Bangladesh, the Rohingya and the new reality in Rakhine

• DECEMBER 30, 2024

Bangladesh’s interim government has lobbied successfully for an international conference on the Rohingya. But for repatriation to have any chance of moving forward, organisers need to consider the rise of the Arakan Army.

By LAETITIA VAN DEN ASSUM | FRONTIER

Since taking office in August after a mass uprising toppled the former regime, Bangladesh’s interim government has sought to mobilise international support for a solution to the Rohingya crisis. In one of his first speeches as head of the new administration, Muhammad Yunus called forthe “sustained  efforts” of the international community to support the one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and their eventual repatriation to Myanmar.

In November, his government’s determined lobbying resulted in the United Nations General Assembly adopting a resolution calling for a “high-level conference” next year. The conference would contribute to “a comprehensive, innovative, concrete and time-bound plan for the sustainable resolution of the crisis, including the voluntary, safe and dignified return of Rohingya Muslims to Myanmar”, according to the resolution. Both Bangladesh and Qatar have been mentioned as potential venues for the conference, which the Bangladesh government said it expects to take place in September or October, with arrangements finalised by April.

Given the Rohingya refugee burden Bangladesh has shouldered since the 1970s, its demand for speedy and effective repatriation is understandable. The UN resolution is a welcome effort to ensure the Rohingya crisis remains a global priority. It is also notable because there is presently no credible international dialogue about the crisis. Setting one up will be no easy task, however, particularly given the shifting political landscape in Myanmar. Since November 2023, the Arakan Army has seized control of much of Rakhine State – also known as Arakan – from the country’s military junta, the State Administration Council. The group’s territory now includes the areas where most Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh from.

The AA’s emergence over the past decade was largely ignored by the previous Bangladesh government, led by Sheikh Hasina. But in an encouraging development, public debate in Bangladesh is increasingly starting to address issues that were anathema under Hasina’s rule, such as the possibility of dialogue with the AA. The interim government is reportedly considering how to establish semi-formal communication with the group. In another example, a recent series of opinion articles by two veteran diplomats, former Bangladesh foreign secretary Shahidul Haque and Mohammad Sufiur Rahman, a former ambassador to Myanmar, revisited their country’s Rohingya policies and suggested specific ways forward.

Organisers of next year’s Rohingya conference now face two immediate questions. First, how to define the scope of the conference? Second, how to ensure that the perspectives of the de facto authorities in Rakhine are reflected?

Addressing a global challenge

To build additional international support for the Rohingya crisis, its wider relevance needs to be highlighted. Too often, the Rohingya are seen as a bilateral issue for Myanmar and Bangladesh. A recent report titled “Behind the Wire” from Doctors Without Borders, also known by the French acronym MSF, estimates there are 2.8 million Rohingya around the world, of whom just 23 percent remain in their home country of Myanmar – a vivid reminder of the brutal effectiveness of decades of oppression and discrimination. Aside from Myanmar, the four countries with the largest Rohingya populations are Bangladesh with 1.1 million, Pakistan with 400,000, Saudi Arabia with 340,000 and Malaysia with 210,000.

The situation of the Rohingya differs between these countries. In Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example, most Rohingya arrived several decades ago and their children have never seen their homeland. MSF found that while 76pc of Rohingya who fled within the past five years wanted to return to Myanmar, this fell to just 28pc among those who have spent more than 20 years abroad. This suggests that solutions should be tailor-made and guided by the objectives of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, including easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Given the number of Rohingya in Bangladesh, and the fact that most of them left Myanmar in 2016-17, it makes sense for Dhaka to focus on repatriation to Rakhine as the primary solution to the crisis. Its renewed push to start refugee returns is also understandable. But experience has shown that pressure to move quickly risks continuing the “revolving door” phenomenon seen since the 1970s, in which flight from Myanmar has been followed by return from Bangladesh, before the cycle begins again. If the underlying causes of the Rohingya crisis are not addressed, much needed progress and stability will remain out of reach, with growing impacts for the entire region.

Shifting from a state-centric approach

The resolution and debate at the UN General Assembly reflect a traditional state-centric approach, one that assumes that in Myanmar a central government can shape political life in all its component parts. The multiple references to “Myanmar” appear to refer exclusively to the military regime. But the SAC has now lost control of much of the country. In Rakhine, it barely retains a toehold: following recent heavy losses, its authority is limited to the state capital Sittwe, the island of Munaung, and small sections of Kyaukphyu and Gwa townships – with the latter seemingly about to fall.

Even before the AA’s emergence as a major power, however, the state-centric approach had failed. Since 2017, China made several attempts to mediate the start of Rohingya repatriation between Bangladesh and the Myanmar authorities, but these failed in large part because both the Rohingya and the Rakhine, the majority community in the state, were excluded. Efforts to resume repatriation after the 2021 military coup were even less successful. If the international community does not acknowledge the de facto territorial control of the AA, progress on repatriation and other urgent issues related to the Rohingya will remain illusory.

More pragmatic approaches are needed. For the Rohingya conference organisers, this means making contact with the AA. Bangladesh, though, seems to still have some hesitancy about engaging a non-state actor, even when it is clearly the de facto authority in Rakhine.

While full recognition of the AA may be some way off, it is in the interests of both sides to cooperate on areas of mutual interest. This could include establishing a humanitarian corridor into Rakhine to deliver humanitarian assistance to all communities in need; countering cross-border crime; and resuming bilateral trade. In this, Dhaka could draw lessons from how Myanmar’s other neighbours, particularly China and Thailand, interact with non-state groups along their borders with the country.

For now, it is unclear what kind of state will emerge in Rakhine to replace the former regime. The AA leadership has made clear that it rejects the recent political past, with its centralisation of power in Myanmar’s capital Nay Pyi Taw, and has occasionally suggested a confederate structure, but it has not excluded other options. Over the past few years, the United League of Arakan, the AA’s civilian wing, has expanded administrative and judicial services in parts of Rakhine, and also started training more civilian personnel. This, however, is only the starting point for building greater autonomy.

A Rohingya refugee holds his child while carrying relief material at a camp in Ukhia, Bangladesh, on September 12. (AFP)

Changes on the ground

The past year has been a troubling one for Rakhine. Even though the AA has liberated most of the state from the SAC, two developments have cast dark shadows over the group’s military achievements.

The latest round of fighting, which began in November 2023, has brought Rakhine to the brink of humanitarian and economic disaster. The Myanmar military has intensified its blockade of the state, preventing essential goods from entering. Prices of basic commodities have skyrocketed; in AA-controlled areas, there is even a shortage of banknotes. The United Nations Development Programme and others have warned of the potential for serious food shortages, and even famine-like conditions.

In addition, the conflict has damaged communal relations. Although the SAC has been losing the war, it scored one major victory, using its tried and tested divide-and-rule strategy to turn large numbers of Rohingya against the mostly ethnic Rakhine fighters of the AA. It has done this by recruiting Rohingya directly and collaborating with Rohingya armed groups, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Since April, all sides have been accused of committing human rights violations against civilians, only adding to the tensions.

The deterioration in communal ties is a setback after developments in 2022 and 2023 suggested that the Rakhine and Rohingya were increasingly prepared to live side by side, particularly in central Rakhine. Informal trade was gradually resuming, and access to services was improving. In 2022, Rohingya students were able to enrol at Sittwe University for the first time since 2012.

Rohingya in Bangladesh have not been spared from the recent fighting. In the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar district, Rohingya armed groups have forcibly recruited many young men; reports indicate they were taken across the border into Myanmar and forced to fight on the side of the SAC. A recent Reuters report speaks of 3,000 to 5,000 Rohingya fighters being abducted or recruited, often under false promises, such as access to Myanmar citizenship documents.

In early December, following months of heavy fighting, the AA captured the last SAC outpost in Maungdaw Township, along the border with Bangladesh. In the process, it took hundreds of prisoners of war, including many Rohingya fighters. Although the AA says that it wants to include all communities in its vision for the future, it has also denounced the Rohingya who fought against it.

The AA will now have to carefully consider how it can reset its relationship with the Rohingya community. As a gesture it might want to consider commissioning an independent investigation into the still-contested circumstances of mass violence in Buthidaung Township in April and May. It could also allow Rohingya affected by the violence to return from displacement sites to their homes; in cases where their homes have been damaged or destroyed, providing support to repair or rebuild would be a practical way to restore some trust.

The AA will also have to consider how it can improve its relations with Bangladesh. The recruitment of several thousand Rohingya from the camps in Cox’s Bazar and their transfer across the border into Myanmar has angered the group. Many observers, including in Bangladesh, find it hard to believe that this happened without the knowledge of senior Bangladeshi officials.

Improving communal relations

Rebuilding Rakhine from the ravages of war will be a major challenge – one with no quick fixes. It was already one of Myanmar’s poorest states, suffering from underdevelopment, inter-communal strife and marginalisation; as a result, poverty, lack of opportunities and displacement have plagued all its communities. Conditions have worsened since late 2018, when violent conflict between the military and the AA intensified. Rakhine needs a comprehensive long-term recovery plan and roadmap to capture the monumental task ahead, including the voluntary, secure and dignified return of Rohingya refugees.

One of the most complex and pressing challenges is how to strengthen the cohesion of the state’s diverse ethnic and religious communities, particularly the Rakhine and the Rohingya. Both sides continue to harbour deep fears of each other. For some Rakhine, the large number of Rohingya who fought with SAC forces against the AA corroborated their own fears.

The international community must play a role, too, in recognising what the different communities have been through. In recent decades, the suffering of the Rohingya has been well documented. The significant attention their cause received, including from the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, has been justified. Yet, over the past five years, the Myanmar military has intensified its abuses against all communities: torturing, killing and maiming; destroying livelihoods; burning down homes, hospitals, schools, markets and prayer houses; blocking the transport of basic goods; and cutting essential services, including electricity, banking and communications. All the people of Rakhine are victims now.

If the world wants to make a meaningful contribution to the crisis, therefore, it must dedicate itself not only to dealing with the plight of the Rohingya but also to helping all people in Rakhine rebuild their state together. This approach should be at the heart of a transitional justice programme, with emphasis on institutional reforms, truth, justice, reparations and memorialisation.

In doing so, the international community would be aligning with the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, of which I was a member. In August 2017, our commission, which was chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, proposed solutions to Rakhine’s development, human rights and security challenges, offering a path to peace and prosperity, security and human rights for all. Despite all that has happened since, many of the recommendations remain relevant today. It is now up to the people of the state and their leaders to see how they might be incorporated into plans for a new Rakhine.

Laetitia van den Assum is a former Dutch ambassador who served as a member of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State established in August 2016.