https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKKZssitB44
Saturday, October 31, 2026
Situation of human rights in Myanmar - Note by the Secretary-General*
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Kelley Anne Eckels-Currie, submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 61/30.
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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Kelley Anne Eckels-Currie
I. Introduction
1. The Special Rapporteur officially assumed responsibility for the mandate on 1 May 2026. She has since notified the Secretariat that, owing to her recent appointment, she would not be in a position to present a substantial report, given the deadline of 20 July 2026 for submission of the report. The present report outlines an initial vision and set of priorities to guide the Special Rapporteur’s approach to the mandate, on which she will elaborate in her presentation to the General Assembly and future reports.
2. As noted in the reports of the previous mandate holder, the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council of August 2026 on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, 1 and the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar,2 the overall human rights situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate and is characterized by ongoing, widespread and systematic violations of human rights. The ongoing and multidimensional armed conflict in Myanmar serves as the primary driver of these violations and is rooted in the underlying denial of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Myanmar by the military regime that seized power following the coup of 1 February 2021, as well as the history of denial of full citizenship rights to all the people of Myanmar by previous Governments.
3. In the period since the report of the previous mandate holder to the Human Rights Council in March 2026,3 the military leaders have changed their clothing and their titles but not their fundamental approach to governance. Their level of brutality towards the people of Myanmar has only increased. They are increasingly enabled with new military equipment and surveillance and other technologies of repression and encouraged by diplomatic engagements with other Member States. But neither the military’s change of clothes nor the wishful thinking of other Member States will improve the human rights situation on the ground in Myanmar as long as impunity is the order of the day.
II. Background
4. On 19 March 2026, the Human Rights Council appointed Kelley Anne Eckels Currie as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. She officially assumed responsibility for the mandate on 1 May 2026, succeeding her predecessor, Thomas H. Andrews. The present report therefore marks her first opportunity to engage with the General Assembly in her capacity as Special Rapporteur.
5. Given the limited time and resources available since the Special Rapporteur assumed the mandate, as well as the continuously deteriorating situation for civilians in Myanmar and refugees from Myanmar, she has not yet had an opportunity to make official country visits. She has formally requested access for an official country visit to Myanmar and received a response from the Nay Pyi Taw regime that “owing to extensive responsibilities and national obligations incumbent upon the new administration, it is not ready to accommodate the proposed visit”. She is pleased that Bangladesh has agreed for her to conduct an official country visit before the end of 2026.
6. In the meantime, the Special Rapporteur has had opportunities to engage with local stakeholders in Myanmar, Thailand and other countries, both in person and through online consultations, since assuming the mandate. Broader and more sustained engagement with a diverse range of stakeholders, including those inside Myanmar and across the region, will be essential as she carries out the mandate. She appreciates the cooperation of Member States in carrying out such consultations up to now and encourages Member States to continue supporting these efforts.
7. Based on the mandate holder’s initial consultations with Myanmar civil society actors and human rights advocates, as well as desk reviews of the reports and communications submitted directly to her, she has developed an initial vision and set of priorities to guide her work as Special Rapporteur.
8. The present report sets out the approach that the Special Rapporteur intends to take in addressing the complex and evolving human rights situation in Myanmar. It is intended to serve as a road map for the mandate holder, while remaining responsive to developments on the ground and foregrounding the perspectives of affected communities and relevant stakeholders.
9. The Special Rapporteur will supplement the present report with an oral statement to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session in October 2026.
III. Political landscape and initial assessment
10. Min Aung Hlaing and the military leadership have dissolved the State Administration Council formed after the coup and have appointed themselves to nominally civilian positions following regime-organized “electoral theatre” that lacked basic elements of credibility.4
11. These developments are a transparent attempt to recast military rule under the guise of nominally civilian institutions and do not represent a genuine transfer of power away from the miliary institutionally or individually. Of particular concern is that the military has further subsumed pre-existing civilian institutions into its structure, removing even the veneer of civilian control. The military has instrumentalized institutions of State to introduce laws and regulations that institutionalize practices developed under military emergency rule and to further restrict civic space and constrain civil society under the gloss of civilian authority.
12. This institutional reconfiguration requires corresponding changes in terminology. References to the former State Administration Council no longer accurately reflect the structures through which the military leadership exercises authority, while terminology concerning the newly constituted institutions should avoid conferring any form of legitimacy on an electoral process and so-called transition that fail to meet minimum standards of credibility and are predicated on an illegal coup.
13. Despite the regime’s launching of a so-called “100-day peace plan” for the period from 20 April to 31 July 2026, the human rights situation across the country has continued to deteriorate due to widespread and systematic military violence against the civilian population and the extension of martial law in 58 townships. During the “100 days of peace”, the military continued to target air strikes, artillery shelling, arson attacks and ground offensives at civilian populations, destroying civilian infrastructure, including schools, healthcare facilities, religious buildings, markets and camps for internally displaced persons, and resulting in civilian casualties and widespread repeated displacement. Credible sources have verified that, during the 100 days, at least 753 civilians were killed, with Myanmar military and paramilitary forces responsible for 89 per cent of civilian fatalities, that is, at least 668 deaths.5 Of these, at least 146 civilian deaths were due to air strikes, with media sources reporting at least 657 attacks – more than six per day. Violence on the ground also reignited concerns for civilian protection as the military advanced on the battlefield. Credible sources have verified that at least 65 civilians were killed during ground operations as a result of artillery shelling and small-arms fire, and in arson incidents, cumulatively representing a 44 per cent surge compared to the previous 100 days.
14. The Myanmar military continues to deliberately obstruct humanitarian operations aimed at limiting the civilian suffering caused by these attacks, including through telecommunications blackouts, movement restrictions and stops at checkpoints, thereby blocking the delivery of food, medicine, fuel and other essential supplies to displaced communities. Front-line humanitarian workers providing support on the ground continue to face harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings. In July 2026, three humanitarian workers in Dawei were reportedly tortured and killed, allegedly due to the assistance they provide to communities in the area. The military’s attacks on civilians and weaponization of humanitarian aid during a period reportedly aimed at peace underscore the urgent need for meaningful measures to ensure the protection of civilians and unimpeded humanitarian access. The intentional deprivation and denial of aid appear to be a tool of warfare, consistent with the military’s history of using the “four cuts” strategy, whereby the regime collectively punishes communities that are perceived to be supporting the resistance.
15. While the figures already depict a devastating situation for civilians, they represent an underestimation of the reality, whereby military-imposed restrictions on movements and telecommunication are hampering monitoring and verification activities. Protection and humanitarian concerns on the ground have continued to escalate due to military air strikes, with the resumption of ground operations leading to a new surge in burning of villages and civilian infrastructure and the persistent denial of humanitarian assistance to those in need, including during natural disaster emergencies, such as the flooding in Ayeyarwady, Sagaing, Mandalay, Bago, Rakhine, Kachin and Shan in September 2026, affecting at least 1.3 million people.
16. Credible reporting up to and including 15 September 2026 indicates that a minimum of 8,384 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup, including 1,873 women and 1,112 children. Out of the total number of verified civilian deaths, 2,530, including the deaths of 889 women and 550 children, were due to air strikes, Sagaing being the most affected region, with 804 verified deaths. This dire situation has been compounded by the continued denial of humanitarian assistance by the military across the country, and especially in the so-called “dry zone” of Sagaing, Magway and Bago. Rakhine State, which was the area with the second highest number of recorded civilian deaths due to air strikes, with 508 verified deaths since the coup, remains under a military-imposed humanitarian blockade, which is preventing food,medicines, construction materials, communications equipment and other life -saving items from reaching those in need. This situation further aggravates the conditions of the Rohingya community, which remains exposed to widespread and systematic violations by the Myanmar military, as well as abuses by the Arakan Army, including forced conscription.
17. The situation of political prisoners across the country remains of grave concern. Political prisoners are generally detained in inhumane conditions and continuously exposed to human rights violations and sexual violence. According to credible sources, since the coup, the military has arrested at least 31,926 political prisoners, including 6,484 women and 641 children, on political grounds. Of these, at least 14,817 remain languishing in detention, with nearly 8,000 cases in the process of verification. While the President, Win Myint, was allowed to return home in April, his conditions remain detention-like. The State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains detained in isolation, without access to family or legal assistance. In August, the military allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to meet with her briefly and publicize the meeting in the media, responding to long-standing requests for proof of life. Recent reporting on the situation of women political prisoners has documented extreme levels of abuse, including sexual violence, on a systematic basis.
18. The Special Rapporteur’s assessment is that the current political and human rights situation of Myanmar is not an isolated domestic crisis. In the past year, since the previous mandate holder last addressed the General Assembly, the Myanmar conflict has become increasingly internationalized in both its drivers and its consequences, and the actions and interests of external actors are increasingly shaping the trajectory of the conflict and the prospects for its resolution, mostly in an unhelpful manner.
19. Neighbouring States, including China, Thailand and India, exercise significant political, economic and security influence, while other States, such as the Russian Federation and Belarus, have important ties with the military authorities. In particular, the Special Rapporteur has concluded that China has become a decisive enabler of the armed conflict in Myanmar, particularly with regard to the conflict economy and the provision of weapons and technologies that enable the regime and its proxies to carry out associated human rights violations. Other Member States that previously withheld support for the military regime appear to be in the process of modulating their policies towards engagement with regime actors in ways that do not account for the human rights, humanitarian and transnational crime crises that the regime’s behaviour has precipitated or the likelihood that engagement with regime interlocutors could legitimize and empower an otherwise illegitimate regime, thereby worsening the human rights situation on the ground and further undermining the five - point consensus on Myanmar of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
20. Contrary to the Myanmar military’s continued attempts at describing the human rights crisis in Myanmar as an issue of internal affairs, the situation in Myanmar clearly has significant international and regional impacts, including in relation to, inter alia: instability, violence and displacement; illicit financial flows, human trafficking and forced labour related to industrial-scale scam operations and conflict economy activities; the drugs trade and other illicit trades; cross-border environmental damage; and other transnational crimes.
21. Civil society organizations have reported to the mandate holder that scam centres in Myanmar are linked to broader networks of human trafficking, forced labour and exploitation, including in the rare-earth mining sector. Information received alleges that some individuals forced to work in scam centres have been transferred or sold into forced labour in mining operations, including in rare -earth mines. These allegations point to a disturbing cycle of trafficking and retrafficking across interconnected conflict-enabled industries and warrant urgent investigation.
22. Of particular note is the recent refoulement of ethnic Rohingya and other Myanmar citizens from Malaysia, despite the absence of conditions allowing the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of these individuals to Myanmar as a whole or to their homelands in Rakhine State. Given the ongoing armed conflict in Rakhine and targeting of Rohingya civilians from various sides of the conflict, this refoulement marks a dangerous and disturbing turn with regard to the situation of Rohingya refugees who were dehumanized and rendered stateless by past Myanmar regimes, only to find themselves instrumentalized by these same Nay Pyi Taw authorities when they are seeking political legitimacy. Likewise, any return of refugees or asylum seekers conducted in the context of cooperation with Myanmar military authorities is of utmost concern, and Member States are strongly urged to work with the relevant offices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to accurately assess the situation in the country in order to ensure non-refoulement of Myanmar persons.
23. Myanmar’s human rights crisis must therefore be understood not only through its domestic political and conflict dynamics, but also within a broader regional and international context in which external actors can contribute to either sustaining the conditions that enable widespread and systematic violations or creating incentives and pathways towards their cessation.
IV. Proposed priorities
24. Based on the Special Rapporteur’s initial assessment, informed by human rights reporting and consultations, improving the protection of civilians will be a central priority of the mandate. Civilian protection must be at the heart of all efforts towards de-escalation, ceasefires and conflict resolution. Within this framework, the Special Rapporteur will pay particular attention to the protection and security of women, children and marginalized communities, as well as to the gendered impacts of the conflict. She will also prioritize the protection of refugees and displaced populations, with particular attention to the Rohingya.
25. Another priority of the mandate holder will be to examine the growing intersection between key elements of the conflict economy, including transnational organized crime, illicit financial flows, human trafficking, forced labour and extractive industries in Myanmar. The Special Rapporteur will seek to document these interconnected patterns of exploitation, identify the actors involved and assess the political and economic structures that enable them. Particular attention will be paid to cross-border networks, financial flows and supply chains that connect human rights abuses inside Myanmar to regional and international actors and markets. Within this priority, the Special Rapporteur will also examine the nexus between extractive industries, human rights violations and environmental harm, including their impacts within Myanmar and across borders. Particular attention will be given to protecting the rights of environmental human rights defenders and addressing the risks they face.
26. Lastly, the mandate holder will examine how the Myanmar military, through the instrumental use of the legislative framework and regime-controlled mechanisms, is abusing legal systems, policies and the public apparatus to restrict fundamental freedoms, rent-seek on the backs of a population already immiserated by its misgovernance, and target repression towards civilians, political opponents and others attempting to resist its reign of terror.
V. Conclusion
27. Efforts by the regime to achieve legitimacy through electoral theatre, a performative transition to sham civilian rule, and external diplomatic engagements have again served to prolong the suffering of the people of Myanmar and risk driving a more intense and destructive armed conflict. External actors taking short-term approaches that involve attempted or even unintentional legitimization of the Min Aung Hlaing regime are unlikely to produce positive results for either the Myanmar people or those who engage with the regime. The Min Aung Hlaing regime remains the greatest source of civilian death and suffering, instability, impoverishment, corruption and gross violations of human rights in Myanmar and the key driver of the wider impact on the region. Going forward, the mandate holder will continue to prioritize communities under threat and the civic actors who are supporting them, and will encourage Member States to do the same, including by providing direct support to those working on the ground to document and ameliorate the suffering of the people of Myanmar. They – not their tormentors – are the true architects of a peaceful future for Myanmar in which rights are respected, and they should be heard and supported.
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* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information
26-15089 (E)
1 A/HRC/63/21.
2 A/81/302.
3 A/HRC/61/58
4 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/statements/20251222-stm-myanmar-office-hc en.pdf. The previous mandate holder concluded that the military-organized general election constituted “electoral theatre” designed to confer legitimacy on continued military rule, rather than a genuine democratic process, and served to mask ongoing repression behind the appearance of civilian governance (A/HRC/61/58, paras. 15–28).
Iran lawmakers call for withdrawal from NPT: Will we have war or peace?
Several Iranian lawmakers have called for the country’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as United States President Donald Trump says the war on Iran will be “wrapped up” soon.
The lawmakers’ demands come as Qatari mediators returned to Tehran this week to mediate peace talks with the US.
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Before the US and Israel’s war on Iran began on February 28, Washington and Tehran had already been engaging in indirect nuclear negotiations mediated by Oman. Iran had also stated on numerous occasions that it had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.
Trump has also repeatedly stated that Iran “cannot have a nuclear weapon”, making it a non-negotiable condition for ending the ongoing conflict and securing a permanent deal.
Iran, however, has demanded certain conditions be met before it will talk again about its nuclear programme – including an end to the US naval blockade of its ports in and around the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of sanctions and a guarantee there will be no more attacks.
The war, which is entering its ninth month, has upended global energy and financial markets with the closure of Hormuz.
On Friday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi hit back at Friedrich Merz after the German chancellor said the war on Iran has added more than 100 billion euros ($112bn) to Europe’s energy costs.
In a post on X, Araghchi noted that Merz had “hailed” the US and Israel’s attacks on Iran in June of last year, when he said: “This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us.”
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The Iranian foreign minister then warned that any renewed attacks could come at a far higher cost for Europe.
“100bn Euro is nothing compared to the Earth-shattering blow Iran’s Powerful Armed Forces will deal against those who dare harm our people,” Araghchi wrote. “Red lines are a thing of the past,” he added.
Could Iran withdraw from the NPT, and what would that mean for diplomatic efforts to end the war?
Here’s what we know:
Which Iranian lawmakers are calling for withdrawal from the NPT, and why?
On Saturday, Iranian legislator Mahmoud Nabavian called for Iran to withdraw from the NPT and change its nuclear doctrine, adding to similar demands from other lawmakers and public figures.
“Now that we have paid the heavy costs of war and sanctions, it is time for the Iranian nation to withdraw from the NPT treaty and change the nuclear doctrine,” he wrote on X.
In parliament, Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said 10 proposals to withdraw from the treaty had been registered, and withdrawal was under consideration, according to the Fars news agency.
Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari, an Iranian politician and scholar, also called for a review of Iran’s nuclear doctrine, describing it as a “national demand” during his sermon on Friday, state broadcaster IRIB reported.
He said the demand was not a hasty or emotional reaction, but reflected Iranians’ awareness of what he described as US failures to honour commitments.
Separately, in a report earlier this week, Iran’s Tasnim news agency reported calls for Iran to withdraw from the NPT and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of becoming politically aligned with the US and Israel.
Last month, an IAEA resolution expressed “grave concerns” about Iran’s “continued noncompliance” with its obligations under the NPT, to which it is a signatory.
But the IAEA has not had access to key nuclear facilities in Iran since the US and Israel launched a 12-day war against the country in June 2025, which included attacks on key Iranian nuclear sites, such as the Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan facilities.
Iran has condemned the IAEA resolution, calling it baseless and politically motivated.
What is the NPT?
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a landmark international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. The treaty was negotiated by the US, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
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Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing them.
Non-nuclear-weapon states also agree not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons.
The treaty views nuclear-weapon states as those which manufactured and tested a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device before January 1, 1967. Those countries are the US, UK, France, China and Russia. The treaty also paves a path for these original nuclear weapons powers to phase out their arsenals.
A total of 191 countries are now part of the treaty. Non-signatories include India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan.
The treaty supports the right of all signatories to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under safeguards overseen by the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Among the 11 articles of the treaty, one allows a country to withdraw with three months’ notice “if it decides that extraordinary events … have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”.
Iran signed the NPT in July 1968 and ratified it in February 1970 as a nonnuclear-weapon state.
It has since stated consistently that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes and research only. The IAEA has conducted inspections under the treaty’s safeguards system.
Has there been any response from Iran’s leaders?
Iranian leaders have not yet responded to demands from lawmakers to withdraw from the NPT.
But on October 24, according to Iranian media reports, the Paydari Front, a hardline faction aligned with conservative groups, also called on parliament to withdraw from the NPT.
Withdrawal from the NPT would not automatically mean that Iran would build a nuclear weapon. Officially, the Iranian government’s position on not seeking nuclear arms remains unchanged.
In June, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that lawmakers are preparing a bill to withdraw Tehran from the NPT.
“In light of recent developments, we will take an appropriate decision,” ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei had said at a news conference. “[The] government has to enforce parliament bills, but such a proposal is just being prepared, and we will coordinate in the later stages with parliament.”
But Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian has said Tehran’s policies align with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s longstanding religious edict against weapons of mass destruction. “The Zionist regime is the only possessor of weapons of mass destruction in the region,” Baghaei had said, referring to the Israeli government.
What has Trump said about ‘wrapping up’ the war?
The US President has repeatedly stated that Iran “cannot have a nuclear weapon” and made this a non-negotiable condition for ending the ongoing conflict and securing a permanent deal.
In a speech at Daytona Beach, Florida late on Friday, he brought up Iran several times and repeated claims about destroying its navy and air force. “We are never going to give them a nuclear weapon,” he said.
Trump also denied that the US had started the war, saying, “This was a war they started many years ago,” and “Iran has been waging war on America since 1979.″
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Separately, in an interview with Kansas City radio station KCMO on Friday, he said the war is “going to get wrapped up soon” but said Washington needs “a guarantee there’ll never be a nuclear weapon”.
Mohamed Elmenshawy, a Washington-based analyst, told Al Jazeera that Trump wants to end the standoff with Iran “whether through peace or war as quickly as possible”, and may launch new attacks after the November 3 midterm elections.
“What breaks this state of stalemate, this condition of ‘no peace, no war’, is either achieving some progress in the negotiating track, or the attacks beginning anew,” Elmenshawy told Al Jazeera.
He said Trump believes “time is on his side”, pointing to “strict economic pressure” on Iran, including the US naval blockade that has curtailed Tehran’s ability to export oil as well as sanctions on Iranian aviation and land border closures by several other countries.
Elmenshawy said Tehran “must realise” Trump will not let the conflict “remain suspended like this” and that this pressure should push “the Qatari and Pakistani mediators to drive the efforts more forcefully in order to avoid the path of war”.
Trump faces “pressure from the Israeli side to launch the attacks, and opposite pressure from the Arab Gulf side to push the negotiating track”, he added, saying Trump, “whose next moves cannot be predicted”, could yield to either.
On Saturday, the spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad Akraminia, sent a warning to US President Donald Trump, writing on X that its armed forces are “closely monitoring America’s movements in the region”.
Akraminia said that if the US president “resorts to another adventure in the region” along with Israel, then Iran will retaliate significantly.
“There is no doubt that the flames of war will engulf a much wider area, and the end of the conflict will not be in his [Trump’s] hands,” Akraminia wrote.
“Given the US President’s track record of betraying diplomacy,” and citing Trump’s “distrustful” nature, Akraminia said the IRGC’s armed forces are “relentlessly enhancing their combat readiness”.
What was the position before the war began?
Before the US and Israel attacked Iran on February 28 this year, Tehran and Washington were in active nuclear negotiations.
At talks in Geneva, mediator Oman said both countries had made “significant progress”.
Just one day before the US-Israeli attacks started, Oman’s foreign minister said Iran had agreed to reduce its nuclear stockpiles to “the lowest level possible”. Then the war began.
Almost eight months later, the war has brought this position no further forward.
In fact, more problems, with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz upending global energy markets and most recently, the Iran-aligned Houthis and Saudi Arabia locking horns, have threatened the Middle East’s regional stability.
Furthermore, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Al Jazeera in September that Iran no longer trusts negotiations with Washington because attacks had come during previous rounds of talks.
Christopher Featherstone, associate lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of York in the UK, told Al Jazeera that the war has set the potential for negotiations all the way back to square one, and it will take significant diplomatic effort to initiate any meaningful negotiations, let alone achieve success in those negotiations.
“Intermediaries will be cautious about being seen to be too close to the US if the conflict reignites, and Iran has shown a strong willingness to reject a ‘deal’ that would favour the Trump administration too heavily,” he said.
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What diplomatic efforts are happening to de-escalate the war?
On Friday morning, Qatari mediators, in coordination with US officials, returned to Tehran in an apparent bid to revive the June ceasefire that quickly fell apart over control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Days earlier, they delivered a letter from US Vice President JD Vance to Iran’s security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, proposing renewed peace talks, according to US media.
Iranian sources have confirmed to Al Jazeera that Tehran received a letter from the US on ending the war and suggested the Qatari delegation had come to collect Iran’s response.
The sources said a meeting to discuss a new diplomatic path could be held within a week, either in Doha or Istanbul.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, spokesman for Pakistan’s military, told the Reuters news agency his country is “cautiously optimistic” about mediation efforts between Iran and the US as regional countries seek to revive a ceasefire in the eight-month-old war.
He suggested on Friday that there were positive signs in attempts to de-escalate the conflict. His comments to Reuters were the first since a high-level delegation visited Tehran this week.
Ali al-Sari, a former member of Iran’s parliament, said there are positive indications from both Tehran and Washington on the diplomatic track, despite a military buildup on both sides.
“The response has not been clear so far, but there are indications on the Iranian side, and also in my view on the American side, that the signs are somewhat positive rather than negative,” al-Sari told Al Jazeera.
He said the US is reinforcing its military buildup, while Iran is strengthening its forces “in the Strait of Hormuz and along the borders”. He added that “the coincidence of this message with the Qatari mediation is significant.
“For this reason, Tehran is studying its response carefully and has not rushed, but it wants something in return, even amid a tense situation between the two parties,” he said.
He pointed to the repeated visits of the Qatari delegation, which “came, then returned, then came again”. In his view, this suggests that the Qatari mediation and other mediation efforts, including Russia’s mediation, mean coordination with the US is continuing and is a “positive sign”. Al-Sari also highlighted the US ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack’s recent comments that the US and Iran are “very close” to a deal to de-escalate tensions.
Is peace or renewal of war more likely after the US midterm elections?
Currently, Washington and Tehran have sent mixed signals about whether the eight-month war is heading back to full-scale attacks or towards a peace deal.
On Thursday, the head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Admiral Brad Cooper, briefed US President Donald Trump on options for renewed attacks on Iran, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported.
The Wall Street Journal also reported that Trump was briefed on options for renewed attacks on Thursday. On the same day, US Senator Chris Murphy said he had been briefed on the war plan and described it as “insane”.
Separately, US media reported that Washington has warned Gulf allies to prepare for potential military action after the November 3 midterm elections.
“There has been little signal from either side of a move to a formal peace, but there is the potential for another cautious temporary ceasefire,” Featherstone said.
“After the midterm elections, if Trump loses both Houses, he will be severely limited in his ability to pursue his domestic agenda. This could push him to be more active on the international stage, and the Iran conflict would likely be a focus for his attention,” he added.
“However, he has set out almost no sign of how he would measure victory or success in this war, so a path out of the conflict is incredibly unclear,” he said.
Abas Aslani, a researcher at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, said a deep lack of trust lies behind Iran’s failure to respond to the US proposals it has received.
“Washington wants Iran to make concessions on the nuclear issue in advance, but Iran insists on the seven conditions,” Aslani told Al Jazeera, referring to Tehran’s seven-point plan to end the war.
“In Iran, they fear that if they commit and fulfil their obligations, the United States will not honour its obligations and will backtrack. Instead, the United States would launch another attack.”
He noted that Trump is “trying to use this potential agreement to promote it to the public and to use it for electoral purposes in the United States”, while “Iran wants an agreement that will be vital and bring peace to the region.”
Aslani said “the conditions and the sequencing” also remain in dispute.
Iran is using mediators to send a message “that its position has not changed”, he said, but Washington “also insists on its position”.
“We don’t see any tangible progress – but despite this, efforts are still ongoing,” he added.
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