The Rohingya crisis is no longer simply a humanitarian tragedy confined to the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. It is increasingly becoming a strategic fault line in the Bay of Bengal, where the interests of China, India, the United States and other regional actors intersect. What began as a mass displacement crisis following Myanmar’s military crackdown has evolved into a complex geopolitical challenge involving border security, maritime interests, regional connectivity, great-power competition and the future of the Indo-Pacific order.
This transformation creates a complex strategic dilemma for Bangladesh. The longer the crisis remains unresolved, the greater the risk that the Rohingya issue will become embedded in the broader strategic competition unfolding across the Bay of Bengal.
The geography explains why the Rohingya crisis matters in the region of the Bay of Bengal, which connects South Asia with Southeast Asia, creating an intersection of major sea lanes, energy routes and emerging connectivity corridors. Its strategic significance has intensified the competition between China and the United States and also India’s views on its maritime security.
As Myanmar occupies a particularly important position in this equation, it provides China with access to the Indian Ocean through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, reducing Beijing’s dependence on the Malacca Strait. So, the Rohingya crisis therefore sits within a much larger strategic landscape, with the Bangladesh-Myanmar-China economic corridor proposal that will create strategic complexity in the Bay of Bengal Region.
From humanitarian crisis to security challenge
Bangladesh has repeatedly emphasised that the Rohingya issue must be resolved through the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the refugees to Myanmar. The prolonged displacement has created substantial economic, social and security pressures for Bangladesh. Refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar remain vulnerable to criminal networks, trafficking, armed-group activity and radicalisation. The situation becomes even more complicated as fighting inside Myanmar intensifies, and the authority of the central government over Rakhine State becomes increasingly uncertain.
The emergence of the Arakan Army as a powerful actor in Rakhine has changed the strategic environment of the region. Any future repatriation process will have to account not only for the Myanmar military and civilian authorities but also for non-state actors controlling territory on the ground in Arakan. As a result, the Rohingya crisis can no longer be addressed exclusively through conventional bilateral diplomacy between Dhaka and Naypyidaw.
Great-power rivalry complicates the search for a solution
China maintains close relations with Myanmar and has repeatedly expressed support for resolving the Rohingya issue through bilateral negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar. China’s economic and strategic interests in Myanmar give it considerable leverage, but its priority is likely to remain stability and the protection of its strategic investments. Therefore, China’s role presents both an opportunity and a limitation for Bangladesh. Beijing has the capacity to influence Myanmar, but its strategic calculus is not identical to Dhaka’s humanitarian and security priorities.
Similarly, India has strong security interests in Myanmar because of its northeastern states and its broader Act East policy. Its approach towards Myanmar is consequently influenced not only by the Rohingya question but also by border security, insurgency and China’s growing footprint.
Meanwhile, the United States has focused on human rights, accountability and humanitarian assistance in responding to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Washington’s strategic interest in the wider Indo-Pacific gives the Bay of Bengal greater importance in American regional calculations. Yet American pressure on Myanmar alone has not produced a sustainable political settlement.
All of these create a strained reality for Bangladesh: the major powers have influence over the crisis, but none has sufficient interest or sufficient leverage to resolve it alone.
Bangladesh must avoid becoming a theatre of rivalry
For Bangladesh, the strategic danger is not the great powers’ competition over the Bay of Bengal; rather, Dhaka itself could become caught between competing strategic agendas.
Bangladesh has traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign policy based on friendship to all and malice towards none. Though the approach remains valuable, the changing strategic environment requires a more sophisticated form of strategic balancing.
Dhaka should resist pressure to align itself exclusively with any one major power. Instead, it should take issue-based partnerships: humanitarian cooperation with Western partners, economic and connectivity cooperation with China, security and border cooperation with India and diplomatic engagement with ASEAN and other regional actors. It allows Bangladesh to maximise its strategic autonomy as well as make the Rohingya issue internationally visible.
The Bay of Bengal is becoming increasingly contested in strategic terms. As instability continues in Myanmar, Bangladesh needs to strengthen its own maritime and border-security capabilities.
Repatriation must remain the strategic objective
Bangladesh cannot afford this crisis for long. Bangladesh’s resources are finite, while international attention can decline as other global crises emerge. The humanitarian response may have to continue for years, but permanent refugee settlement should not become an implicit substitute for repatriation.
The international community must therefore move from humanitarian management towards political resolution, that is, repatriation with peace and stability. It needs to require addressing the root causes of displacement, guaranteeing the rights and security of returning Rohingya, establishing credible monitoring mechanisms and creating conditions under which return is genuinely voluntary and sustainable.
A new strategic framework for Bangladesh
The Rohingya crisis substantiates why Bangladesh’s foreign and security policies can no longer be separated into humanitarian, diplomatic and strategic categories; rather, they need a comprehensive strategy built around four priorities.
Diplomatic diversification: Bangladesh should maintain simultaneous engagement with China, India, the United States and other relevant actors like Japan, the European Union and ASEAN rather than allowing the crisis to become dependent on a single external power.
Stronger regional diplomacy: Bangladesh should make the Rohingya issue a central component of its engagement with ASEAN and BIMSTEC, transforming it from a bilateral dispute into a broader regional security concern.
Enhanced border and maritime security: Bangladesh must prepare for prolonged instability in Rakhine State, including possible refugee inflows, trafficking, arms smuggling and cross-border violence.
Sustained internationalisation of the repatriation agenda: Dhaka should continue to insist that the ultimate solution is not indefinite humanitarian assistance but safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return.
The Bay of Bengal’s future is tied to Rakhine
The Rohingya crisis is essentially a question of whether regional diplomacy can resist a humanitarian crisis from turning into a permanent security crisis. As Myanmar remains unstable, Rakhine State may become a more and more conflicted area where military forces from Myanmar and other ethnic armed groups might clash, as well as with neighbouring states and external actors. This would have ramifications that would extend beyond the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar.
At the same time, the Bay of Bengal is gradually gaining significance as a part of the new Indo-Pacific order. The area is becoming more geopolitically relevant due to ports, connectivity corridors, maritime routes and security collaborations. In this context, the instability in Rakhine may not be considered simply a domestic issue of Myanmar.
The answer for Bangladesh should not be confrontation and alignment. It’s supposed to be strategic autonomy with credible national capability. The lesson is clear that Bangladesh has no ability to influence or manage the competition between the great powers, but it can influence and manage how that competition impacts it. The Rohingya crisis should not be regarded as a humanitarian issue but also as a key component of the national security and foreign policy agenda. The real challenge for Bangladesh is to make sure that the Bay of Bengal is not another battleground of the great powers, not a mere witness to a game of great-power competition on its shores.
The time has come to move beyond managing the consequences of the Rohingya crisis and towards shaping the regional conditions necessary for its resolution.
Md Minhazul Islam is a Research Assistant at the Foundation for Strategic and Development Studies (FSDS), a Dhaka-based strategic policy think-tank.
