would also be seen by some Rohingya as rewarding Myanmar’s brutal army for its ethnic cleansing, handing them a clear victory. Still, this may be the least bad option for now. The Rohingya, skilful and resourceful, with an intricate web of trading relationships throughout the region, contributed a great deal to the economy of Rakhine state. They may well do the same for Bangladesh.

But eventually Bangladesh and Myanmar, supported by the UN and foreign countries, will have to resolve the question of the Rohingyas’ legal status, which is the root of the problem. For now, they are the world’s most numerous “stateless” people, and there is little hope left that Myanmar will ever give them citizenship. The UN says that it wants to end statelessness by 2024. Maybe a successful SEZ on the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar, supported by overseas funds, could provide the basis for an autonomous enclave of some sort, to which the Rohingya might eventually have legal rights.