Digital Hate: BHRN December Report - Burma

 

Digital Hate: Monthly Report for December 2025 (English / Myanmar)

 

24 Jan 2026

 

1. Introduction 2. Research Methodology 3. Monitoring Activities 4. Findings 5. The figure illustrating types of hate speech 6. The figure illustrating the number of hate speech targets 7. Keywords used by hate speech writers 8. Distribution by Platform 9. Conclusion ၁။ နိဒါန်း ၂။ သုတေသနနည်းနာ ၃။ စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှုများ ၄။ တွေ့ရှိချက်များ ၅။ အမုန်းစကားအမျိုးအစား အရေအတွက်ပြပုံ ၆။ အမုန်းစကား ဦးတည်ပစ်မှတ် အရေအတွက်များအား ဖော်ညွှန်းပုံ ၇။ အမုန်းစကားရေးသားသူများ သုံးစွဲသည့် keywords များ ၈။ ပလက်ဖောင်းအလိုက် ဖြန့်ဝေမှု ၉။ နိဂုံး

 

Report on Hate Speech and Misinformation Found in Myanmar in December

 

1.               Introduction

 

The spread of hate speech and misinformation on social media and other communication channels in Myanmar exacerbates ethnic, religious, and political tensions, increasing conflicts within communities. This report systematically monitors hate speech that occurred in Myanmar during December 2025, analyzing its main sources, patterns of dissemination, vulnerable social groups, and potential impacts.  This study examines the prevalence of incitement to violence and hate speech across major digital and social media platforms, including Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram. The research specifically focuses on analysing content that encourages or promotes violence, identifying insulting discourse targeting specific ethnicities and religions, and monitoring high-intensity political criticism and its impact. Furthermore, the study provides strategic recommendations to mitigate these campaigns through legal frameworks, technical interventions, and community-based measures.  The report also highlights how hate speech evolved in December in connection with Myanmar’s current political, economic, and social conditions. The information is intended to serve as a reference for peacebuilders, media professionals, policymakers, and civil society organizations.

 

2. Research Methodology

 

Hate speech is inherently rooted in emotional expression and subjective sentiment; it does not have a universally accepted definition. For this report, the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) defines hate speech as follows:   "Hate speech refers to any form of expression, verbal, written, behavioural, or artistic, that targets an individual or group to express severe criticism, condemnation, or to incite hostility and hatred based on protected characteristics. This includes attacks on fundamental rights and identity, such as religion, language, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnicity, skin color, beliefs, or physical appearance."   Based on the findings of this study, hate speech is further categorized into the following types: ·       Criminalisation: Portraying specific groups as inherent criminals or "sinners." ·       Dehumanisation: Stripping individuals of their human qualities or dignity. ·    Oppressive Speech: Language used to exert dominance over or bully marginalized groups. ·       Incitement: Direct calls for violence, riots, or civil unrest. ·    Existential Threat: Characterising specific groups as a fundamental threat to the existence of others. ·       Glorification: The celebration or promotion of acts of violence and hatred.   In the context of Myanmar’s ongoing political and military tensions, BHRN continuously monitors and documents hate speech terminology disseminated by the military and its associated propaganda channels.   1. Data Collection Monitored platforms: Data were collected from Facebook, TikTok, and Telegram channels. Types of content: ●    Hate speech related to ethnicity, religion, politics, and gender. ●    Content inciting violence and discrimination. ●    Harmful misinformation and incitement-related posts.   2. Data Approach Manual monitoring: Members of the hate speech monitoring team systematically reviewed designated keywords, images, and videos to ensure a high level of accuracy in documentation.     3. Data Analysis ●    Thematic Categorisation: Content is grouped into specific themes—such as ethnicity, religion, and politics to identify recurring patterns of targeting. ●    Level of dissemination: The scale of spread is measured by analysing Engagement (Likes, Shares, Comments) and total Reach. ●    Identification of Key Perpetrators: The study identifies specific groups and individuals responsible for disseminating hate speech, while assessing their level of influence and broader social impact.     4. Ethical Considerations -       Data Confidentiality: All monitored and documented information is stored securely. BHRN adheres to a strict policy that prohibits the disclosure of data to the public or unauthorised individuals.     5. Limitations ●  Platform Coverage: It is not possible to comprehensively monitor all social media platforms ●  Encryption Challenges: Some online activities occur on encrypted communication platforms, which pose significant challenges for effective tracking and monitoring. ●  Authenticity and Impact: The prevalence of fake accounts and bots complicates assessing the genuine social impact accurately

 

3. Monitoring Activities

 

This report was compiled by monitoring online and print media used by the military junta and its supporters to disseminate hate speech. During December 2025, BHRN conducted a monitoring exercise with the following results: · - Facebook: monitored 3 groups, one page, and 13 accounts, identifying 13 incidents of hate speech. ·       Telegram: Monitored 24 Channels; identified 66 incidents of hate speech. ·       TikTok: Monitored 24 Accounts; identified 15 incidents of hate speech. ·       Print Media: Monitored 2 newspapers and 1 journal. In total, 94 instances of misinformation and hate speech were documented during the month. The findings are presented using tables, graphs, and clear descriptive text. This report further examines the root causes and effects of hate speech, providing recommendations for prevention and mitigation. Due to significant limitations in achieving comprehensive coverage of the entire social media landscape, there may be undocumented incidents of hate speech that fall outside the scope of this report.   Key Findings 1. Targeted Groups ●      Religious and Ethnic Minorities: Racial persecution of the Rohingya persists through false allegations labelling them as "illegal immigrants from Bangladesh." Similarly, the broader Muslim community is targeted with religious insults and derogatory slurs, such as "Kalar" and "Pork-abstainers" (Whet-ma-sar), intended to dehumanise and demean ●      Women: Hate speech targeting women frequently employs dehumanising language, sexual harassment, and the exposure of personal information to damage their reputations and social standing. ●      Political and Armed Groups: Content frequently labels People’s Defence Forces (PDF) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) as "terrorists," "murderers," "bandits," and "rapists" to incite communal hatred against these groups. ●      The Chin ethnic group is subjected to oppressive and derogatory rhetoric, including dehumanising terms such as "Chin Cows" (Chin-Nwar-Nout) and "Vile Chin" (Chin-Amyo-Yoke), used to marginalise and coerce the community.   2. Methods of Disseminating Hate Speech and Misinformation ●    Social media (Facebook, TikTok, Telegram): Hate speech against Muslims and Rohingya circulated through posts, videos, and cartoons, targeting ethnicity, religion, and politics. ●    Arakan Army (AA) and PDF members: Portrayed as drug traffickers, terrorists, rapists, and Chin outcastes spreading hate speech to depict them as criminals. ●    Misinformation: Used to create public suspicion and fear.   3. Impacts ●    The prevalence of these campaigns has led to significant societal consequences: -       Erosion of Public Trust and Ethnic Polarisation: Heightened animosity toward the AA and PDF threatens to exacerbate ethnic tensions, particularly between the Chin and Bamar ethnic groups. -       Threats to Safety and Dignity: Beyond the psychological impact of online harassment, women and activists face severe threats to their physical safety and personal dignity. -    Obstruction of Peacebuilding: The persistent fueling of racial and religious hatred serves as a major barrier to peacebuilding efforts and a stable democratic transition in Myanmar.

 

4. Findings

 

Dissemination of Hate Speech Against Muslims

 

The Telegram channel "Hmaing Wai" disseminated a post targeting a Director from the Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs in Nay Pyi Taw. The post alleged involvement in the sexual exploitation of women, claiming his actions damaged the Ministry’s reputation. Because the official is Muslim, the content utilized derisive and mocking language throughout the post. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (1)

 

 

A Facebook account named "U Ayar Linn" shared a photograph of a foreign Islamic preacher captioned with a message of gratitude to the Junta Head. The post included a fabricated quote—"We will not stop until Islam reaches every household"—to incite communal fear. It further claims that under the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the winners of the 2020 General Election, the growth of the Muslim population in Myanmar had been unchecked. The publication utilised derogatory language aimed at mocking the Muslim community. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (2)

 

Pauk Sayadaw, a monk operating under the guise of "Protecting Race and Religion," used his Telegram channel to share a TikTok video targeting a Muslim youth. He characterised the individual as a "predator" and a threat to Buddhist women. This framing was intentionally designed to amplify religious polarisation and foster animosity between faith communities. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (3)

 

The Facebook account "Zaw Aung Kyaw Zaw" disseminated hate speech, asserting that Taungup Township in Rakhine State must remain a "Muslim-free zone." The post employed derogatory and derisive language, characterising the Muslim population as "territorial usurpers" to justify exclusion and hostility. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (4)

 

A Facebook account named "Nga Pyan Lar Pyi (“I Have Returned)” posted content containing hate speech regarding the involvement of the United States and China in Myanmar’s political affairs. The post claimed that the United States is influencing Myanmar’s politics by controlling the KNU in the eastern part of the country and Muslim groups in the western part, while China is allegedly controlling the Northern Alliance groups and the People’s Defense Forces in central Myanmar, thereby engaging in political manipulation of the country. It was further noted that the writings used mocking and sarcastic language. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (5)  Dissemination of Hate Speech Against the Rohingya  The Facebook account "Zaw Aung Kyaw Zaw" disseminated hate speech regarding armed conflict, claiming that the Rohingya community opposes a potential ceasefire between the military junta and the Arakan Army (AA). The post claims that a peace agreement would act as a barrier to Rohingya entry into the country, using derisive and mocking language to frame the community as an obstacle to national stability. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (6)

 

A Facebook account named "Ko Zaw KZ" disseminated hate speech while publicly stating he would remove any Rohingya individuals from his "Friend List." The post featured degrading terms to express explicit hatred and disgust toward the Rohingya people. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (7)

 

The Facebook account named "Zaw Aung Kyaw Zaw" disseminates hate speech using false information, claiming that numerous Rakhine villages were destroyed during the 1942 Rakhine-Rohingya conflict in western Myanmar. The list of Rakhine villages presented in the post lacks any supporting documents or verifiable data sources; consequently, it is observed that such content is intended to incite hatred between different ethnic and religious groups. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (8)

 

The Facebook page “Yetkwat Thadin (ရပ်ကွက်သတင်း)” disseminated hate speech claiming that the Rohingya’s pursuit of ethnic recognition is a pretext for territorial secession. The post falsely asserted that because Myanmar is a union, only "indigenous" groups have the legal right to secession, framing the Rohingya’s struggle for status as a strategic threat to national sovereignty. The writing utilized derisive and mocking language in the post.  Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (9)

 

Again, the Facebook page "ရပ်ကွက်သတင်း" disseminated hate speech claiming that during the National League for Democracy (NLD) administration, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi collaborated with the late Muslim legal expert U Ko Ni and tried to grant official status to the Rohingya. The post alleged that the NLD government repealed the Guest Registration Law and the adoption of children by foreigners, specifically as a means to legitimise the Rohingya. These allegations were expressed using derisive and mocking language directed at the Rohingya community. Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (10)  Dissemination of Hate Speech Against Revolutionary Armed Groups

 

A Telegram channel named "Ka Ka Han" disseminated hate speech utilizing the tragic murder of a pregnant woman in Monywa to frame the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) as "terrorists" who commit murders for financial gain.   Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (11)

 

A Telegram Channel named "Ka Ka Han" disseminated hate speech by resharing a news report from DVB regarding the prevalence of narcotics in the rural region of central Myanmar. The channel alleged that the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) in the rural region are drug distributors and addicts. In this dissemination of hate speech, the PDF was portrayed as terrorists and destructive elements of the state.  Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (12)

 

A telegram channel named "Sit Thawy (စစ်သွေး)" disseminated hate speech, targeted at Paletwa Township, a sensitive border region between Chin and Rakhine States. The channel used mocking language to blame both the Arakan Army (AA) and the Chin People's Defence Forces (CPDF) for local hardships, characterising both groups as terrorists to fuel regional instability.   Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (13)

 

The Telegram channel "Ka Ka Han" further disseminated hate speech by accusing PDF members of collecting public donations for personal gain under the guise of the anti-dictatorship revolution. The post was found to be portraying the PDF as terrorists.  Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (14)

 

A TikTok account named "Min Thu" disseminated hate speech claiming that once the military recaptures the Magway-Rakhine border and the majority of Chin State, the role of the Arakan Army (AA) will be eliminated. The post used degrading terms to spread hate speech and belittle the AA.   Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (15)

 

The Telegram channel "Ka Ka Han" disseminated hate speech claiming that the Arakan Army (AA) systematically commits sexual violence against Chin women of all ages. The channel portrayed and accused the AA of being terrorists.   Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (16)

 

Dissemination of Hate Speech Against Women in Politics

 

The "စစ်သွေး" Telegram channel disseminated hate speech specifically targeting women supporters of the National Unity Government (NUG) living abroad and those participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The posts used degrading terms, including accusations of sex work and labels of "traitor," to dehumanise women involved in the pro-democracy movement and spread hate speech against them.  Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (17)

 

A TikTok account named "GHOST" disseminated hate speech against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Chairperson of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, claiming that she failed to protect "Race, Religion, and Sasana". By focusing on her marriage to a foreigner and alleging she "sold out" the country, the content utilized insulting terms to appeal to ultranationalist sentiments. Original Post  See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (18)  A Telegram Channel named "Nay Pyi Taw" disseminated hate speech targeted at well-known actress, singer, and CDM participant Chit Thu Wai. By sharing her image alongside derisive, mocking commentary, the channel aimed to incite public hostility toward artists who supported the revolution.  Original Post See the translation of the attached link below the conclusion (19)