Comments on the so-called Inquiry Ducument of the BDR Carnage

I just reviewed the 50-page report, touted as being from the government investigation team of Mr. Anisuzzaman Khan: http://www.newsfrombangladesh.net/dbimages/266858-0-BDR%20Draft%20Cover%20Up%20Document%20June%2002.pdf

The highlighted colored passages are presumably marked by the link provider who seems to be on a mission to prove government cover-up on the inquiry. Obviously in our political culture such an attitude is not uncommon with every die-hard partisan finger pointing the other guy as the bad guy and attempting to blow things out of proportion when such may not be relevant or warranted.

Here below is my synopsis of major findings:

(1) Major Intelligence units like the DGFI and SB did not know about the BDR leaflet, which was widely distributed since 21 Feb. amongst the BDR-jawans in the Peelkhana HQ (Section 6.2). The NSI came to learn about it on Feb. 23, two days before the tragedy. That really paints a very damning picture about the health of our national security. No wonder how all the coups succeed in our country! Interestingly, here in the BDR mutiny, some BDR members of its own intelligence (the RSU) had participated in the conspiracy (Section 9.1). Not only that the NSI failed to inform the government. It informed Maj. Mahmud of RSU. The NSI, DGFI and SB had no in-house sources within the BDR to track conspiracy, while the BDR's own RSU was involved in the mutiny. Its chief security officer was Lt. Col. Shams, who was from the 44th Rifles. The same unit was responsible in the planning of the mutiny. He survived the mutiny and was not killed. Nor were other Army officers from the 44th unit (Section 10.4). Is it possible that he was party to the conspiracy? How about Maj. Mahmud? The behavior of Major Mahmudul Hasan, when informed by the NSI, is not very clear whether he paid enough importance to the matter and informed his higher officers on the nature of the leaflet, esp. its provocative, threatening language. Some thorough investigation on the involvement, if any, of some Army officers like Lt. Col. Shams is necessary for greater good of our national security. In the failure of such an inquiry, whether we like it or not, Lt. Col. Shams and other officers who had managed to survive may always be viewed in a different light with some suspicion hanging over their heads. If they are not party to the conspiracy, such must also be stated clearly.

Another thing that is clear from the report is that the PM had not been participating in Darbar Hall (DH) meetings since at least 1996. So the claim that Hasina had deliberately missed the event knowing a priori that something this bad was in the making seems far-fetched and preposterous.

(2) I have some problem with timing of the incidents. We learn that first rebel to enter the Hall with an SMG was at 926 hours and then he was promptly subdued by the officers. As pre-planned by the rebels, with the firing of the blank shot, all the Jawans left the Darbar Hall. (This view confirms what I personally learned during my visit to Bangladesh in Feb. from a brother of a JCO who had come from outside to join the meeting.) Then the officers were in full control of the DH and some of them went out to call the BDR Jawans to return to the Darbar Hall. Even a Subedar, later shot, was one such person who had called for return of the Jawans into the DH. Apparently with all the shots fired, some live ones, too, no BDR Jawan returned to the Hall except the rebel leaders who surrounded it. If the BDR-DG Maj. Gen. Shaqil had sent the SMS around 930 hours saying that he and other officers were in trouble (Section 7.2) all those things happened very fast (which is not improbable though). Otherwise, timing may not have been rightly recorded.

(3) A group of rebels had already broken into the arms storage area of the 44th Rifle Battalion and had procured deadly weapons by 830 hours after disarming its officer in charge Major Reazul Karim, nearly half an hour before the DH meeting even started.

(4) An ash-colored pickup van (presumably) from the 44th unit supplied live ammunitions to the rebels outside around 930 hours. The leaders must had the live ammos by 830 hours.

(5) Following up on requests from the hostage officers, by 1015 hours some units of the RAB h ad taken position around gate numbers 3-5 of the HQ. The presence of the Air Force helicopters over the rebel held area and the RAB created tremendous commotion, agitating the rebels who shot fires randomly, killing some civilians.

(6) Around 1030 hours the rebel leaders ordered the officers to come out from the DH in a single column. Then they brush fired, killing most of the officers including DG Shaqil. Between 930 and 1030 hours the rebels had entered the home of the DG and killed the family members including guests and servants. This incident reportedly happened in parallel while the officers were held hostages in the DH.

(7) Rebels set fire to private cars owned by some officers around 1100 hours coinciding with the presence of an Army unit nearby in Dhanmondi. They even fired shots aiming at a helicopter that was circling the HQ. Six shots hit the helicopter around 1215 hours.

(8) It is also clear that the rebels were able to confuse the govt. negotiation team by hiding facts and providing false, misleading information. This once again shows that Bangladesh government does not have adequate preparation to deal with emergency crisis of this nature. [They need Risk Analysis for Prevention, esp. the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to better handle such crises!!!]

If the timing is noted right, it is difficult to accept the claims made by some conspiracy theorists that if the RAB and the Army had stormed into the HQ they could have stopped the bloodshed. My gut feeling is that, when provoked, these rebels would have wasted no time into promptly killing all officers (unless they were co-conspirators), even if they were alive at the time and rampantly killed many hujuge Bangalis watching the national tamasha from outside the gates. But worse still, there would have been killings of officers in all the BDR camps and posts.

I personally, therefore, endorse the softer negotiation tactics to ease out the tension. I am nonetheless critical of the fact that government has shown its immaturity and incompetence in dealing with crisis of this magnitude and nature. It ought to seriously develop such groups that can handle this kind of tasks more effectively and efficiently. Those who advised Hasina and those who negotiated with the rebels definitely were not the best ones chosen to deal with such a crisis.

I don't doubt that the prolonged negotiations had given the rebel leaders enough time to escape and commit some other nefarious activities in the dead of the night. Some would argue that if Army been asked to deal with the matter such extra lives (which may have been lost in that night) or physical harassment or abuse, if any, could have been avoided. But one should not forget that important decisions are often taken keeping in mind greater good of the people, risks entailed, priorities available and opportunities offered. Even if Bangladesh might have lost some souls in that night, such losses were probably lesser of the misery endured compared to what could have happened if strong arms tactics had been invoked to quell the mutiny. Of course, the jury is divided on this important matter. As one who witnessed the event in Bangladesh, at least, this is my honest view which I share with you. And Allah knows the best what could have happened!

If the motives, identified by the Commission in Section 11.3, to harm Bangladesh's image are true, the planners of the mutiny had partially succeeded, and may try again. It is, therefore, necessary that the govt. sets another committee up to close some gaps in the inquiry so that we know who actually were behind the planning of this sad event.

Overall, I think Anisuzzaman Khan Inquiry Commission did a good job. Although like many, I wish it had completed this task much sooner, which would have helped to arrest the spread of unnecessary and unfounded rumors by some groups with their hideous agenda.

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