Sunday, November 15, 2026

Amnesty International honours envoy who called Oct 7 a ‘response to oppression’

 

  • Award Recipient: UN envoy Francesca Albanese will receive Amnesty’s Ambassador of Conscience award on Dec 7 in Paris for speaking out about the Gaza conflict, despite her comments justifying the Oct 7 killings as a response to Israel’s oppression.
  • Public Backlash: Her remarks have drawn condemnation from France, Germany, human rights campaigners, and bereaved families, who argue the victims were targeted for being Jewish, making the award highly controversial.
  • Organizational Concerns: Leaked documents reveal internal worries that Amnesty’s credibility and donor confidence could be undermined due to perceived biases and mishandling of anti-Semitism concerns, highlighting risks to its global operations.

Amnesty International is to give its “highest honour” to a UN envoy who said the Oct 7 victims had been killed “in response to Israel’s oppression”.

Francesca Albanese, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied territories, will receive the Ambassador of Conscience award at a “highly confidential” ceremony in Paris on Dec 7, leaked correspondence has shown.

The 240-seat event, at which Javier Bardem, an Oscar-winning actor, will also be honoured, will be private for “security reasons”, according to an email seen by The Telegraph. Amnesty plans to use it to court donors.

Ms Albanese made her comments about the Oct 7 atrocities in 2024, when she disputed Emmanuel Macron’s description of the attack as the “greatest anti-Semitic massacre of our century”.

She wrote on X: “The victims of Oct 7 were not killed because of their Judaism, but in response to Israel’s oppression. France and the international community did nothing to prevent it. My respects to the victims.”

France and Germany condemned the post. Ms Albanese said she had repeatedly condemned Hamas’s crimes and that she rejected anti-Semitism, calling it “a global threat”.

News of the award has angered human rights campaigners, politicians and bereaved families. Adam Ma’anit, a British-Israeli man whose relatives were killed in the Hamas massacre, said it had made him “sick to my stomach”.

“After Hamas terrorists shot my cousin Tsachi’s daughter in the head, one said to her little sister that she was ‘with her God now’. Religion was most certainly on the minds of her murderers.

“My family were targeted because they were Jews living in their ancestral homeland. Amnesty honouring someone who justified their slaughter makes me sick to my stomach. This perverse ceremony needs to be stopped.”

Ms Albanese on a Facebook post in 2014, before her UN appointment,  described the US as having been “subjugated by the Jewish lobby”. She separately said that the BBC had the “Israeli lobby” in its “veins and system”.

This year’s recipients will be recognised for having “spoken out about the genocide in Gaza”, she added.

Ms Brigot said the ceremony would “generate more support for Amnesty, notably by reaching out to numbers of major donors or people who could become so”. She urged national directors to attend and to “work on bringing with you one or two of your major donors to secure support for our collective work”.

Amnesty has drawn criticism from governments and divided its own ranks in recent years. In 2022, its Ukraine chief resigned after the NGO accused Ukrainian troops of endangering civilians during Russia’s invasion.

Leaked documents have revealed concerns within Amnesty that “increasing hostility” towards the organisation was a major threat to its ability to operate.

A confidential risk assessment warned that the NGO could be forced to “reduce, alter, or worst – withdraw its physical presence” from some countries.

An Amnesty International spokesman said: “Amnesty International supports the independent work of UN special procedures, including the mandate of the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese.

“We stand with all those who face threats, intimidation, smear campaigns or unfounded attacks for documenting human-rights violations, seeking justice for victims, and working to prevent and end atrocity crimes. 

“Attempts to discredit or silence those carrying out legitimate human-rights work undermine accountability and the protection of human rights.

“Amnesty International takes allegations of anti-Semitism very seriously. Anti-Semitism is antithetical to human rights and has no place within our organisation. 

“We remain committed to ensuring that our movement’s culture, language and practices consistently reflect our human-rights principles.

“Regarding the question about Amnesty’s Ambassador of Conscience award, we are only able to comment on events that have been formally communicated through Amnesty’s official channels.”

ICJ to Rule on Myanmar Genocide Allegations in Landmark Case with Implications for Israel

 

TEHRAN (Tasnim) – The International Court of Justice is preparing to deliver a landmark ruling on Myanmar’s genocide against the Rohingya, a decision that could influence South Africa’s genocide case against the Israeli regime over Gaza.

The ICJ is set to deliver a landmark ruling on whether Myanmar committed genocide against its Rohingya Muslim minority, a decision that could have far-reaching implications for the separate genocide case brought by South Africa against the Israeli regime over its genocidal war on Gaza.

The ruling, expected Thursday in The Hague, will mark a critical moment in international law, as the world’s highest court has never directly found a state responsible for genocide, a crime defined in the aftermath of the Nazi-led Holocaust.

Nearly a decade after Myanmar’s military campaign forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims to flee across the border into Bangladesh, ICJ judges are preparing to deliver their judgment on accusations that the country violated the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.

The case was brought by The Gambia, a Muslim-majority country, which argues that Myanmar’s systematic repression and military operations against the Rohingya constituted genocide.

The judgment is also being closely watched for its potential implications for Israel, whose military campaign in Gaza has become the subject of a separate genocide case initiated by South Africa at the same court.

Both cases concern allegations of a powerful military targeting an ethnic or national group, with the ICJ now facing the task of determining how evidence of systematic violence, mass killings and the destruction of civilian communities establishes genocidal intent.

The Israeli regime, which has received extensive diplomatic and military backing from Washington, faces mounting international scrutiny over its conduct in Gaza, while the United States has increasingly moved against international institutions seeking to hold its allies accountable.

Against this backdrop, the Myanmar judgment could provide important indications of how the court approaches the legal threshold for establishing genocide and the responsibility of states.

Evidence of systematic violence

A central issue in the Myanmar proceedings has been proving the specific intent required under the Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as acts committed with the intention of destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

Antonia Mulvey, founder of Legal Action Worldwide (Law), an organization representing hundreds of Rohingya survivors, said she was “cautiously optimistic” that the court would hold Myanmar fully accountable.

She said patterns of government conduct demonstrated clear attempts to destroy the Rohingya community.

“The attacks on the villages took place the same way,” she said. “They would attack the civilians, burn the villages, separate men and women, conduct sexual violence … and then as they fled, they would continue to kill them.”

Mulvey also highlighted the significance of rape and other forms of sexual violence in establishing genocidal intent, saying her organization had collected testimonies describing soldiers mutilating women’s genitals and biting their faces.

“That’s to mark people, to brand them … it is also to stop reproduction,” she said.

“Yes, we would say sexual violence is a critical part to show their intent to destroy the group,” she added.

“You don’t need to gang-rape people. You don’t need to kill their children in front of them. You don’t need to mutilate them. You don’t need to do it in public. What is the purpose of that? The purpose is to destroy the group.”

In January, the ICJ held closed-door sessions to hear directly from Rohingya survivors who had travelled from refugee camps in Bangladesh.

According to Law, one witness described how her child was taken from her arms, stabbed and thrown into a fire, while another recounted seeing piles of bodies in a mass grave.

During the hearings, Gambian Justice Minister Dawda Jallow stressed that the proceedings concerned the fate of an entire population rather than abstract legal questions.

“This is not about esoteric issues of international law,” Jallow told the court.

“It is about real people, real stories and a real group of human beings,” he said. “The Rohingya of Myanmar. They have been targeted for destruction.”

A history of persecution and military atrocities

The allegations against Myanmar stem from decades of persecution, discrimination and the systematic denial of citizenship to the Rohingya, who have faced increasingly severe restrictions and violence in the country’s western Rakhine state.

The crisis escalated in 2017 after a Rohingya militant group launched guerrilla-style attacks, prompting the Myanmar military to carry out what it described as “clearance operations.”

The military campaign forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee into neighboring Bangladesh.

Refugees who escaped in 2017 told the Guardian about a massacre in the village of Tula Toli, where survivors described systematic shootings of civilians, including children being drowned in a river.

Satellite imagery subsequently showed that the village had been razed, reinforcing accounts of widespread destruction collected by investigators documenting the alleged genocide.

The ICJ has previously considered cases involving mass atrocities in the Balkans, but those proceedings stopped short of finding states directly responsible for genocide.

Serbia, however, was found legally responsible for failing to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica.

A finding against Myanmar would increase international pressure on Min Aung Hlaing, who led the military during the 2016-2017 attacks and later seized power in a 2021 coup that overthrew the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.

The coup triggered a civil war that has killed tens of thousands of people.

Min Aung Hlaing is also under investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over allegations of crimes against humanity.

Unlike the ICJ, which rules on disputes between states, the ICC prosecutes individuals.

The former general was installed as civilian president in April following elections widely condemned as a sham and has sought to rebuild Myanmar’s diplomatic relations.

US opposition to international accountability

The Myanmar proceedings are unfolding amid growing tensions between Washington and international human rights institutions.

The United States has taken an increasingly confrontational approach toward international judicial bodies, including imposing sanctions on the ICC.

Although the Biden administration formally recognized the Rohingya atrocities as genocide, Trump’s UN ambassador, Mike Waltz, warned that the ICJ “must not be allowed” to establish a standard for genocide that could be applied to “allied soldiers.”

The warning has particular significance for Israeli military personnel, given the genocide proceedings against the Israeli regime over its actions in Gaza.

Washington’s position has raised further questions about the extent to which political alliances and military partnerships influence international efforts to enforce accountability for alleged war crimes and genocide.

Supporters of the Myanmar case argue that a genocide ruling should prompt countries to halt arms transfers and supplies of jet fuel that could facilitate further military atrocities.

Although the ICJ lacks its own enforcement mechanism, its judgments carry considerable legal and political weight and could be reinforced through the UN Security Council.

However, divisions among major powers, particularly the United States and China, could prevent meaningful enforcement measures.

Rohingya seek justice and recognition

The consequences of the Myanmar military campaign remain devastating for the Rohingya population.

More than 1 million Rohingya refugees remain in Bangladesh, where they live in the world’s largest refugee settlement, while fewer than 600,000 are estimated to remain inside Myanmar.

Yanghee Lee, a former UN rights investigator on Myanmar, described the upcoming ruling as a historic opportunity for survivors and their families.

“The ICJ ruling will be historic for Rohingya survivors and their families around the world,” she said.

“The international community failed to prevent Myanmar military atrocities against the Rohingya nine years ago. It must seize this opportunity to finally secure justice for the Rohingya and begin to reckon with these failings.”

For Rohingya survivors, the ruling represents a long-awaited opportunity to secure recognition of the atrocities committed against their community and establish international responsibility.

A displaced Rohingya living inside Myanmar told the Guardian that he hoped the judgment would “help end decades of persecution and discrimination.”

“We are not asking for sympathy alone,” he said. “We are asking for justice, recognition, equal rights and a future in which our children can live safely and with dignity in their own homeland.”

The ruling will therefore carry significance beyond Myanmar, as its treatment of genocidal intent, systematic violence and state responsibility could help shape the legal framework applied to other cases, including South Africa’s genocide case against the Israeli regime over the genocide in Gaza.

Saturday, November 14, 2026

'You cannot build peace on a burning planet,’ UN chief tells Cop31 in farewell speech

 Click here to read: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2026/nov/13/cop31-antonio-guterres-united-nations-climate-action 

Genocide BEYOND ONLY INTENT - The ICJ's Erroneous Standard for Proof of Genocide

 BEYOND ONLY INTENT

 

By Dr. Gregory Stanton and the Genocide Watch Legal Team: Fitry Hamidah, Htet Htet Hliang, Anita Lesniak, Maximilian Millington, Emma Op het Veld, Tami Tasaki, Aymen Zehra, Natalie Kasper, and Omar Kausar

 

November 13, 2026

 

Executive Summary

 

The International Court of Justice has never held that a state has directly violated the Genocide Convention. The ICJ adopted an erroneous standard to prove intent in the only genocide cases it has tried, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007) and Croatia v. Serbia (2015).

In both cases, The ICJ ruled that genocide must be the ONLY INTENT of a state for the ICJ to hold that genocide was conclusively proven.

 

Because Serbia’s intent in both cases included “ethnic cleansing” (forced displacement), genocide was not Serbia’s ONLY INTENT. Therefore, the ICJ ruled that it could not hold that Serbia’s intent to commit genocide was conclusively proven. Serbia was not found to have violated the Genocide Convention.

 

The Genocide Convention does not require that intent to destroy a protected group must be the ONLY INTENT of a state. It is time to correct this error of law made in the ICJ’s Bosnia and Croatia cases.

 

If this fundamental error of law is not corrected, the Genocide Convention will be unenforceable against states in all future cases.

 

The ONLY INTENT doctrine and the ‘Only Reasonable Inference’ test must not defeat the Circumstantial Inference of Genocidal Intent in The Gambia v Myanmar case at the International Court of Justice.

 

Introduction

 

Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), requires a determination that acts of genocide are committed by an individual or a state with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.

 

Unlike other international crimes, the occurrence of one or more of the prohibited acts of genocide is not enough to prove commission of the crime of genocide. A disputing state accusing another state of violating the Genocide Convention must also prove that such acts were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy a protected group.

 

Since evidence of genocidal intent is often not explicit in clear statements by an individual or the leaders of a state, the ICTY, ICTR, and other international courts have recognized that intent to destroy a particular group may be inferred from patterns of conduct and the surrounding circumstances of actions. In analogous criminal law, such an inference may be proven by “circumstantial” evidence.

 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that, when genocidal intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, the intent to destroy a group in whole or in part must be the ONLY reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence. This doctrine has come to be known as the ONLY INTENT test.

 

The Court repeated this test of intent in Croatia v. Serbia (2015). The ONLY INTENT doctrine sets a very high evidentiary threshold, making it almost impossible to prove genocidal intent to destroy a specific group. Especially for states, such specific intent usually coexists with military, political, or territorial intents.

 

The ONLY INTENT doctrine raises a crucial question: should the existence of another reasonable intent by a state automatically rule out genocidal intent?

 

This article argues that the ICJ’s “only reasonable inference” approach should be reconsidered and modified in its judgment in the Gambia v. Myanmar case. The court should correct its rulings in the Bosnia and Croatia cases and hold that genocidal intent, intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part, can be conclusively proven even though it coexists with other intents.

 

II. What is the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard? 

 

To understand the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard, it is necessary to look at the laws of evidence in proving genocidal intent. The ICTR and ICTY only tried individuals, not states. These courts characterized the specific intent for genocide as “the conscious desire to achieve the destruction of the targeted group through the commission of the prohibited acts” (Akayesu, paras. 544-547; KupreÅ¡kić, para. 636). The destruction of the targeted group, in whole or in part, concerns the intent with which the prohibited acts are committed, not the actual outcome of those acts (Krstić, para. 584).

 

Establishing specific intent to destroy a group presents considerable evidentiary challenges. Direct evidence or explicit manifestations of genocidal intent are rarely available. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Krstić recognized that the perpetrator may be prevented from putting a genocidal plan “into action in the most direct and efficient way” due to international attention and instead be forced to adopt “the method which would allow them to implement the genocidal design while minimizing the risk of retribution.” (Krstić Appeals, para. 32).

 

Accordingly, the ICTR and ICTY accepted that the intent may be inferred from the context, scale, systematic targeting and surrounding circumstances of actions (Akayesu, para. 523; Jelisić Appeals, para. 47; Rutaganda Appeals, para. 525). The ICTY in Tolimir recognized that genocidal intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (Tolimir, para. 745).

 

In Bosnia v. Serbia,the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accepted that dolus specialis may be inferred through circumstantial evidence, but it set a demanding threshold. In Bosnia v. Serbia, the Court held that, “for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent” (Bosnia, para. 373, emphasis added).

 

The ICJ’s stated rationale was that allegations of exceptional gravity against a State must be established by evidence that is “fully conclusive” (Bosnia, para. 209). A policy of “ethnic cleansing”, and the operations to implement it, cannot as such be conclusively proven to amount to intent to commit genocide.” (Bosnia, para. 190).

 

By requiring a “fully conclusive” standard of proof, the ICJ imposed a standard normally only required in criminal trials: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard had never been applied in the ICJ before Bosnia v. Serbia.

 

The ICJ is not a criminal court. It is a court that decides disputes between states. In all its other cases, it used the usual standard of proof in civil cases: the preponderance of the evidence.

 

In Bosnia v. Serbia, for the massacre of over 8000 men and boys in Srebrenica, the ICJ relied on ICTY judgments which stated that the systematic execution of Bosnian Muslim males and the decision of the Bosnian Serb leadership to destroy the Srebrenica community (Bosnia, paras. 290–297; Krstić Appeals, paras. 25–37) were proof of genocidal intent. Intent was established by evidence of a command-level decision as well as by the pattern of conduct of Bosnian Serb troops.

 

For killings outside Srebrenica, the ICJ was not convinced that intent to destroy was conclusively proven, because the conduct of Serbia was also consistent with the intent of “ethnic cleansing” (Bosnia, paras. 276–277, paras. 370–376), the crime against humanity of forced displacement  of a group out of the territory it occupied.

 

[It is telling that the ICJ used “ethnic cleansing”, the euphemism invented by the MiloÅ¡ević regime itself to deny it was committing genocide. By 2007, the ICTY had obtained the records of the Serbian central command in Belgrade that proved a pattern of intentional genocidal conduct by Serbia. In 2007, Dr. Gregory Stanton, President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), at an IAGS meeting in Sarajevo, asked the Prosecutor at the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte why, knowing that the ICJ was considering Bosnia v Serbia, she did not take these records across town in the Hague to the ICJ. She replied, “Because they didn’t ask.”]

 

In Croatia v. Serbia, the Court reaffirmed that genocidal intent must be “the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the pattern of conduct” (para. 148). The ICJ noted that “the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such is specific to genocide.”

 

Because destruction of a group, in whole or in part, is the intent required to prove genocide, isolated acts without a proven pattern are not sufficient to prove genocidal intent. In the absence of such direct proof, the ICJ required evidence of a pattern of conduct or acts on a scale that “establishes an intent not only to target certain individuals because of their membership in a particular group, but also to destroy the group itself in whole or in part.” (Croatia, para. 139 and 148).

 

Applying this reasoning, the ICJ accepted the fact that prohibited acts under Article II of the Genocide Convention had occurred. However, the ICJ held that such acts were also consistent with the alternative intent to “ethnically cleanse” (forcibly displace) Bosnians and Croats from territory they lived in. “Ethnic cleansing” is a euphemism for forced displacement. The goal of the Bosnian Serb forces was to create a Serb-dominated territory that could reunite with Serbia.

 

The ICJ similarly held that intent to destroy was not the ONLY reasonable inference (Croatia v. Serbia, paras. 425–430) of acts by Serb forces and Serbia. Therefore, Serbia’s intent to commit genocide had not been conclusively proven.

 

While both the ICJ and the international criminal tribunals have relied on the ‘reasonable inference’ approach, they have applied it dramatically differently. In determining individual intent, the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, ICC and other international criminal tribunals have applied the reasonable-inference rule to individuals as part of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed genocide. But these tribunals have never insisted that genocide be the ONLY INTENT of the defendants.

 

In trials of individuals at these international tribunals, the defendant was often charged with several crimes requiring different intents. Defendants have been convicted of both crimes against humanity and genocide in the same trials.

 

In contrast, the ICJ has judged the intent of states, using a “fully conclusive” standard of proof, to determine whether intent to destroy a protected group was the ONLY INTENT of the state charged with violating the Genocide Convention. That standard to prove intent led the ICJ to rule in both Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia that there was insufficient proof that Serbia had violated the Genocide Convention.

 

In Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia, the ICJ ruled that although Serbia may have aided and abetted or been complicit in the crime against humanity of forced displacement (“ethnic cleansing”), genocide was not Serbia’s ONLY INTENT. Therefore, Serbia could not be found responsible for committing genocide.

 

Viewed in the context of State responsibility, the ONLY INTENT test makes the Genocide Convention unenforceable against States.

 

States always have more than one intent for their actions. They have multiple leaders and many policies. States also do not have “minds”, making analogies to “mens rea” inapplicable.

 

The implications of the ONLY INTENT test will become apparent in the ICJ's subsequent cases. In Gambia v. Myanmar and Ukraine v. Russia, application of the ONLY INTENT test will doom plaintiffs to defeat.

 

Across the cases, although the actus reus may be established, genocidal intent can be found only where evidence tied it to statements or documented policies of a decision-making authority. Otherwise, forced displacement or “ethnic cleansing” will be an alternative inference that defeats genocidal intent.

 

Although the ICJ in Bosnia and Croatia did not expressly hold these alternative intents to be legally incompatible with genocidal intent, the ICJ’s application of the ONLY INTENT test treated them as mutually exclusive.

 

III. Can genocidal intent coexist with other intentions?

 

The question is whether the ICJ can modify its rulings in those cases to clarify that an additional alternate inference of intent based on the same conduct can coexist with conclusive proof of genocidal intent.

 

The ‘only reasonable inference’ standard overlooks the case law in international jurisprudence that acknowledges that genocidal intent can coexist with other intents. The ICJ clarified that “the specific intent is also to be distinguished from other reasons or motives the perpetrator may have.” (Bosnia v. Serbia, para.189). This point had already been highlighted in previous judgements (Kayishema and Ruzindana, para. 161; BlaÅ¡kić, para.694).

 

The international tribunals have pointed out that intent should not be confused with motive. In Jelisić, the Appeals Chamber held that “the personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide” (para.49; see also Krnojelac, para.102).

 

Similarly, in Karera the Trial Chamber confirmed that the accused does not need to be “solely motivated by a genocidal intent and having a personal motive will not preclude such a specific intent” (para.534). The motive and genocidal intent can coexist, and often other motives are used by the perpetrator to obscure the genocidal intent.

 

The coexistence of military objectives and genocidal intent is a frequent example of a “parallel intent”, since genocide is often committed during armed conflict. Article I of the Genocide Convention prohibits genocide “whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.”

 

In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber confirmed that genocide can occur during an armed conflict, and it elaborated that “the execution of this genocide was probably facilitated by the conflict” by using the conflict “as a pretext for the propaganda inciting genocide against the Tutsi” (para.127).

 

Srebrenica illustrates both “instrumental” and “overlapping” intent. Even if the initial intents were both military conquest and forced displacement, genocide was “part of the means to achieve the objective” of clearing the territory of its Bosnian Muslim population (Mladić, para.4987; see also Krstić Trial, para.572).

 

“Overlapping intent” arises where the same acts serve both genocidal and other objectives. Bosnian Serb troops killing Bosnian Muslim fighters served a military objective. Yet Bosnian Serb forces went further and killed almost all ‘military-age’ men and boys in Srebrenica, most of whom were civilians.

 

The Appeals Chamber in Krstić (para. 26) and the ICJ (Bosnia v. Serbia, para. 292) found that this course of action could only be explained as intended to destroy part of a national, ethnic, and religious group. Thus, international jurisprudence clearly recognizes that genocidal intent can coexist with other intents. Their simultaneous co-existence does not rule out genocidal intent.

 

 

IV. The ‘only reasonable inference’ standard must not exclude multiple intents.

 

If the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard is interpreted to require that genocidal intent be the exclusive plausible explanation for a particular pattern of conduct, establishing such intent would become nearly impossible. The available evidence will nearly always support multiple reasonable inferences rather than solely point to genocidal intent. 

 

Proof of genocidal intent requires the Court to assess competing explanations for conduct. The existence of another intent does not establish that the specific intent required for genocide was absent.

 

A political objective may explain the broader purpose of a military operation without resolving whether the military forces also intended to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part. The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence supporting the alternative explanation genuinely excludes genocidal intent, rather than whether an other intent precludes intent to commit genocide.

 

In The Gambia v. Myanmar, Myanmar’s characterization of its operations in Rakhine State as security measures raises precisely this question: whether a counter-insurgency objective can, by itself, exclude an inference of genocidal intent.

 

In its written observations in the same proceedings, Belgium argues that the pursuit of a military objective is not sufficient to preclude the identification of genocidal intent. The Court must therefore assess any alternative explanation against evidence of intentional group destruction, including the pattern of conduct directed at the protected group, rather than treating the existence of a security objective as decisive of the question of specific intent.

 

Most allegations of genocide have arisen within the context of an armed conflict, as evidenced by the recent institution of proceedings at the ICJ (South Africa v. Israel; The Gambia v. Myanmar; Ukraine v. Russian Federation). If genocidal intent can never coexist with another reasonably inferred intent, situations involving complex armed conflicts will systematically fail to satisfy proof of accompanying genocide. 

 

This outcome is not merely problematic for enforcement. It is also directly at odds with the history and purpose of the Genocide Convention, which seeks to prevent and punish the crime of genocide.

 

Interpreting the ‘only reasonable inference’ test to mean that the existence of other intents automatically precludes a finding of genocidal intent, will ultimately facilitate State impunity for committing a crime that constitutes one of the gravest threats against humanity.

 

Following the ONLY INTENT doctrine announced by the ICJ in its Bosnia and Croatia cases will lead to the destruction of the enforceability of the Genocide Convention against its Contracting Parties, weakening States’ accountability for their role in the commission of genocide (Dissenting Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 144 & 467).

 

V. Developing jurisprudence in Gambia v. Myanmar

 

The International Court of Justice has announced that it will deliver its judgement in The Gambia v. Myanmar on 19 November 2026.

 

The ‘only reasonable inference’ standard and the ONLY INTENT doctrine are at the heart of this case.

 

The Gambia alleges that Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention by committing acts of genocide against the Rohingya and by failing to prevent and punish genocide. Its case relies substantially on the 444 page detailed report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (FFM), which identified seven indicators from which an intent to destroy the Rohingya, in whole or in part, could reasonably be inferred (The Gambia’s Memorial, para. 4.50).

 

These included “the Myanmar Army’s [Tatmadaw’s] extreme brutality”, “the organized nature”, “the enormity and nature of the sexual violence”, “racist and exclusionary utterances”, “discriminatory plans and policies”, “tolerance for public rhetoric of hatred and contempt”, and “failure to investigate and prosecute gross violations” of international law (FFM Report, 2019, para 224). The Gambia argues that, taken cumulatively, this pattern of conduct supports the inference that Myanmar acted with the intent to destroy the Rohingya group, in whole or in part, as such (The Gambia’s Memorial, para. 12.104).

 

Myanmar, in rebuttal, maintains that the alleged genocidal acts occurred during counter-terrorism operations directed against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and its supporters. ARSA’s attacks threatened Myanmar’s civilians and national security (Myanmar’s Counter-Memorial, paras. 8.12, 13.96). Myanmar argues that these alternative explanations prevent genocidal intent from being the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from its actions. (paras. 13.76-13.79).

 

As discussed above, international jurisprudence recognizes that genocidal intent may coexist with other intents. The intervening Republic of Ireland expressly highlights this distinction, observing that “[t]hat the pattern of conduct could only point to the existence of such intent is not to say that it could point to such intent only” (Declaration of Intervention by Ireland, para. 36).

 

The Joint Intervening States further emphasize that alternative explanations must be reasonable and that the evidence must be assessed as a whole.  The existence of a counter-insurgency objective should not in itself rule out an inference of genocidal intent. (Written Observations of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, paras. 43, 45).

 

VI. Conclusion

 

For these reasons, Genocide Watch considers that the ‘only reasonable inference’ standard should be reformulated to protect the purpose and enforcement of the Genocide Convention. Multiple intentions for a state’s acts may coexist without an alternative intent nullifying the specific intent to commit genocide. The ICJ should clarify that the existence of another intent for a state’s acts does not necessarily preclude a finding of genocidal intent.

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

Dr. Gregory H. Stanton

Founding President, Genocide Watch

Chair, The Alliance Against Genocide

Amnesty International honours envoy who called Oct 7 a ‘response to oppression’

  Award Recipient: UN envoy Francesca Albanese will receive Amnesty’s Ambassador of Conscience award on Dec 7 in Paris for speaking out abou...