Sunday, August 16, 2026
An Appeal - search for missing persons
My classmate, Cadet Arshad Jamal, is one of the few survivors of the horrific massacre of the Bihari community in Shantahar on April 17–18, 1971, during the War of Liberation. His father (Abdul Ahad) — shown seated at the center in the photograph — had passed away three months before the turmoil engulfed East Pakistan, spared from witnessing the unspeakable violence that would soon claim so many lives.
Arshad himself — shown standing on the left corner in the picture — survived only because one of our cadetmates, Ruhul Rabban (Baten), risked everything to save him. Ruhul Rabban sheltered Arshad and his immediate younger brother Kokab (not shown in the picture below) for two months (in his village home, 80 km from Naogaon/Shantahar), protecting them until in May when Pakistan military sheltered them. He and Kokab later lived with close relatives in Dhaka before moving to Pakistan.
Arshad’s older brother (Manzar) — standing on the right corner — also survived the Shantahar tragedy and later settled in Karachi, where he passed away of natural causes. One of Arshad’s sisters, Tahera — standing in the middle among her sisters — was in Dhaka during the Holocaust and survived; she too later died in Karachi. Another older brother, Zubair Ahmed (sitting next to his father), who was in Dhaka, serving PIA, also survived.
But the fate of the rest of his family remains shrouded in uncertainty and grief.
Arshad fears that his mother (Khadija Khatoon) — seated in the photograph — and his two sisters, Shahnaz (about 22 years old at the time, a B.Com student at Eden Girls' College, Dhaka, shown standing next to his brother Manzar) and Sarwarnaz (then 16 years old, shown standing next to him), as well as his youngest brother Nayyer (about 8 years old and not pictured), may have been killed during the violence. Yet he has never been able to confirm what truly happened to them.
For decades, Arshad has been searching — desperately, tirelessly — for any trace of his lost family in Bangladesh. Their disappearance remains an open wound, a story unfinished, a grief without closure.
If you have any information about the Abdul Ahad/Jamal family of Shantahar — survivors, witnesses, neighbors, or anyone who may have known them — please contact me. Even the smallest detail may help bring long‑awaited answers to a man who has carried this burden for more than half a century.
Thank you.
Habib Siddiqui
(Arshad can be directly contacted at Arshadjamal137@yahoo.com)
Why Was General M. A. G. Osmani Absent from the Pakistani Surrender Ceremony on 16 December 1971?
My cousin Razib Razzaq asked the question in the title above, and here below is the draft prepared by AI on the answer that I want to share below from him. - HS
==========
An examination of the documented facts, conflicting accounts, and the unanswered historical questions
On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani Eastern Command formally surrendered in Dhaka, bringing the Bangladesh Liberation War to its decisive conclusion. The ceremony at the Ramna Race Course has become one of the most iconic moments in South Asian history. Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi signed the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of Pakistan, while Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora accepted it on behalf of the Indian and Bangladesh forces.
Yet one conspicuous figure was missing: Major General M. A. G. Osmani, Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Forces.
His absence has generated questions for decades. Was he prevented from reaching Dhaka because his helicopter was attacked? Was the incident simply an unfortunate consequence of the chaotic final hours of the war? Or was there a political or military decision that resulted in Bangladesh’s principal military commander not participating in the surrender ceremony?
The available evidence does not permit a definitive answer. But it does allow us to distinguish between what is firmly established and what remains disputed.
The historical context
By the morning of 16 December, the military position of Pakistan’s Eastern Command had become untenable. Indian and Bangladeshi forces had encircled Dhaka, while Pakistani forces throughout East Pakistan were surrendering or withdrawing.
At approximately 1 p.m., Major General J. F. R. Jacob, Chief of Staff of India’s Eastern Command, reached Dhaka and continued negotiations concerning the surrender. The ceremony was eventually arranged for the Ramna Race Course. The decision to hold a public ceremony was significant: Jacob wanted the surrender to occur before the people of Dhaka rather than privately inside Niazi’s headquarters. (Liberation War Museum)
The final Instrument of Surrender stated that the Pakistan Eastern Command would surrender all Pakistani Armed Forces in Bangladesh to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, described in the document as the commander of the “Indian and BANGLA DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre.” (Wikisource)
Thus, Bangladesh was explicitly included in the surrender arrangement.
But Bangladesh’s Commander-in-Chief was not present.
Where was General Osmani?
This is the point at which the historical record becomes less clear.
The most widely cited explanation comes from the Indian commander J. F. R. Jacob. In his account of the surrender, Jacob stated that a helicopter sent to bring Osmani to Dhaka was damaged by hostile fire and consequently could not be used to bring him to the ceremony.
Jacob later repeated the basic explanation in interviews: Osmani was supposed to attend, but the helicopter associated with his journey came under fire and became unavailable.
If this account is accepted, Osmani’s absence was essentially the result of the extraordinary conditions of the final hours of the war.
However, this explanation does not answer every question.
The available account does not conclusively establish the precise location of the incident, the identity of those who fired on the helicopter, the exact extent of the damage, or why another aircraft could not subsequently have been arranged.
These gaps have encouraged alternative interpretations.
The alternative interpretation
Some Bangladeshi writers and commentators have questioned the helicopter explanation. One line of argument maintains that Osmani was in the broader Sylhet/Comilla area and had access to air transportation, and that his failure to reach Dhaka involved more than simply an accidental attack on his helicopter.
Some have gone further and suggested that Indian military authorities did not make sufficient efforts to ensure Osmani’s participation—or even that his absence was politically convenient.
Such claims, however, need to be treated cautiously.
There is no conclusive documentary evidence establishing that India deliberately ordered Osmani to be excluded from the surrender ceremony.
Therefore, it would be historically irresponsible to present deliberate exclusion as an established fact.
At the same time, the existence of unanswered questions means that the helicopter explanation should not automatically be treated as the final word either.
What happened when Osmani could not attend?
The Bangladesh government needed someone to represent the Bangladesh Forces at the ceremony.
That responsibility fell to Air Commodore A. K. Khandker, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Forces.
Khandker later recalled that he was in Kolkata when he was informed that Pakistan would surrender that day and that he had to represent Bangladesh and the Mukti Bahini at the Race Course. He travelled to Dhaka and attended the ceremony. (bdnews24.com)
Photographs from the ceremony show Khandker standing behind Aurora and Niazi, along with other military officers. (Wikimedia Commons)
This is an important correction to a common misunderstanding: Bangladesh was not unrepresented at the ceremony. Bangladesh was represented by Khandker.
But Khandker was not Osmani.
Why did Osmani’s absence matter?
Osmani was not merely another Bangladeshi officer.
He was the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Forces.
For nine months, the Mukti Bahini had fought Pakistan’s military forces, with India entering the war directly in December. Osmani therefore occupied an extraordinarily important military and symbolic position.
His presence at the surrender could have carried enormous significance.
Imagine the historical photograph differently: Osmani standing beside Aurora while Niazi signed the surrender of the Pakistani Eastern Command.
That image would have emphasized not only India’s military victory over Pakistan, but also the role of the Bangladesh Liberation Forces and their own commander in the creation of the new state.
Instead, the iconic photograph shows Aurora and Niazi signing the document, with Bangladeshi and Indian officers standing behind them.
That distinction is historically significant.
Who actually signed the Instrument of Surrender?
The answer is unequivocal.
The two principal signatories were:
Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora
and
Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi.
The official document does not contain Osmani’s signature or Khandker’s signature. (Wikisource)
The wording, however, is important.
Aurora’s designation on the document was:
“General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre.”
And the document stated that Pakistan’s Eastern Command was surrendering all Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh to Aurora in that capacity. (Wikisource)
Therefore, it would be inaccurate to describe the document simply as a surrender “to India.”
The formal language explicitly included Bangladesh forces.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that no Bangladeshi commander signed the principal instrument.
An important clue from the ceremony itself
There is another interesting detail.
According to A. K. Khandker’s later recollection, when he reached the Race Course, a table had been prepared with two chairs for Aurora and Niazi. (bdnews24.com)
This is sometimes presented as evidence that the ceremony was designed from the beginning as an India-Pakistan surrender ceremony.
But this conclusion is not necessarily justified.
The two chairs may simply have reflected the fact that the two commanders actually signing the document were Aurora and Niazi.
Therefore, this detail is interesting, but it does not prove that Osmani was deliberately excluded.
The Indian perspective is also important
It would be too simplistic to assume that all questions about Osmani’s absence originated with Bangladeshi critics of India.
Indian diplomatic and military accounts have themselves acknowledged the political sensitivity of Osmani’s absence.
The problem was obvious: Bangladesh had fought its own war of liberation, and Osmani was the commander of its armed forces. Ensuring his presence—or, at minimum, ensuring that a senior Bangladeshi commander had an unmistakable role in the surrender—would have been politically and symbolically valuable.
The fact that Khandker was brought in to represent Bangladesh demonstrates that the Bangladeshi side understood the importance of having a representative present.
What can we establish with confidence?
A careful examination produces the following hierarchy of evidence.
Established facts
1. Osmani was not present at the surrender ceremony.
2. A. K. Khandker represented Bangladesh at the ceremony.
3. Aurora and Niazi were the principal signatories of the Instrument of Surrender.
4. The document explicitly described Aurora as commander of the Indian and Bangladesh forces.
5. Bangladesh therefore was explicitly incorporated into the surrender arrangement, even though a Bangladeshi officer did not sign the principal document. (Wikisource)
Strongly reported but not completely independently established
6. Osmani was expected or intended to attend the ceremony.
7. A helicopter associated with bringing him to Dhaka was damaged by gunfire.
8. J. F. R. Jacob attributed the incident to hostile fire.
Claims that remain unproven
9. India deliberately prevented Osmani from attending.
10. The helicopter incident was fabricated.
11. The surrender ceremony was deliberately designed to erase or minimize Bangladesh’s military role.
The last three propositions remain interpretations or allegations rather than established historical facts.
The central unanswered question
The most interesting question may not actually be:
“Who shot at Osmani’s helicopter?”
A deeper question is:
“Why was Bangladesh’s Commander-in-Chief not already in Dhaka when the surrender of the Pakistani Eastern Command was being finalized?”
By 16 December, surrender was clearly imminent. The Indian and Bangladeshi commands had been communicating about the rapidly developing situation.
Given Osmani’s position, it would have been reasonable to expect that arrangements would have been made to ensure his presence.
If the helicopter incident was genuinely unexpected, then his absence may simply have been an unfortunate consequence of the chaotic circumstances.
But if the leadership knew in advance that he might not reach Dhaka, why was a more reliable alternative not arranged?
That is a legitimate historical question.
Was the surrender an Indian surrender or a Bangladesh-India joint surrender?
The answer depends partly on whether we are discussing the military reality, the legal wording, or the symbolism of the ceremony.
Militarily
The war had become a combined Bangladesh-India military effort by December 1971.
In the surrender document
Bangladesh is explicitly named. Aurora is identified as commander of the Indian and Bangladesh forces. (Wikisource)
Symbolically
The photograph and signatures prominently show Aurora and Niazi.
That distinction explains why the ceremony has generated debate.
The document recognized Bangladesh’s forces, but the ceremony’s most visible representation of the victorious command was an Indian general.
Both statements can therefore be true at the same time:
Bangladesh was formally included in the surrender, while India’s military role was visually and institutionally dominant at the ceremony.
A balanced historical conclusion
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that General M. A. G. Osmani was deliberately prevented from attending the surrender ceremony.
The helicopter incident described by J. F. R. Jacob should not simply be dismissed as a fabricated story. It appears in the historical record and has been repeated by people directly involved in the surrender process.
At the same time, the available evidence does not completely explain the incident. Important details concerning the helicopter, the alleged gunfire, the location, and the subsequent failure to bring Osmani to Dhaka remain unclear.
Consequently, the most defensible historical position is neither:
“Osmani was definitely deliberately excluded,”
nor:
“There is nothing mysterious about his absence.”
The evidence supports a more cautious conclusion:
General Osmani’s absence was real; the helicopter incident provides a plausible explanation, but the circumstances surrounding that incident and the failure to ensure the presence of Bangladesh’s Commander-in-Chief remain insufficiently documented. There is no conclusive evidence that he was deliberately excluded, but there are legitimate historical questions about why his participation was not secured.
Perhaps the most important point is that the absence of Osmani does not diminish the role of the Mukti Bahini or the people of Bangladesh in the Liberation War.
The Instrument of Surrender itself recognized the forces as “Indian and BANGLA DESH forces.” The Pakistani Eastern Command surrendered all its forces in Bangladesh under the command of Aurora in that capacity. (Wikisource)
Yet history is not only about legal wording. It is also about symbols.
And on one of the most important days in Bangladesh’s history, the absence of the commander who had led its armed forces remains a question worthy of careful historical investigation.
Sources and documentary references
* The Instrument of Surrender, including its original wording and signatures. (Wikisource)
* Liberation War Museum, chronology of 16 December 1971 and the surrender preparations. (Liberation War Museum)
* A. K. Khandker’s recollection of representing Bangladesh at the Race Course. (bdnews24.com)
* The Daily Star, historical account of the surrender arrangements and Osmani’s absence. (The Daily Star)
* Contemporary Indian reporting on the surrender. (Bharat-Rakshak.com)
Historical caution: Accounts concerning Osmani’s helicopter and the reasons for his absence should be presented as competing accounts unless supported by contemporaneous primary documentation. Claims of deliberate exclusion should not be presented as established fact without such evidence.
Top Israeli Official’s Call to Murder ‘30 to 40’ Each Night in Gaza Again Exposes Israeli Genocide
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization, today said remarks by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir advocating the killing of “30 to 40” people in Gaza every night provide further evidence of genocidal intent and underscore the urgent need for the United States to end its support for Israel’s military campaign.
Ben-Gvir said in a podcast conversation that he believes Israel should conduct targeted assassinations in Gaza and “tak[e] down 30 to 40 every night.” He further said that some people in Gaza are “not worthy of life” and “not even people.” Similar statements by Ben-Gvir and other Israeli officials have been presented to the International Court of Justice as evidence of genocidal intent.
In a statement, Washington, D.C.-based CAIR said:
“Once again, a senior Israeli official is openly advocating an increase in the ongoing mass murder of Palestinians in Gaza. Itamar Ben-Gvir’s hate-filled calls for more genocidal violence are no different than what one would hear from the Nazi Party or Hutu Power Radio or the KKK, and are a chilling expression of a racist ideology that treats Palestinian lives as disposable.
“When an Israeli cabinet minister publicly calls for the killing of 30 to 40 people every night and declares that some Palestinians are ‘not even people,’ the White House and Congress must take note, and stop enabling the Israeli government’s crimes.”
CAIR recently called on Congress to take immediate action following the circulation of new videos that appear to show Palestinian civilians in Gaza being bombed and killed in Israeli military attacks.
CAIR also called on Congress to immediately suspend U.S. military aid to Israel in response to a newly-leaked image of elderly Palestinians who were reportedly used as human shields by Israeli forces in Gaza and then executed.
CAIR’s mission is to protect civil rights, enhance understanding of Islam, promote justice, and empower American Muslims.
La misión de CAIR es proteger las libertades civiles, mejorar la comprensión del Islam, promover la justicia, y empoderar a los musulmanes en los Estados Unidos.
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END
CAIR-NY Calls for Hate Crime Probe of Hate Vandalism Targeting Mosque Site on Long Island
The New York chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-NY), a chapter of the nation’s largest Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization, today called on local, state and federal law enforcement authorities to investigate reported hate vandalism targeting a mosque site on Long Island as a possible hate crime and to identify and hold accountable those responsible.
In a statement, CAIR-NY Executive Director Afaf Nasher said:
“Targeting a mosque site with hateful vandalism is an act of intimidation against an entire community. Muslim New Yorkers should be able to establish houses of worship and gather for prayer without fear that their property will be targeted because of their faith.
“We urge local, state and federal law enforcement to conduct a thorough investigation and determine whether this incident constitutes a hate crime. We also call on elected officials and community leaders to speak out clearly against growing anti-Muslim bigotry and religious intimidation.”
She noted that CAIR recently said it has documented 17 incidents targeting Islamic places of worship in May, June, and July. The 17 incidents represent 51 percent of the previous year’s total and a 183 percent increase over the same three-month period last year, during which CAIR documented six such incidents.
Last week, Washington, D.C.-based CAIR responded to a number of anti-Muslim hate incidents nationwide.
CAIR called on local, state and federal law enforcement authorities to investigate an allegedly bias-motivated spitting attack on a Muslim woman in Kentucky as a hate crime.
CAIR’s Florida chapter welcomed charges for an alleged plot to carry out a mass shooting at a mosque.
Its Michigan chapter welcomed federal charges against an Alaska man accused of making threats to injure and murder Dearborn Mayor Abdullah Hammoud and issuing violent, Islamophobic threats against Muslims.
Its Pittsburgh and Philadelphia chapters welcomed the City of Erie’s response to reported threats targeting the local Muslim community and urged authorities to remain vigilant in protecting residents from anti-Muslim hate and intimidation.
CAIR also welcomed the federal indictment of a Utah man on a hate crime charge for allegedly stabbing a Muslim man at the West Valley Mall in West Valley City, Utah.
CAIR’s latest civil rights report documented 8,683 anti-Muslim bias complaints in 2025 – the highest number ever recorded by the organization since it began publishing civil rights reports in 1996.
CAIR-NY’s mission is to protect civil rights, enhance understanding of Islam, promote justice, and empower American Muslims.
La misión de CAIR-NY es proteger las libertades civiles, mejorar la comprensión del Islam, promover la justicia, y empoderar a los musulmanes en los Estados Unidos.
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You can help contribute to CAIR’s work of defending civil rights and empowering American Muslims across the country by making a one-time contribution or becoming a monthly donor. Supporters like you make CAIR’s advocacy work possible and defeating Islamophobia an achievable goal.
END
Dhaka must deflect Naypyidaw’s Rohingya ploy
MYANMAR’S claim, as New Age reported on August 16, that only 540,000 Rohingyas had fled violence in Rakhine State into Bangladesh in 2016–2017 appears nothing but a ploy to delay any likely repatriation of the Rohingyas who have lived here since then. Naypyidaw has dismissed Dhaka’s figure that more than a million Rohingyas having lived in Bangladesh as being ‘inaccurate’. Myanmar’s foreign ministry, in the claim made on August 15, has not also referred to the people who fled to Bangladesh as the Rohingyas. Myanmar’s statement names them as ‘Bengalis’ and has said that more than 740,000 of them had lived in Buthidaung, Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships in Rakhine before the ‘Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacks,’ noting that more than 200,000 of them still remained in the areas whilst more than 540,000 fled to Bangladesh. In the wake of several such attempts by Myanmar to delay, confuse or frustrate any efforts to repatriate the Rohingyas, this appears to be one more such attempt. Myanmar has earlier created a fearful situation in Rakhine and deflected bilateral or multilateral efforts for the sustainable repatriation of the Rohingyas that could be voluntary, dignified and safe.
Dhaka has rightly rejected Naypyidaw’s claim and noted that Bangladesh has provided Myanmar with detailed information on the Rohingyas living in Bangladesh since the 2017 influx. Myanmar has said that Bangladesh submitted a list of 828,824 Rohingyas living in Bangladesh, noting that Myanmar has verified 426,545 of them as of July and said that 308,707 of them were former residents of Rakhine, 4,241 of them were involved in ‘terrorist activities’ and information on 113,507 could not be verified. Dhaka has again rightly questioned the reliability and completeness of Myanmar’s verification process, noting that Naypyidaw may have relied on household data that could be outdated, allowing discrepancies to creep into the verification process. Besides, children born to Rohingya parents in Bangladesh camps would not appear in Myanmar’s population records. The Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, which looks after relief for and repatriation of the Rohingyas, says that the Rohingya population in Bangladesh has now grown to more than 1.2 million. The UN agencies involved in Rohingya issues also have ample documentation on the number of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Naypyidaw also seeks to say that repatriation is a matter involving Bangladesh and Myanmar and resented Dhaka’s ‘portraying’ the issue as an international matter. But bilateral, and even regional, efforts have failed to send a single Rohingya back home to Rakhine State since then.
Dhaka should, therefore, step up its efforts, bilaterally, regionally and internationally, to make the repatriation of the Rohingyas a reality, without being deterred by Naypyidaw’s ploys.
Non-refoulement: Not all roads lead (safely) home
While the Ministry of Home Affairs has begun screening those who will be repatriated, the Malaysian Bar emphasises that those subject to this process must be given a genuine, informed choice of return as they face an existential threat to their lives and safety if they are forcibly returned in dangerous circumstances.
The announcement comes against the backdrop of continuing, if not rising, hostility towards the Rohingya community, including dehumanising rhetoric, misinformation and attempts to portray an entire persecuted community as a security or social threat based on isolated incidents.
Principle of non-refoulement
The principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning individuals to territories where their life, liberty or physical safety is threatened, is not only globally recognised as a rule of customary international law but is increasingly affirmed as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. [Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) and Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Sir Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’, in E Feller et al (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), paras 216–218]
Elements of this principle are embedded in our domestic statutes, such as section 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, which requires that regard shall be had to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
Article 14 of the UDHR states that: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”
This is also reflected in Articles 6, 7 and 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibit arbitrary deprivation of life, forbid the return (refoulement) of persons to face torture or serious harm, guarantee individual procedural protections against arbitrary or collective expulsion together with Articles 2 and 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) protecting vulnerable families and children from non-discriminatory harm.
[Article 4 of the ICCPR: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”]
[United Nations, general comment no 31 (2004) on Article 7: “Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant…”]
[Article 13: “An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.”]
[Article 2 of the ICESCR: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”]
[Article 10: “The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.”]
It does not matter that Malaysia is not a State Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (Refugee Convention and Protocol); the government of Malaysia has acknowledged and accepted the principle of non-refoulement since 2015.
The Hansard records the following assurance by the then-minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Shahidan Kassim (emphasis added in bold):
Pada dasarnya, pelarian di Malaysia tidak dinafikan kebebasan bergerak dan tidak ditahan melainkan terlibat dengan aktiviti yang melanggar undang-undang negara.
Tidak akan dihantar kembali ke negara asal selari dengan prinsip non-refoulement ataupun penghantaran balik ke negara asal tanpa dipaksa melainkan secara sukarela, volunteer return.
Given the significance of the proposed repatriation, the government should disclose the key terms of the reported arrangement, including the screening process and the safeguards that will govern its implementation.
In AAA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [R (on the application of AAA and ors) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (UNHCR Intervening) (2023)], the UK Supreme Court unanimously struck down an arrangement to transfer asylum seekers, finding that diplomatic assurances cannot override the receiving state’s (Rwanda, in that case) poor human rights record and its history of non-compliance with international obligations, concluding that there were substantial grounds to believe asylum seekers transferred would face a real risk of refoulement.
UNHCR documentation
Malaysia’s continued reliance on the UNHCR for refugee registration and status determination reflects the absence of a domestic asylum framework.
The UNHCR documentation, while significant, does not confer lawful immigration status under Malaysian law.
Any transition to the government’s proposed “Dokumen Pendaftaran Pelarian” (Refugee Registration Documentation) system must be transparent, undertaken in close cooperation with the UNHCR and subject to appropriate legal safeguards.
The Malaysian Bar calls upon the government to:
- uphold the jus cogens principle of non-refoulement and ensure that no individual is returned to a situation where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, genocide or other serious harm
- disclose the key terms of the reported repatriation arrangement with Myanmar, including the screening process, the safeguards in place and confirmation that any returns will be voluntary
- ensure that any proposal to return the 5,000 Rohingya refugees is based upon individual risk assessment to guarantee that any returns are voluntary, informed, safe and dignified, while establishing a rights-respecting refugee protection framework through meaningful consultations with refugee communities, the UNHCR and civil society
- ensure there is no interruption to the UNHCR’s refugee status determination process during the transition to any new framework and
- ratify the Refugee Convention and Protocol and align domestic legislation, policies and practice with international human rights standards and the ICCPR and the ICESCR
As the principle of non-refoulement is increasingly recognised as a rule of jus cogens which is binding upon Malaysia, it is only a matter of time before the Malaysian courts would be called upon to apply non-refoulement as a binding principle of international law. – Bar
Anand Raj is the president of the Malaysian Bar.
The views expressed in Aliran's media statements and the NGO statements we have endorsed reflect Aliran's official stand. Views and opinions expressed in other pieces published here do not necessarily reflect Aliran's official position.
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