Many Bangladeshis will hope for a simple headline. They will want to hear the word ‘genocide’ from the world’s highest court. That hope is understandable. But we must prepare for a more complex result. We must also be clear about what any verdict can and cannot do.
What court is being asked to decide
THIS is not a criminal trial. No general will go to prison because of this judgement. The ICJ judges state, not individuals. The Gambia has asked the court to find that Myanmar committed genocide. It has also asked the court to find that Myanmar conspired to commit genocide, failed to prevent it and failed to punish those responsible. In addition, The Gambia says Myanmar ignored the court’s emergency orders of January 2020. Those orders told Myanmar to protect the Rohingya and to preserve evidence.
The Gambia also wants remedies. It has asked for orders that Myanmar prosecute suspects, stop hate speech and pay reparations. Myanmar rejects all these claims. Its main defence is that it never intended to destroy the Rohingya as a group.
Five possible outcomes
THE court has several options. The first is a full finding of genocide. This would mean the judges accept that Myanmar’s forces killed, raped and burnt with the intent to destroy the Rohingya. It would be a historic step. The ICJ has never before held a state directly responsible for committing genocide.
The second option is a partial finding. The court could say Myanmar failed to prevent or punish genocide without saying the state itself committed it. This is what happened in Bosnia v. Serbia in 2007. In that case, the court found that genocide took place at Srebrenica. But it held Serbia responsible only for failing to prevent it. Many legal experts see this as the most likely path here too.
The third option is narrower still. The court could find that Myanmar broke its 2020 emergency orders. Myanmar has sent 12 compliance reports to the court. Yet killings, arson and forced displacement in Rakhine have continued. A finding of breach on this point is widely expected.
The fourth option is a split verdict. The court has many judges. Some may accept the claims of genocide, and others may not. The final judgement may therefore mix strong and weak findings.
The fifth option is dismissal. The court could decide that genocidal intent was not proven. Few observers expect this. The court already rejected Myanmar’s objections to its jurisdiction in 2022. The evidence on the record is also large. But Bangladesh should not treat any result as certain.
What verdict can do
A STRONG verdict would give Bangladesh a powerful tool. It would confirm, in law, what our people saw at the border in 2017. It would show that the Rohingya did not leave Myanmar by choice. They were driven out.
This matters for repatriation. Myanmar has long called the Rohingya ‘Bengalis’. It claims they are illegal migrants from our country. A ruling from the ICJ would weaken that story for good. It would also support our position that return must be safe, voluntary and dignified. No one can ask a victim to go back to a state the world’s highest court has found responsible for their suffering. At least, not without strong guarantees.
A verdict would also help us in diplomacy. Bangladesh can bring it to the UN General Assembly, the Human Rights Council and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. It can use the judgement to ask donors for steady funding. It can point to the ruling when it asks for international monitoring of any return.
Even a partial verdict has value. A finding that Myanmar failed to prevent or punish genocide still places legal duties on Naypyidaw. A finding that Myanmar broke the 2020 orders still proves that the state ignored the court. Both outcomes would keep the pressure on.
What verdict cannot do
WE MUST also be honest about the limits. The ICJ has no police force. It cannot arrest anyone. It cannot send troops to Rakhine. Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, a state can ask the Security Council to enforce an ICJ judgement. But China and Russia hold vetoes there. Both have close ties with Myanmar’s military. Enforcement through the Council is therefore unlikely.
The verdict also cannot change who controls Rakhine. The Arakan Army now holds most of the state, including the area along our border. The Arakan Army is not a party to this case. Human Rights Watch reports that it has used forced labour and arbitrary detention against Rohingya. A ruling against the Myanmar state will not bind this armed group directly.
Finally, the verdict cannot feed the camps. Food rations in Cox’s Bazar were cut in April this year. Many families now receive less than the earlier USD 12 per person each month. The 2026 humanitarian appeal was only about 60 per cent funded by June. A court judgement does not solve this shortfall.
What Bangladesh should do now
FIRST, the government should prepare a clear public response for each possible outcome. It should not wait until the morning of November 19. A strong verdict needs a plan to use it. A weak verdict needs a plan to explain it. Our citizens deserve a calm and consistent message.
Second, Dhaka should manage expectations at home. Some voices may claim that the verdict will send the Rohingya home within months. That will not happen. Over-promising will only feed frustration later. That frustration could turn against both the refugees and the government.
Third, Bangladesh should link any future repatriation to the verdict. Return plans should include citizenship rights, freedom of movement and independent monitoring. These conditions follow directly from what the court may find.
Fourth, we should work with The Gambia, the OIC and like-minded states on next steps. The ICJ case is one track. The International Criminal Court investigation and the UN mechanism for Myanmar are others. Bangladesh is a member of the ICC. We should support every path to accountability.
Long road, not finish line
THE November 19 judgement will be a milestone. It will not be the end of the road. The Rohingya have waited nine years for this day. Bangladesh has carried a heavy burden for just as long. We have done so with limited help and growing fatigue.
A just verdict will strengthen our hand. But only clear policy, patient diplomacy and steady funding will turn that verdict into results. Bangladesh must be ready to use whatever the court gives us. That work begins now, not on judgement day.
Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst and research fellow at Bangladesh Neeti Gobeshona Kendra.
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