Bangladesh today stands at the edge of an energy precipice.
Despite developing more than 30,000 MW (Megawatt) of grid-connected generation
capacity, the country cannot consistently produce even 15,000 MW. During peak
summer months, the deficit exceeds 3,000 MW, and citizens outside Dhaka endure 10-12
hours of crippling load shedding. Industries are suffocating, fertilizer plants
remain idle, and nearly 40% of gas-based power generation capacity sits unused.
The root cause is unmistakable: a chronic shortage of primary fuel, especially
natural gas.
The present demand for gas stands at roughly 4,000 MMCFD
(Million Cubic Feet per Day), yet Petrobangla — despite adding 900–1,000 MMCFD
of imported LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) — can supply only 2,700 MMCFD. The
resulting 1,200–1,300 MMCFD shortfall has cascaded across the economy,
triggering production losses, unemployment, and severe social distress.
Bangladesh’s energy crisis is no longer a technical problem; it is a national
emergency.
This emergency did not emerge overnight. It is the product of decades
of inadequate planning, misplaced priorities, and an overreliance on imported
fuels. Unless the government acts with urgency, professionalism, and strategic
clarity, Bangladesh risks sliding into a prolonged era of energy insecurity.
The Missed Decades: Coal, Gas, and the Failure of
Exploration
Bangladesh possesses one of the world’s richest untapped coal
deposits — 70 Tcf (Trillion Cubic Feet) equivalent of high-quality coal lying
at mineable depth. Environmentally responsible mining technologies exist today
that allow 80% land recovery, safe water management, and full rehabilitation of
affected communities. Yet successive governments have refused to mine coal,
bowing to misinformation, bureaucratic inertia, and vested interests.
The story of natural gas is equally troubling. Bangladesh is
the largest riverine delta on Earth, with enormous geological potential for
hydrocarbons. But after extracting the “low-hanging fruit” from only one-third
of the landmass, exploration slowed to a crawl. Vast regions — Chattak,
Tengratila, Potiya, Sitapahar, Kasalang, and much of the western zone — remain
virtually untouched. Some of these prospects lie near the Indian border, where
geological continuity strongly suggests additional reserves.
The offshore situation is even more disappointing. After
resolving maritime boundary disputes with India and Myanmar, Bangladesh had a
historic opportunity to explore the Bay of Bengal. Both neighbors moved
swiftly, discovered resources, and began extraction. Bangladesh, meanwhile,
remained stuck in bureaucratic loops, half-hearted bidding rounds, and weak
investor outreach. As a result, offshore exploration has barely progressed.
The consequences are now visible: declining proven reserves,
rising import dependence, and a widening gap between demand and supply.
The LNG Trap: Overreliance on Imports Amid Global
Turbulence
Bangladesh currently imports 900–1,000 MMCFD of LNG through
two FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) at Moheshkhali. But global
LNG markets have become volatile due to geopolitical conflicts, supply chain
disruptions — including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — and soaring
prices. The country is now trapped in an expensive and unreliable import
regime.
Policy missteps have worsened the situation. The interim
government of Dr. Muhammad Yunus canceled a signed contract with Summit Group
for a third FSRU — an error that cost Bangladesh an additional 500 MMCFD of
regasified LNG capacity that could have been operational by 2026. Several
advanced‑stage LNG procurement discussions were also abandoned. For nearly 18
months, no meaningful initiative was taken to expand LNG import capacity.
The new government is negotiating with a Chinese company for
an additional FSRU, but concerns about competence and transparency linger. The
dispute with Summit must be resolved in the national interest. Bangladesh
cannot afford further delays.
Moreover, proposals for FSRUs at Khulna and Barishal appear overambitious,
and ideas such as importing LNG in ISO tanks are technically unrealistic. Even
if LNG imports increase, the transmission system is inadequate. The two
existing Moheshkhali–Anowara pipelines can evacuate 1,600 MMCFD, but doing so
would drop inlet pressure to 500 PSI, destabilizing the grid. A new parallel
pipeline from Feni to Bakhrabad is essential and must be fast‑tracked.
Bhola: A National Failure That Must Be Corrected
Perhaps the most glaring example of policy paralysis is the
stranded gas of Bhola. While the nation suffers from a gas famine, Bhola’s
proven reserves remain disconnected from the national grid. Shockingly, the
Prime Minister recently suggested it may take seven years to evacuate Bhola’s
gas.
This is simply incorrect.
Pipeline experts confirm that a 120‑km
Bhola–Barishal–Khulna pipeline can be completed within three years, provided
land acquisition, procurement, and contractor mobilization begin immediately.
Converting Bhola’s gas to CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) or LNG for transport
would be wasteful and inefficient.
Connecting Bhola would not only ease the gas crisis but also
stimulate green industrialization in Barishal and Khulna. It would also
encourage international oil companies (IOCs) to invest in nearby blocks,
especially Block 7, which remains underexplored.
Institutional Weakness: The Achilles Heel of the
Energy Sector
Bangladesh’s energy institutions — Petrobangla, BAPEX, SGFL,
BGFCL, GTCL — are staffed with dedicated professionals, but decades of
bureaucratic dominance have eroded their effectiveness. Many senior officials
are nearing retirement, and a dangerous vacuum of technical expertise looms.
The DPP (Development Project Proposal) approval process is
notoriously slow, often taking more than a year due to unnecessary queries from
inexperienced officials. Land acquisition for drilling projects is equally
sluggish. These delays cripple exploration and development.
Bangladesh must move away from exclusive reliance on
bureaucrats for energy planning. The sector requires petroleum geologists,
reservoir engineers, pipeline specialists, and project managers — not
generalist administrators. Institutional memory must be preserved by retaining
experienced professionals.
A Note on Other Energy Sources: Promise, but
Limited Relief
While this essay focuses on Bangladesh’s gas and coal crisis —
the core driver of today’s emergency — it is important to acknowledge other
energy options. Bangladesh has explored nuclear, solar, wind, battery storage,
and fuel‑cell technologies, but none can meaningfully offset the immediate
shortfall in primary fuels.
Nuclear power, through the Rooppur
plant, will eventually add significant baseload capacity. But nuclear projects
are slow, capital‑intensive, and dependent on imported fuel. Rooppur will not
solve the current crisis.
Solar energy has grown, yet
Bangladesh’s land scarcity, monsoon climate, and low capacity factors limit
utility‑scale deployment. Rooftop solar can help, but it cannot replace
thousands of megawatts of gas‑based generation.
Wind power remains constrained by low wind
speeds across most of the country, except limited coastal pockets.
Battery storage is still too expensive at
grid scale, and fuel‑cell technologies are not commercially viable for
national deployment.
These technologies must be part of Bangladesh’s long‑term
energy transition. But they cannot compensate for the immediate collapse of
domestic gas supply or the paralysis in coal development. The crisis Bangladesh
faces today is fundamentally a primary fuel crisis, and only primary fuels can
resolve it.
The Way Forward: A National Energy Rescue Plan
Bangladesh can still reverse its energy decline — but only
through bold, urgent, and professional action. The following steps are
essential:
1. Launch an Aggressive Domestic Exploration
Program
- Conduct
intensive 2D and 3D seismic surveys across the entire landmass.
- Deploy
at least 10 exploration rigs by 2028.
- Prioritize
drilling in Surma Basin, Chattagram Hill Tracts, western zone, and other
unexplored prospects.
- Initiate
a new PSC (Production Sharing Contract) bidding round for land blocks
outside BAPEX’s ring‑fenced areas.
If executed properly, Bangladesh can add 5 Tcf of new
recoverable gas by 2031.
2. Accelerate Offshore Exploration
- Replace
foreign roadshows with a high‑level investor conference in Dhaka.
- Engage
IOCs directly and offer competitive fiscal terms.
- Strengthen
Petrobangla’s technical and managerial capacity.
3. Mine Bangladesh’s Coal Responsibly
- Adopt
modern, environmentally safe mining technologies.
- Use
domestic coal for power generation to reduce pressure on gas.
- Rehabilitate
affected communities with global best practices.
4. Expand LNG Capacity — But Wisely
- Resolve
the Summit FSRU dispute.
- Ensure
transparency in new FSRU contracts.
- Build
the Feni–Bakhrabad pipeline urgently.
5. Connect Bhola Within Three Years
- Begin
land acquisition and contractor mobilization immediately.
- Engage
international reservoir assessors and subsea pipeline experts.
6. Reform Energy Governance
- Reduce
bureaucratic control.
- Empower
sector professionals.
- Implement
economic pricing for fuel and electricity to ensure financial
sustainability.
Conclusion: A Call for National Resolve
Bangladesh’s energy crisis is not inevitable — it is the
result of choices. For too long, the nation has relied on imported fuels,
ignored its own resources, and allowed bureaucratic inertia to stifle progress.
The consequences are now severe: power shortages, industrial stagnation, rising
debt, and public suffering.
But Bangladesh also possesses extraordinary potential: vast
coal deposits, promising gas basins, offshore prospects, and a capable
technical workforce. With decisive leadership, professional management, and
strategic investment, the country can regain energy security within a decade.
The government must treat the energy and power sector as a top‑priority
national mission. The time for hesitation is over. Bangladesh must explore,
develop, and utilize its own resources — boldly, urgently, and professionally.
Only then can the nation emerge from crisis and build a
resilient, prosperous future.
About the authors:
Saleque
Sufi is widely regarded as Bangladesh’s foremost expert on the
energy and power sector. Over several decades, he has accumulated hands‑on
experience in planning, managing, and implementing major energy‑infrastructure
development projects, as well as in system operation and maintenance. Before
relocating to Australia, he served as Director of the Gas Transmission Company
Limited (GTCL), where he played a key role in expanding and modernizing the
national gas grid. He is currently a Contributory Editor of Energy &
Power Magazine, published from Bangladesh.
Dr. Habib Siddiqui is associated with Esho Desh Gori – Let’s Build Bangladesh,
a platform dedicated to national development and institutional reform. He is author of more than 25 books,
including Operational Excellence in the Process Industry (Taylor
& Francis, 2026), co-authored with his son, Hassan; and Inventory Control and Management: How
Professionals Can Improve Performance (Taylor & Francis, 2027).