The decision that time earned widespread praise from world leaders. During his visit to Dhaka, the UN secretary general António Guterres commended Bangladesh for opening its border to people fleeing from Myanmar at a time when many states had closed theirs. The then World Bank president Jim Yong Kim commented that Bangladesh had rendered a great service to the entire world by providing refuge for the Rohingyas while Miroslav Lajcák, the then president of the UN General Assembly, also commended Bangladesh for its ‘generosity.’ The expressions of appreciation have, however, not translated into meaningful international pressure to facilitate the repatriation of the Rohingyas. Even after eight years, not a single Rohingya has been able to return to Myanmar safely and with dignity through the repatriation process.
Atrocities have not ended
THE persecution of the Rohingyas in Rakhine State did not end with the military operations of 2017. Instead, only the perpetrator changed. When renewed hostilities broke out between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army in November 2023, the latter rapidly established control over nearly 90 per cent of Rakhine State, including the Rohingya-populated Maungdaw district. Initially, the Arakan Army pledged to pursue inclusive governance, but subsequently, it has subjected the Rohingyas to repression comparable to, and in some instances, even more severe than what the Tatmadaw carried out.
According to a July 2025 Human Rights Watch report, the Arakan Army has imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Rohingyas and has engaged in plunder, arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, forced labour and forced recruitment that have continued at the same scale to date. Expressing similar concerns, Fortify Rights, in its July 2025 investigation, accused the Arakan Army of committing serious rights violations, including abduction, torture, killing and beheading, and called for an investigation by the International Criminal Court. In the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, night-time curfews, house-to-house searches, arbitrary detention and torture of suspected individuals and even extrajudicial killings have been reported. Numerous families have been forced to abandon their villages. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at least 153,000 Rohingyas have entered Bangladesh after the takeover by the Arakan Army, further complicating the refugee crisis.
World community
OVER nine years, while UN agencies have played a commendable role in delivering humanitarian assistance, there has been little visible or effective diplomatic engagement to push for the repatriation of the Rohingyas. Coordination between the UNHCR operations in Myanmar and those in Bangladesh has also remained limited. As a result, the camp-based activities of international organisations have become institutionalised, with Bangladeshi policy-makers alleging that greater emphasis is being placed on managing the protracted presence of the Rohingyas rather than generating pressure for their repatriation.
This trend is reflected not only in the humanitarian sphere but also in the geopolitical landscape. The strategic calculations of major powers have made prolonging the status quo comparatively more advantageous than facilitating the repatriation of the Rohingyas. For China, the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, the Kyaukphyu special economic zone and the oil and gas pipelines extending to Yunnan together constitute a strategic corridor that provides direct access for the Indian Ocean while bypassing the Strait of Malacca. As the Arakan Army currently exercises de facto control over much of this region, China has been compelled to maintain a balanced relationship with both the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army. Consequently, its priority is to safeguard its strategic projects and preserve its influence rather than to promote repatriation. Although Beijing undertook trilateral initiatives and pilot repatriation programmes in 2018, 2019, and 2023, they failed to produce tangible results in practice.
Conversely, while the United States and the western have been vocal on rights violations of the Rohingyas, the absence of direct strategic interests in Rakhine State has limited their willingness to exert strong diplomatic pressure to ensure the repatriation of the Rohingyas. Instead, the Rohingya issue has become a component of their broader Indo-Pacific strategy, in which applying pressure on Myanmar and countering China’s influence receive greater priority than expediting repatriation. A similar pragmatic approach is evident in India’s policy. Through the Kaladan multi-modal transit transport project, India seeks to secure an alternative connectivity route to its north-east while maintaining a strategic balance against Chinese influence in Rakhine State. Consequently, regardless of whether the Myanmar government or the Arakan Army holds power in the state, India’s primary focus remains ensuring the security of its strategic projects rather than taking a direct position on the Rohingya issue.
In this context, both the Myanmar government and the Arakan Army have emerged as the principal beneficiary. Previous repatriation initiatives have repeatedly stalled because of conditions that have effectively rendered the process unworkable, including limited verification, the absence of guarantees for return to places of origin and inconsistencies in family-based verification lists. As a result, not a single Rohingya has been repatriated through the official process over eight years. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has established new settlements on land abandoned by the Rohingyas, further diminishing the prospects for repatriation. In effect, the absence of meaningful international accountability has facilitated a long-term process of demographic restructuring in Rakhine State.
Overall, the strategic priorities of the key stakeholders in resolving the Rohingya crisis are increasingly centred on its management rather than its resolution.
Non-traditional security challenge
OVER nine years, the Ukhiya and Teknaf regions of Cox’s Bazar have evolved into a complex non-traditional security challenge, with profound impact on the economy, security, environment and the social fabric. Cox’s Bazar, home to the world’s longest natural sea beach, and Teknaf, the gateway to the St Martins Island, have for long served as the hub of the tourism economy. Since 2017, however, perceptions of insecurity, incidents of harassment at tourist destinations and the spread of mendicancy have adversely affected the tourism sector and the projected decline of several hundred thousand tourists was realised within the first year.
The flow of Yaba and other synthetic drugs from Myanmar’s border areas, particularly territories under the control of the Arakan Army, has increased significantly. A section of the Rohingya population is exploited by drug trafficking networks because of their ability to move quickly through high-risk routes. Meanwhile, an average of 30,000–35,000 children are born annually across the 33 densely populated refugee camps, placing additional strain on the already limited healthcare infrastructure. High population density, inadequate sanitation, and malnutrition have significantly increased the risk of communicable diseases.
Moreover, about 7,000 acres of forestland at Ukhiya and Teknaf were cleared to establish the Rohingya camps, causing damage to the region’s ecosystem services. This has resulted in adverse effects on biodiversity, including the blockage of many migration corridors of Asian elephants, the intensification of human-elephant conflict and the deaths of a significant number of both people and elephants in recent years. Furthermore, the struggle for dominance among Rohingya armed groups and organisations such as the Arakan Army has continued in and around the refugee camps and border areas while conflicts related to drug trafficking and the targeted killings of community leaders have deteriorated the situation.
Also, international humanitarian assistance has continued to decline, exacerbating the crisis. While the total funding requirement stood at $934.5 million in 2025, it declined to $710.5 million in 2026, a reduction of about 24 per cent. During the same period, however, the number of people in need increased from 1.48 million to 1.89 million, representing a 28 per cent increase. This has directly contributed to an increase in camp departure, human trafficking and dangerous irregular migration by sea. At the same time, the influx of Rohingyas have turned the local people into a minority, depressed wages for them and generated tension over land, posing serious long-term risks to social stability and community resilience.
Way forward
NINE years have passed since the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingyas. Yet, they have neither received justice nor been provided with the opportunity for safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation to their homeland. Meanwhile, as the interest of the international community and the flow of humanitarian aid dwindle, Bangladesh is faced with the prospect of shouldering the responsibility for a protracted refugee crisis for an indefinite period of time. Under these circumstances, Bangladesh must use all diplomatic, legal, political and other options to safeguard its legitimate interests.
Most important, the international community has a moral and legal duty to ensure justice for the long-persecuted Rohingyas and facilitate their repatriation to their homeland. This is the least that they can do for the beleaguered Rohingyas as the community solemnly observes Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day.
Md Himel Rahman is a lecturer in international relations, Gopalganj Science and Technology University.
