Sunday, November 1, 2026

What’s Behind the Protests and Riots in France, and What Comes Next by CFR's Rafaela Uzan

 On September 17, teachers at the Antoine de Saint-Exupéry High School in Créteil, a southeastern suburb of Paris, went on strike to draw attention to staff shortages. The teachers, joined by students and parents, blocked the school entrance. Videos of the blockade spread on social media, and soon protests expanded to high schools across the nation.

The protests have continued throughout October, affecting more than one thousand of France’s approximately 3,700 high schools and drawing hundreds of thousands of protesters. As the movement grew, the list of grievances expanded beyond the failings of the public school system to encompass broader economic, political, and social dissatisfaction. Teachers, parents, university students, and left-wing politicians also joined.

A poll from October 7 found that 55 percent of French respondents supported the movement. However, the protests descended into violence on October 17, and French authorities have responded with security crackdowns, curfews, and mass arrests when clashes grew particularly heated.

The unrest occurs against the backdrop of France’s upcoming presidential election in April 2027. With the students’ concerns being eclipsed by scenes of violent riots, the far right’s law-and-order stance could propel it to victory for the first time in France’s modern history. The far left, which is popular among young voters, could also benefit electorally from the student movement, setting up a contest between the two extremes.

What’s driving the French protests?

After the Créteil demonstrations, high schoolers in Lyon, Marseille, Paris, and other major French cities began barricading their schools and protesting in the streets against the lack of teachers, overcrowded classrooms, overpacked schedules, and their schools’ crumbling infrastructure. They also called for an overhaul of the university admissions platform, Parcoursup, saying it is too complex and opaque.

French classrooms are filled to the brim. Excluding vocational schools, the average size of a high school class is about thirty students, while nearly 20 percent of classes have between thirty-five and thirty-nine students. Meanwhile, schools have struggled to fill teacher vacancies. At the beginning of the 2026–2027 academic year, more than half of high schools and middle schools in France lacked at least one teacher. More than nineteen million hours of secondary school classes were not taught during the 2023–2024 academic year, largely because of insufficient substitutes. Recruitment has become difficult because of stagnant pay and increasing physical threats against teachers.

Meanwhile, fewer than 15 percent of French school buildings have been renovated in the last decade. Rising temperatures and more frequent heat waves in recent years have also presented an issue, as many schools lack sunshades, air conditioners, thermal insulation, and other mechanisms to cool overheated buildings. Last summer, millions of students took their final exams in classrooms lacking air conditioning, and one school set up a testing center in an underground parking lot to escape the heat. These issues tend to be exacerbated in poorer, immigrant-heavy neighborhoods, like Créteil.

French students gather outside the Lycee Henri-IV in Paris as part of nationwide protests to demand better school conditions in France, October 8, 2026.
French students gather outside the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris as part of nationwide protests to demand better school conditions in France, October 8, 2026. Reuters/Abdul Saboor

The protests come at a moment of crisis for the French public school system. Although France spends more than other high-income countries on secondary education, the results for the 2025 Program for International Student Assessment rankings showed French students’ standardized test scores in math, science, and reading dropped to their lowest point since tracking began in 2000.

In 2018, Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports Jean-Michel Blanquer led an overhaul of the high school system and baccalaureate exam—a rite of passage in France. The Blanquer reform introduced more subject concentrations, shortened the final exam, and placed greater emphasis on grades. But critics argue the abundance of concentration options exacerbated social stratification and made school days longer. French high schoolers often have gaps in their timetables and regularly finish school at 6:00 p.m. Student protesters have called on the government to address these issues as well.

What other factors are at play?

A generational divide is fueling these protests, too. In a country where youth unemployment is high and where pensions account for roughly 14 percent of GDP, many young people feel that older voters remain the government’s priority. A government report from mid-October indicates that 32 percent of the education ministry’s budget goes toward the pension system.

As the demonstrations grew, their focus expanded beyond issues with the school system to include concerns about affordability, diesel prices, and general dissatisfaction with the government. The movement also brought together students with trade unions, such as the General Confederation of Labor, and the Yellow Vests, a grassroots organization that led anti-government protests in 2018. The breadth of the demonstrations was also reflected in protesters’ signs. Some signs criticized the far-right National Rally party, while others expressed support for the Palestinian territories or warned about the risks posed by climate change and artificial intelligence.

So far, the government has responded by deploying three thousand additional substitute teachers, rescinding its proposal to introduce tuition fees for certain technical programs and preparatory classes, and rolling out an online platform where young people can express their concerns. On October 26, the government proposed additional measures, including making changes to Parcoursup by 2027 and fully replacing it by 2028. Later that day, representatives of the student movement met with Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu and hailed this progress, while still calling for “continued mobilization.”

Have the protests been violent?

Although the government has acknowledged students’ concerns are “legitimate,” demonstrators have been met with a heavy police response, and violence has been present from the start on both sides. Students have set trash cans ablaze near their schools. Videos of police assaulting teenage protesters have gone viral on social media, and mass arrests have occurred. Between September 28 and October 5, more than six thousand people were arrested and five thousand detained; close to 90 percent of detainees were minors. These numbers are unprecedented and eclipse the number of arrests during the Yellow Vests protests.

On October 14, Lecornu stated that 937 police officers, 149 educational personnel, and 248 students had been injured, including a fifteen-year-old who was maimed by a sting ball grenade fired by the police and a fourteen-year-old who suffered a jaw fracture in a similar incident.

October 17marked a major escalation in the demonstrations, with some experts calling them the worst riots in recent years. An estimated between 550,000 and 800,000 people across France—including 110,000 in Paris alone—took to the streets, but the demonstrations were hijacked and turned into violent riots in many French cities. In Marseille, rioters stormed city hall, and in Limoges, they set the town hall on fire. Three thousand shops, including French luxury brands as well as many small local businesses, were looted.

Local and national authorities reacted swiftly, putting in place curfews, including in the center of Paris, and instating local bans on protests. More than a thousand police officers were injured, while 2,700 people were arrested and more than 200 were jailed.

French President Emmanuel Macron condemned the violence and the actions of those “who sought to bring down the Republic.” He drew a distinction between the students and the “ultra-left” rioters whom he accused of wreaking havoc across the country.

How could the protests shape France’s presidential election?

The student protests are poised to play a pivotal role in France’s presidential election, with the first round set to take place in April 2027 and a runoff scheduled for the following month if no candidate secures more than 50 percent of the vote.

Most of the French political establishment, including the prime minister, has blamed the far-left party France Unbowed for fueling violence and using the protests to gain electoral advantage. The far left, which garners strong support among youth, especially those from immigrant backgrounds, has stood by the students from the start. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the party leader and a presidential candidate, joined the protests in early October and described the police response as “ferocity [that] is irresponsible with an obvious racist aftertaste.” After October 17, he condemned the violence on national television but blamed the government for what ensued, and he called on Macron to address the grievances of the French people.

A car is set ablaze during demonstrations on October 17, 2026 in Paris, France. The involvement of the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) with the ongoing French school blockades expands the scope of these demonstrations by linking localised student grievances to broader economic policies. Student unions originally initiated the movement to protest underfunding, deteriorating infrastructure, and acute teacher shortages across French high schools and universities. By joining the protests, the Gilets Jaunes introduce their established platform against austerity cuts, rising living costs, and surging fuel prices into the youth-led action.
A car is set ablaze during demonstrations on October 17, 2026, in Paris, France. Carl Court/Getty Images

In contrast, Marine Le Pen, the presidential candidate of the far-right National Rally party, has expressed support for police forces, deemed the government’s response inadequate, and blamed the far left for stoking violence. At the same time, Le Pen, who has focused her campaign on the cost of living, has empathized with protesters’ “legitimate social demands.” Some in Le Pen’s party have also blamed immigration for the issues plaguing French schools.

The scenes of chaos appear to be helping the far right, Matthias Matthijs, a CFR senior fellow for Europe, explained. “As the riots can be blamed on extremist elements of the far left, Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally can lay claim to be the party of law and order, and position itself as the only realistic governing alternative for French citizens who want to see radical change,” he said. After the October 17 escalation, polling showed Le Pen maintaining her lead, with more than 30 percent of voter support. In the same poll, Mélenchon jumped to second place, with 17 percent, setting the stage for a showdown between the two extremes next spring.

What’s next?

Additional protests have been planned for Halloween weekend, and the movement is unlikely to subside anytime soon. Instead, experts say it will likely intensify. On October 23, a man killed a child and injured five people in what was reportedly a racially motivated shooting meant to avenge the looting on October 17. A day later, between 410,000 and 800,000 people protested again nationwide, in some cases even defying local protest bans. Although the demonstrations were calmer, some clashes erupted in the evening and more than a thousand people were arrested.

With a debt crisis on his hands and his term ending in a few months, Macron has limited options for meeting protesters’ demands, and the unrest has further eroded his credibility. Macron was already viewed as a lame duck because he cannot run for office again, Liana Fix, a senior fellow for Europe at CFR, explained, but “after the protests, he is seen as a lame duck that has lost control of his country and connection to his people.” In a poll asking who was to blame for the violence on October 17, 81 percent of respondents blamed the government.

The country’s political extremes, for their part, appear intent on riding this wave of discontent all the way to the Élysée.

This work represents the views solely of the author(s). The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

LDC graduation delayed: Who really wins? by Anisuzzaman Chowdhury

LDC graduation delayed: Who really wins?

 The passage of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution (A/81/L.8) approving Bangladesh’s request for an extension of the preparatory period for its graduation from the least developed country (LDC) category by three more years has been greeted in Bangladesh with a sigh of relief.

Instead of the end of November 2026, as previously scheduled, Bangladesh and Nepal will now graduate from their LDC status in November 2029. There is a feeling that Bangladesh has been saved from an imminent catastrophe.

In granting the extension, the UNGA gave due consideration to the severity of the challenges faced by Bangladesh and Nepal amid heightened risks of uncertain magnitude stemming from recent conflicts and associated disruptions in international energy and supply flows, uncertainties concerning global trade, as well as the complexity and specific nature of the recent political transitions in both countries, which may affect the governments’ capacity to respond to external shocks.

A slap in the Interim Government’s face?

Readers of this column may recall that the Interim Government was in favour of Bangladesh’s scheduled LDC graduation on 24 November 2026. So, many will try to present the UNGA resolution as a slap in the face of the Interim Government.

I, who was given the responsibility as the Chief Adviser’s Special Assistant to guide the country’s preparations for LDC graduation, have an obligation to explain the circumstances and actions of the Interim Government.

First, the decision to stay on course was not taken in a vacuum or in a whimsical manner. It was based on rigorous analyses of facts and the recommendations of experts responsible for the White Paper on the state of the economy.

Second, the Interim Government did not sit idle; it prepared a “Smooth Transition Strategy” and accelerated its implementation.

Third, the UN assessed Bangladesh’s LDC graduation preparations in February 2025 and found, “The five interrelated pillars [of Interim Government’s strategy] offer a comprehensive framework to address immediate and long-term economic challenges, facilitating a smooth and sustainable transition.”

Fourth, the heightened uncertainties in the global economy due to the illegal US-Israel war on Iran and Trump’s unilateral, whimsical, so-called reciprocal tariffs were absent at the time of the Interim Government’s decision.

Fifth, the Interim Government invited the United Nations to independently assess Bangladesh’s preparations in anticipation of Trump-tariff-induced global uncertainties and in consideration of the impending change of government following the February national elections and the new government’s capacity to respond to external shocks. The UN’s assessment report has been the key document for the UNGA’s resolution in favour of the extension granted.

Sixth, the UNGA resolution explicitly endorsed the Interim Government’s preparation strategy when it “invites Bangladesh to advance domestic reforms and continue to implement, during the extended preparatory period … its national smooth transition strategy.”

The above facts clearly demonstrate that the Interim Government was on the right track. Those who are out to delegitimise the Interim Government have no leg to stand on.

A win for Bangladesh?

The extra three years for preparations could be a win for Bangladesh, provided it accelerates the implementation of the Interim Government’s reforms and Smooth Transition Strategy, as the UNGA resolution explicitly recommends.

One of the Interim Government’s key reforms has been the elimination of cash subsidies to industries according to a clear timeline. In the 2024-25 fiscal year, these amounted to approximately 16,000 crore taka in the form of direct cash subsidies and reduced taxes.

Besides being a post-LDC graduation requirement under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, the elimination of cash subsidies is an urgent imperative given Bangladesh’s low tax revenue collections, resulting in high debt accumulation.

The urgency of this measure also arises from the need to accelerate Bangladesh’s structural transformation away from overdependence on a single sector, ready-made garments (RMG).

The bulk of the cash incentives goes to the RMG sector, limiting the government’s ability to support other potential sectors, such as light engineering, electronics, agriculture and processed food, fisheries, pharmaceuticals, leather and footwear, jute and jute goods, plastics, and information and communication technology (ICT), identified by the Interim Government.

Professor Munir Quddus of Prairie View A&M University has exposed the RMG sector’s stranglehold on the economy by comparing the RMG sector’s policy support with that of the leather and other sectors, as summarised below:

The usual justification for such preferential treatment is that RMG is the “largest export sector and foreign exchange earner”. But the argument is perverse. Given that some of these subsidies have been in existence for nearly 50 years, prudent policymaking demands that scarce resources be redirected to support other potentially dynamic export sectors.

Unfortunately, this trend continues today. Out of the government’s 60,000 crore taka stimulus package for industries, announced in May this year, a paltry 3,000 crore taka has been allocated for export diversification. The first policy initiative of the new Bangladesh Bank Governor was to allow banks to advance loans to the RMG sector for paying wages. This defies the basic principle of economics, taught in the first year of undergraduate studies, that a firm’s revenue must cover variable costs, the bulk of which consists of wages, to minimise its losses.

One should seriously ask: why should this sector be protected when it cannot pay wages from its revenues despite being directly subsidised? Is this sector really helping the country by draining its scarce fiscal resources and weakening the country’s fragile banking sector, already saddled with non-performing loans owing mainly to it?

The UN resolution is a win for the RMG sector, which lobbied for a delay.

The government must withstand pressure from the RMG lobby to turn the respite given by the UN resolution into a win for Bangladesh.

It must “advance domestic reforms and continue to implement… national smooth transition strategy” developed by the Interim Government, as the UN resolution clearly advises.

Business as usual will take Bangladesh to a blind alley.

--

Emeritus Professor Anisuzzaman Chowdhury is a former Special Assistant (for the Ministry of Finance) to the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government, led by Professor Yunus. He held senior United Nations positions in Economic and Social Affairs in New York and Bangkok. Email: a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu.au; anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com.

My TV interview on Desi TV USA

 I was interviewed last week by Desi TV USA's Unzila, which you can view by clicking here:

Human Rights, Democracy & South Asian Politics | Dr. Habib Siddiqui Interview

If you like it, please, share it with others.

Thanks,

Habib Siddiqui

As Burmese Rohingya bleed, immigrants in Karachi share grief

 This is an old article, dating back to 2012, published in the Dawn, which I am resharing for readers.

=====

As Burmese Rohingya bleed, immigrants in Karachi share grief - Pakistan - DAWN.COM

As the world rallies in favour of non-violence and mobilises against unjust oppression, a small community in Pakistan’s largest city struggles to raise its voice: these are Karachi’s Rohingya Muslims – a small band of immigrants who managed to escape from the Burmese oppression when the time was right. Today, they helplessly look upon the citizens of the world for a gleam of hope as their kith and kin are persecuted in Myanmar’s Arakan province.

Mahmud, a Rohingya Muslim living in Karachi says that over 90,000 men, women and children have been left displaced in Arakan. “Many were pushed into the water whilst they were trying to escape to neighbouring Bangladesh and several were beaten to death. We know this because we have been using the internet to stay in touch,” he says.

Pakistan’s stance on this issue of contention remains shrouded. Following Tehrik-e-Taliban’s threat directed towards the governments of Myanmar and Pakistan, the Pakistani Foreign Office said in a brief statement on July 26 2012 that there were reports claiming that the situation in Arakan had improved.

This claim made by Pakistan’s Foreign Office goes against Amnesty International’s report on the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Arakan. The report states that ‘targeted attacks and other violations by security forces against minority Rohingyas and other Muslims have increased’ since emergency was declared six weeks ago and that ‘Amnesty International has also received credible reports of other human rights abuses against Rohingyas and other Rakhine Muslims– including physical abuse, rape, destruction of property, and unlawful killings – carried out by both Rakhine Buddhists and security forces.’

It goes on to state that the ‘authorities’ should prevent such acts from occurring. The solution proposed by these ‘authorities’, namely Myanmar’s President, runs along the lines of forcing the nation’s Rohingya Muslims numbering close to a million, into refugee camps run by UNHCR or deporting them to a third country.

But UNHCR has rejected President Thein Sein’s proposals, claiming that the solution to this conflict is that Arakan’s Rohingya Muslims should be granted citizenship of Myanmar. And third countries don’t seem to want the Rohingya Muslims either.

According to reports the Bangladeshi government has given orders to force back Rohingya refugees whilst Burma Campaign UK (BCUK) claims that Rohingya Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh “are getting no aid or protection, while thousands more are turned back by the government of Bangladesh, literally at gunpoint, in violation of international law.”

The justification put forward by the Bangladeshi government for their actions is that their country does not have the capacity to bear a large influx of refugees. Nevertheless, this does not constitute as a valid justification for forcing back destitute immigrants to a land where, according to the United Nations, they are subject to many forms of “persecution, discrimination and exploitation”.

Says Nurul Islam, Chairman of London based Arakan Rohingya National Organisation: “Under present circumstances, it is impossible to get the exact number of casualties. What is coming to the press is largely distorted. However, it is estimated that many hundreds of Rohingya Muslims have been gunned or killed down whilst thousands of homes have been destroyed. Those who are injured have no access to medical treatment. People are now dying of starvation and disease.”

“Do you know that the Rohingya settled in Arakan centuries ago?” asks Ismail, a resident of Karachi. “My grandparents migrated from Myanmar to Pakistan in 1962. That was their good fortune. The Rohingya Muslims in Arakan are fired at from helicopters. When they try to escape to Bangladesh in open boats, they are pushed back into the high seas. How can you possibly rely on a death toll that puts the numbers fatalities close to a hundred?”

Specialist in Burmese Ethnic Relations, Professor Abid Bahar’s book, Burma’s Missing Dots states that Arab traders began to settle both in Arakan and Chittagong of present-day Bangladesh from the years 785 to 957 and that Persian was made the official language of Arakan under General Wali Khan’s rule of the region in the year 1431. It goes on to mention that a British historian, Francis Buchanon Hamilton, met some Rohingya people in Burma conversing in a language they called Roinga in the year 1799. His colleague, Dr Habib Siddiqui’s book mentions similar facts.

The United Nations estimates that there are approximately 800,000 Rohingya Muslims in Arakan. Yet, Myanmar’s Citizenship Law of 1982 does not recognise the members of this ethnic group as citizens. They are thus stateless and protection-less within their own country.

A statement jointly released on this issue by 34 organizations including the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, BCUK and the International Federation for Human Rights states that Myanmar’s Citizenship Law is not compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or with Burma’s legal obligations under international treaties. Furthermore, the statement proposes that the 1982 Citizenship Law should be repealed, and replaced with a new law founded on basic principles of human rights, should honour equality and non-discrimination, and help create an inclusive and tolerant Burma.

A report published in 2006 by the Alternative Asean Network on Burma brings to light, unheard warnings sounded in the past. The report states that “the campaign of displacement, denial of culture and identity, restrictions on the right to marry and form a family, killings, rape, torture and denial of food are a slow-burning genocide”.

It also mentions United Nations Resolution 47/144 passed in December 1992 which urges the Government of Myanmar to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities. Twenty years post, the Rohingya community is languishing in Arakan.

“Official restrictions on the Rohingya including marriage and reproduction are relevant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The harsh responses by racist extremists, the traditional role of the authorities in targeting the Rohingya for abuses, the absence of independent witnesses and the UN in the area,  and Bangladesh's refusal to allow fleeing Rohingya to seek protection all point to the strong possibility of genocide,” says Debbie Stothard, coordinator of the Alternative Asean Network on Burma.

As the violence in Arakan escalates to new levels and the number of people displaced climbs, it has become increasingly evident that the time for action is ripe.

“The governments of Burma and Bangladesh need to allow provision of basic supplies to the displaced and free access to independent fact-finding teams to establish the facts. There have to be effective community relations mechanisms to resolve conflicts between individuals and groups and to prevent them from escalating,” says Debbie Stothard, regarding the path towards establishing stability in Arakan.

She adds: “Most importantly there has to be rule of law where the law is fair to all sides and is implemented impartially. Many laws must be reformed to reflect modern standards and values, including the Citizenship Law. I am extremely concerned that the lack of effective responses could lead to similar situations for other minority groups in the country.”

The government of Myanmar has allowed UN investigator Tomas Ojea Quintana to visit the volatile region from July 30 to August 4. This measure should serve as a precedent for Myanmar’s authorities. It is imperative that transparent international humanitarian organizations and journalists are granted access to Arakan in order to bring all forms of human rights abuse to a halt and provide Arakan’s impoverished inhabitants with much needed aid and protection. Only then will this crisis turn towards the path of resolution.

The author is a freelance contributor based in Karachi.

What’s Behind the Protests and Riots in France, and What Comes Next by CFR's Rafaela Uzan

  On September 17, teachers at the Antoine de Saint-Exupéry High School in Créteil, a southeastern suburb of Paris, went on strike to draw a...