Far-right Israeli ministers began more forcefully advocating the wholesale removal of Palestinians in Gaza last week, offering timelines and government mechanisms to conduct illegal forced expulsions while displacement, demolitions and killings continued across Gaza and the occupied West Bank.
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz told a conference on Wednesday that removing Palestinians from Gaza is “the only solution”, saying Israel is prepared to do it “by sea, by air and by every way possible”, and that US President Donald Trump has merely “frozen” – not cancelled – his support for the idea.
Then, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir unveiled a seven-year plan, branded “Disengagement 710”, to remove Gaza’s roughly two million residents through what he called “voluntary emigration”.
Ben-Gvir added that, if re-elected, he would establish a Migration Ministry to expel Palestinians.
The US State Department said it “does not support any plan or proposal for the forced displacement, expulsion, or mandatory transfer of the population of Gaza” – but stopped short of directly condemning Katz or Ben-Gvir.
Then, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir unveiled a seven-year plan, branded “Disengagement 710”, to remove Gaza’s roughly two million residents through what he called “voluntary emigration”.
Ben-Gvir added that, if re-elected, he would establish a Migration Ministry to expel Palestinians.
The US State Department said it “does not support any plan or proposal for the forced displacement, expulsion, or mandatory transfer of the population of Gaza” – but stopped short of directly condemning Katz or Ben-Gvir.
On Thursday, two Palestinians, including a 13-year-old, were shot dead near Beit Lahia after Israel said they had crossed into an Israeli-controlled area, while a separate drone strike killed a man near a church compound in Gaza City’s Remal neighbourhood.
Strikes continued through the week’s end: On Sunday alone, Israel attacked near a school in Gaza City, wounding several, and a separate drone strike on a car near Gaza City’s Hamid intersection killed Youssef Akila and his young daughter, Wafaa.
Before dawn on Monday, at least five more Palestinians in Gaza were killed including three-year-old Saadi Ghalia, who was killed when an artillery shell struck a school in Deir el-Balah sheltering displaced people.
By Monday, the Palestinian Ministry of Health reported that 73,658 people have been killed and 174,622 wounded since October 2023, after 160 additional deaths were certified and added to the casualty figures. Of those, more than 1,340 have been killed since the October 2025 Israeli-Hamas “ceasefire”.
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Mass funeral in Gaza: Palestinians mourn around 100 killed in 2023 attack
The recovery of bodies has slowly continued alongside the killings.
Families in northern Gaza held funerals on Sunday for around 100 people, including 60 children, whose remains were pulled from the rubble of Gaza City’s Zeitoun neighbourhood, many of them members of the extended Malaka family.
Gaza civil defence chief Raed al-Dahshan told Al Jazeera his teams could recover an estimated 8,000 more bodies still under the rubble within 90 days if given proper heavy equipment, but warned that without it, “this work will continue for years”. Between 10,000 and 14,000 people remain missing under Gaza’s rubble.
In the strip, humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate without sufficient aid getting in. The World Health Organization warned that water contamination in Gaza has nearly tripled since January. The Palestinian Water Authority reported all five of Gaza’s wastewater plants have shut down entirely, with roughly 55,000 cubic metres of untreated sewage discharged daily.
West Bank: Demolitions and villages under siege
Meanwhile, Israeli forces carried out demolitions this week in the West Bank. In the community of Khirbet al-Tabban in Masafer Yatta, those demolitions were absolute – demolishing all 12 homes left 70 people, including 30 children, homeless.
“It’s wiping the village off the face of the earth,” council head Nidal Younis said. Residents, he added, intend to rebuild.
Israeli forces also destroyed four water wells and several greenhouses in nearby Beit Ummar in Hebron in the occupied West Bank, causing an estimated $60,000 in losses, and demolished a home in Nahalin in Bethlehem governorate.
Around Jenin, the bulldozing of hundreds of farmers’ trees continued along the Arraba-Yabad and Jenin-Nablus roads, part of six military orders issued in August to clear vegetation from across four Jenin-area villages, according to to the Palestinian Wafa news agency.
In occupied East Jerusalem’s al-Bustan neighbourhood, community representative Fakhri Abu Diab said municipal bulldozers demolished a four-apartment building – the 60th demolition there since October 2023. On Monday morning another home was demolished in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beit Hanina, according to Wafa, and authorities forced a Palestinian man in the city’s Jabal al-Mukaber area to demolish his home.
Despite all of the land and property destruction, last week’s most sustained violence centred on al-Mughayyir, northeast of Ramallah. Settlers and soldiers raided the village on the evening of Wednesday after accusing residents of stealing livestock.
Snipers took rooftop positions and opened fire as residents tried to stop settlers stealing sheep, killing Khalil Abu Alia, 16, and Mohammad Nassan, 19.
The Israeli military told the Times of Israel that troops were “securing the retrieval of livestock belonging to Israeli civilians” when a “violent riot” broke out and soldiers “fired at key instigators”. Eyewitnesses said Nasan was shot in the back.
In the days after, mourners were beaten and pepper-sprayed and their vehicle stolen, with an ambulance also attacked.
Wafa also reported late on Sunday that Israeli settlers killed Omar Tubasi, 20, and injured three people when they raided and opened fire on the village of Hajja, east of Qalqilya governorate in the occupied West Bank.
Elsewhere, settlers stormed Umm al-Khair in the South Hebron Hills on Friday, injuring a child. Soldiers who arrived declared the area a closed military zone that was enforced for Palestinians, not the settlers who remained.
In Turmus Ayya north of Ramallah, a settler wearing a T-shirt bearing the logo of the outlawed Kach movement was filmed atop a Palestinian home declaring “this land is Jewish” after US Ambassador Mike Huckabee visited the town and called settler violence “a form of terrorism”.
In Qusra, south of Nablus, a month-long siege of three homes continued, with the army initially blocking roughly 100 peace activists from delivering food and medicine. Settlers also stole water tanks and livestock in the Jordan Valley and sabotaged water lines serving a Bedouin encampment near Tayasir in the northern West Bank, according to reports and photos from local Palestinian activists.
In East Jerusalem’s Old City, Israeli police shot and killed Ibrahim al-Hendi, 33, from Beit Hanina, near Damascus Gate on Friday, claiming he had tried to stab an officer.
There are dates that divide your life into a before and after. For me, it is April 12, 2024. That afternoon, hundreds of armed settlers stormed our village of Al-Mughayyir under the protection of the Israeli army, setting homes and cars ablaze. At least 25 residents were injured, some by settler and soldier fire — and 25-year-old Jihad Abu Alia was shot in the head and killed, martyred only weeks before his wedding.
On that day, the settlers reached my home. They barged inside, vandalized everything they could, and tried to burn the house while we were still in it. My wife and I covered our children with our own bodies as smoke filled the rooms. Afterward, our children needed months of psychological treatment to recover from the PTSD.
But my wife, who was pregnant at the time, paid the heaviest toll. The shock of that day affected her pregnancy so severely that doctors were forced to deliver our son prematurely. Yaqoub, the wish of my heart, lived for only two days. He is one of the youngest victims of settler terror, a child who died before he had a chance to see the light of day.
For most people, Al-Mughayyir is just another Palestinian village on a map. For us, it has long been on the front line against the relentless Israeli machine of annexation and dispossession in the occupied West Bank.
Home to fewer than 4,000 residents, the village sits 30 kilometers northeast of Ramallah, with agricultural lands stretching east toward the Jordan Valley. Between us and those lands runs the Allon Road, a north-south highway built by Israel through the West Bank that links settlements across the Jordan Valley while largely bypassing Palestinian communities.
For more than two decades, since the days of the Second Intifada, residents went out to try and prevent settlements from expanding beyond that corridor and swallowing the farmland that sustains the village. Yet since October 2023, we have found ourselves in an existential battle, alone with no protection against Israel’s merciless apparatus of erasure and displacement, aimed at turning our daily lives into an unbearable hell. Our stricken village has become a living laboratory for the ugliest policies of ethnic cleansing and deliberate economic strangulation.
Palestinians attend the funeral of 14-year-old Aws Hamdi Al-Naasan and 32-year-old Jihad Marzouq Abu Naiem, who were killed by Israeli settler fire, in Al-Mughayyir, east of Ramallah, occupied West Bank, April 22, 2026. (Flash90)
Over the past three years, settlers have established eight outposts around Al-Mughayyir, tightening their grip on the village from every direction. Today, nearly all 43,000 dunams of our land have become inaccessible, either under the pretext of a “closed military zone” or because settlers have made it too dangerous to enter. Nearly 4,000 people have been squeezed into little more than a single square kilometer.
The army closed the main eastern entrance into Al-Mughayyir after October 7, and the only remaining way in and out of the village from the west is controlled by military checkpoints, where workers are delayed and humiliated. Delivery companies increasingly refuse to come. Teachers from outside the village struggle to reach our schools. Little by little, every ordinary act of life is made more difficult — with the clear goal of making us disappear.
Our only land
Settler and soldier incursions have become a feature of daily life in and around our village. Just this week, after receiving permission from Israel’s High Court, farmers went out to cultivate their land near the Allon Road — only to be attacked by settlers, while soldiers stood idly by.
The siege is not only enforced by these routine acts of military violence, but has also transformed into an economic and environmental one. In 2025 alone, settlers and army bulldozers uprooted thousands of our olive trees, many during a three-day total siege on Al-Mughayyir last August. Our village’s greenhouses have been destroyed, crops burned, and fields repeatedly damaged by settler-ignited fires and the gas of stun grenades released during military raids.
As settler outposts have spread across the hills, they have violently swallowed up our grazing lands that have served generations of shepherds. “Closed military zones” have barred Palestinians from land where settlers freely graze their flocks — among them stolen sheep, with some families losing entire herds — under army protection. Within a few years, nearly 80 percent of the local livestock sector collapsed.
A Palestinian shepherd walks with his flock among burnt cars in Al-Mughayyir, after a settler attack on the village, occupied West Bank, April 13, 2024. (Flash90)
The pressure reaches every corner of human life. The buildings that settlers’s fires leave standing, the occupation’s judicial guillotine pursues. Army bulldozers have leveled homes, shops, and agricultural structures on the outskirts of the village that fall within Area C of the West Bank, where Israel refuses Palestinian building permits, and more than 90 buildings remain under demolition orders.
The function of such orders is clear: Whoever is not killed by bullets faces the slow death of poverty and unemployment, and whoever endures the siege faces having their home demolished over their head.
This April, settlers opened fire during an attack on our village school, killing 14-year-old Aws Al-Na’san and Jihad Abu Naim, 37, who stepped forward to shield the students with his body. Aws’ own father, Hamdi Al-Na’san, 38, had been killed in a similar settler incursion in 2019.
And less than a month ago, we buried 17-year-old Fadi Al-Na’san, who died from wounds he sustained a week earlier after settlers launched an attack on a house on the village’s outskirts; soldiers opened fire on him and others who tried to reach those under assault.
I don’t know how a community survives such loss. I only know what happens next. If someone is wounded, the hospital fills with villagers. When someone is arrested, every family pays their relatives a visit. When we bury one of our dead, we bury them as though they were the eldest son of every household.
Despite the ever-present death and destruction, Al-Mughayyir chooses life every morning. It is, one might say, a school in the doctrine of sumud (steadfastness). Each season we plant new trees where others have been uprooted. We rebuild what is demolished because we know it may be demolished again. We return to land that others insist no longer belongs to us.
This is the only way, and this is our only land: Al-Mughayyir will remain.
A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here.
For decades, one of the keys to Washington’s power has been its ability to use favorably inclined allies as force multipliers. Now, facing its first peer competitor in generations, Washington has been busily alienating pretty much everyone it can. This alienation can be measured, and the results are striking.
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes surveys track favorable views of the United States and China across dozens of countries. In 2023, the United States still held a clear edge. A median of about 59% of respondents across surveyed nations viewed America favorably, compared with just 28% for China. By spring 2025 the gap had narrowed sharply (49% U.S. versus 37% China). By the spring 2026 survey—covering thirty-six countries—the reversal was unmistakable: China was viewed more favorably than the United States in twenty-five of them. Median favorable views of China sat around 51%; America’s had fallen further.
The pattern is especially vivid among traditional U.S. partners and neighbors. In Canada, favorable views of the United States dropped from 57% in 2023 to 33% in 2026, while China’s rose from 14% to 44%. Mexico moved from a narrow U.S. edge (63%–57%) to a decisive Chinese one (40%–59%). In Brazil, once solidly tilted toward Washington, the two countries are now roughly even.
Europe tells a similar story. In the United Kingdom, a roughly 32-point American advantage in 2023 had evaporated by 2026, with China slightly ahead (46% to 41%). Italy swung from a strong U.S. preference (around 60% versus the low-to-mid 30s for China) to China leading at 51% against 31% for the United States—the highest Chinese favorability Pew has recorded there in nearly two decades. Germany and France followed the same trajectory: large American advantages in 2023 collapsed into Chinese leads or near-ties by 2026.
In the Indo-Pacific the picture is more mixed but still revealing. Japan and South Korea continue to prefer the United States by comfortable margins, as does the Philippines – three of the six countries in the 2026 survey where America still leads. Yet even here U.S. numbers have softened. Indonesia, by contrast, shows a decisive shift: China was already popular in 2023 and has pulled further ahead as American favorability declined. Turkey has long rated China more highly; recent data only reinforce that preference.
These are not abstract polling curiosities. They measure the soft-power foundation of American primacy. Washington’s postwar order rested on the assumption that key capitals would treat American leadership as, if not always welcome, at least preferable to the alternatives. That assumption is eroding fastest precisely where it once seemed safest—among rich democracies and immediate neighbors. Younger respondents in many of these countries, including the United States, are especially inclined to view China more positively, suggesting the shift may have staying power.
The strategic irony is rich. Official Washington remains obsessed with “containing” China. Strategy documents, congressional hearings, and think-tank papers overflow with language about alliances, partnerships, and the necessity of preventing Beijing from rewriting the rules. Yet the practical effect of its policies—wild wars, tariffs that hit allies as well as rivals, demands for defense-spending increases framed as ultimatums, rhetorical escalations, and a foreign-policy style that treats friends as perpetual debtors—has been to make the United States look less reliable and China relatively more so. In middle-income countries in particular, publics increasingly see China as the more reliable partner and the United States as the greater interferer in other nations’ affairs.
This is classic government work—and for seasoned observers the own-goal feeling will be a familiar one. For roughly thirty years, American Middle East policy was sold as a project to weaken Iran and isolate its influence: the cumulative result was a stronger Iran, a more chaotic region, and a series of expensive American failures. The China portfolio is following a parallel script. The more Washington insists on primacy and demands that others pay the costs of maintaining it, the more those others begin to hedge—or simply prefer the competitor that asks less and offers more commercial opportunity.
None of this means China is about to replace the United States as a global hegemon, or that Beijing’s own governance model is suddenly attractive on its merits. It does mean that the force-multiplier advantage America once enjoyed is shrinking at the precise moment Washington policymakers claim to need it most. Allies are not obligated to underwrite someone else’s empire, especially when the imperial center seems determined to make the arrangement as unpleasant as possible.
Libertarians have long argued that overextended empires eventually trip over their own ambitions. The Pew numbers offer a real-time illustration. Washington set out to contain China and, through a combination of arrogance, protectionism, and diplomatic tone-deafness, has instead helped improve China’s relative standing in the eyes of much of the world. It is the sort of outcome that would be impressive if it were intentional. Unfortunately for the strategists, it appears to be pure accident: the predictable byproduct of a foreign policy that mistakes coercion for leadership and alienates the very partners it claims are indispensable.
A quarter-century has passed since the terrorist attack that killed almost 3,000 people in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. During the first seven years after that mass atrocity, Pentagon spendingdoubled. The aftermath of 9/11 was also a huge boost for “the intelligence community.” Despite – and because of – their failure to prevent the carnage on that day, the CIA and the National Security Agency as well as 14 smaller spy agencies boomed withenormous jolts of funds.
Along the way, some line items paid for torture that persisted during the George W. Bush presidency under the euphemism of “enhanced interrogation techniques.”
The most publicized location was Guantánamo on the island of Cuba. There, “the U.S. opened the offshore detention facility in an attempt to evade the rule of law,” the London-based organization Freedom From Torture reports. “In the name of the U.S.’s ‘War on Terror,’ people deemed by the U.S. to be ‘enemy combatants’ were detained at the facility. Many were tortured and denied basic human rights and due process… Since the first detainees arrived in 2002, Guantánamo Bay has imprisoned 780 men and boys from 48 countries… Yet only 16 detainees have ever been convicted of a crime – just 2 percent.”
Despite public pressure, Bush vetoed a version of the Intelligence Authorization Act in March 2008 that would have required CIA interrogators to adhere to Army Field Manual regulations. As soon as Barack Obama became president, he issued an executive order rescinding the free hand for the CIA director on interrogations that Bush had reaffirmed in a July 2007 order. Obama’s directive removed the CIA’s detention power and required the agency to follow Army Field Manual rules.
Yet five and a half years went by before President Obama acknowledged, in his notable words, “We tortured some folks.” He told a news conference: “When we engaged in some of these enhanced interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and I think any fair-minded person would believe were torture, we crossed a line.”
The acknowledgement came four months before the long-awaited release of a report in December 2014 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. While heavily redacted, it was a political indictment of torture. “CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values,” wrote the committee’s chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein. Among the report’s conclusions:
“The CIA’s justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.”
“The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.”
“The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.”
“Two contract psychologists devised the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques and played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.”
Months later, the New England Journal of Medicinesummed up aspects of the Senate committee’s findings: “Medical professionals, primarily private contractors, filled four basic roles at the black sites: clearing terrorist suspects as ‘medically fit’ for torture; monitoring torture to prevent death and treat injuries; developing novel torture methods; and actually torturing prisoners. All these actions were taken only after CIA and U.S. Department of Justice attorneys assured the medical professionals that they had immunity from prosecution and would not be held legally responsible for violating U.S. and international law against torture as long as they used the techniques approved in legal memos (since withdrawn) written to justify their actions. Lawyers agreed to provide immunity assurances that specific torture techniques were legal ‘enhanced interrogation’ methods only if the physicians assured them that they would be present to prevent permanent harm to prisoners. The CIA opened more than a dozen black sites around the world after 9/11, in which at least 117 prisoners were held; 39 of these prisoners were subjected to one or more torture techniques.”
At least hundreds more “suspected terrorists” who’d been captured by the U.S. were turned over to ruthless governments. “If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan,” former CIA officer Bob Baer said. “If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear – never to see them again – you send them to Egypt.”
When shocking photos emerged of vile mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, a media uproar caused an official probe by two-star Army General Anthonio Taguba. His report, issued in 2004, concluded that “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees.” Taguba’s candor got him pushed into early retirement. In the preface to a Physicians for Human Rights report in 2008, he addressed the matter of accountability by flatly declaring that ”the Commander-in-Chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of torture.”
But in spite of the voluminous evidence that documented high-level approval of methodical torture, not a single U.S. official went to prison as a result. Foreshadowing such impunity was a comment by Obama nine days before he became president in January 2009. On national television, he voiced “a belief that we need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards.” The words that came next were even more telling: “And part of my job is to make sure that for example at the CIA, you’ve got extraordinarily talented people who are working very hard to keep Americans safe. I don’t want them to suddenly feel like they’ve got to spend all their time looking over their shoulders and lawyering.”
The lack of accountability set a template. As president, Obama continued with his theme of governance without a rear-view mirror. On October 25, 2012, he tweeted: “We don’t look backwards, we look forward.” Career outlooks were bright for top CIA officials who’d been implicated in Bush-era torture.
“Much has been made of President Trump’s disregard for rules and norms – boundaries delineated by ethics and morality if not written laws themselves,” Adam Serwer wrote in March 2018. “But transgressing laws, rules, and norms isn’t the only way to destroy them. Another way is simply not to enforce them. In that regard, the 44th president, Barack Obama, bears a measure of responsibility for the recklessness of his successor, in particular Trump’s decision to appoint Gina Haspel, the Central Intelligence Agency’s deputy director, to run the agency itself.”
Haspel became the CIA’s director in 2018 when confirmed by the Senate despite her key role in the CIA’s torture program. Citing declassified documents, the National Security Archive at George Washington University explained that she “personally supervised the torture of a CIA detainee in 2002 leading to at least three waterboard sessions, subsequently drafted the cable that ordered destruction of the videotape evidence of torture, and served as a senior CIA official while the Agency was lying to itself, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the Congress, and the public about the effectiveness of torture in eliciting useful intelligence.”
The Center for Victims of Torture points out that “architects and operators of the CIA torture program have risen to prestigious positions in government, the private sector, the federal judiciary and academia.” And so it was after president-elect Joe Biden nominated Avril Haines to be Director of National Intelligence. As Obama’s CIA deputy director, she had worked to impede the Senate committee investigation into torture.
“In 2015, Haines had to decide what to do about CIA officials who had hacked into the computers of Senate intelligence committee staffers who had been compiling a comprehensive report on torture, and even drummed up spurious criminal cases against them,” the Guardianreported. “She overrode the advice of the CIA inspector general and recommended against disciplinary action.” The lead researcher for that committee, Daniel J. Jones (who was portrayed by Adam Driver in the movie “The Report”), warned against Biden going through with the nomination, saying: “This is about the continuing cover-up of the torture program, the long legacy of that. And I wish I could say Haines wasn’t a part of that, but she was.” The Senate confirmed Haines to the DNI job with an 84-10 vote. She remained in the position throughout Biden’s presidency.
Three months ago, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace announced that its next president will be Avril Haines. The organization declared: “One of the most respected national security leaders of her generation, Avril brings a deep commitment to public service and the values at the heart of our mission.”
These were the final days of September 2023. Terrorist attacks inflamed the West Bank, masses of Gazans regularly protested at the border fence, and the country was reeling from internal conflict over the judicial coup laws. Anyone watching the events with clear eyes could sense that an escalation was lurking around every corner.
UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed – known as MBZ – was particularly concerned. "He spoke with me about this often in the months leading up to the war," recounts President Isaac Herzog, who maintains friendly relations with bin Zayed. "He constantly conveyed messages that the situation needed to be defused. He even sent a special envoy to Israel who met with the prime minister. The emir seemed to sense that the area was on the verge of explosion."
Bin Zayed would also speak directly with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These conversations followed a standard procedure: A representative from the Emirati embassy would come to the prime minister's bureau, bringing a special phone device that ensured the confidentiality of the call.
But this time, the call initiated by bin Zayed was unusual. A week and a half before October 7, 2023 the Emirati ruler called Netanyahu from the Presidential Palace in Abu Dhabi and spoke with him for 45 minutes.
In that conversation, bin Zayed warned that Hamas' leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was planning a major operation against Israel. Bin Zayed expressed concern that the event in question would not only lead to bloodshed but also destabilize the entire region and undermine the Abraham Accords.
Three foreign senior sources are familiar with the contents of the conversation, the existence of which is revealed here for the first time. Its disclosure is the result of extensive research based on dozens of sources in Israel and worldwide, including very senior officials, as well as recordings, internal documents and correspondence. The research was conducted for the new book "Hostages: 843 Days of Abandonment" (Kinneret Zmora Publishing, in Hebrew) by the authors of this article.
Also present during the call was a close adviser to bin Zayed, a Palestinian who had emigrated years ago from Gaza to Abu Dhabi and maintained strong ties in the Strip. According to the adviser, the Emirati ruler impressed upon Netanyahu the need to prepare for the threat.
"The emir explained that, in his assessment, Sinwar was preparing for a major event," the adviser says. "He told Netanyahu that Israel should be ready. Concurrently, he recommended trying to find an economic solution for the Strip and calming the West Bank to prevent escalation."
Bin Zayed urged Netanyahu to take the situation seriously. To his surprise, however, the prime minister reacted with relative calm. Netanyahu said that, in his assessment, Hamas intended to operate in the West Bank area, and he reassured bin Zayed that Israel was prepared for any scenario.
The Emirati ruler would later recount the conversation he had with Netanyahu and the warning he also relayed to CIA Director William J. Burns. Bin Zayed shared with Burns the sense he tried to convey to Netanyahu that "something there is about to explode," and told him that the Israeli prime minister believed the volatile area was, in fact, the West Bank.
"The emir hoped that despite his reserved response, Netanyahu would take the message seriously and take action," the adviser says. None of them imagined that the prime minister would hear the message but wouldn't brief the heads of the defense establishment. The head of the Shin Bet, the head of the Mossad, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff – none of them knew about bin Zayed's warning.
To understand where the unusual warning came from, and why specifically through the UAE president, one must go back to what transpired behind the scenes in the preceding months. In those months, with Netanyahu's knowledge and approval, Israel held talks with Hamas on a "hudna," a temporary truce aimed at promoting a long-term arrangement in the Strip.
The contacts began secretly in early 2023, coinciding with the rise of Netanyahu's far-right government. Sinwar appointed Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas' political bureau, for the mission. Hamad is fluent in Hebrew and was involved in the secret contacts for the release of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit. At the same time, a senior Fatah official, also fluent in Hebrew, was recruited. The official, who will be referred to here as "Coal Eyes" (a pseudonym, for reasons of caution), is known for his reputation as a reliable figure, acceptable to both Hamas and the Shin Bet. His role was to convey messages between the parties, so it would not appear as if there was direct contact between Hamas and Israel.
In practice, these conversations were virtually direct. Ghazi Hamad and Coal Eyes would sit at the Gaza home of Nasser Sarraj, who previously served as deputy director of the Palestinian Authority's Civil Affairs Ministry. On the Israeli side of the line was the Shin Bet official responsible for hostages and missing persons. Since unrest in Gaza could also harm Egypt, a large part of the discussions was based on agreements reached in advance between Jerusalem and Cairo. Nevertheless, "this entire direct channel was concealed from the Egyptians, for fear they would be offended by being excluded," says one of the Shin Bet team members involved in preparing the talks, "and therefore it became a personal channel cultivated by Netanyahu."
The talks initially focused on a gradual lifting of the blockade on Gaza and increasing the shipments of food and raw materials entering the Strip. A new idea was also raised: establishing trade zones along the Strip's borders with Israel and Egypt, which would offer thousands of jobs to unemployed Gazans. The Egyptians were also willing to allow "safe passage" for residents of the Strip on their way to the airport in Sharm el-Sheikh – which would provide them with an opening to the world. The proposal to supply natural gas to the Strip from the Gaza Marine natural gas field, discovered in 2000 off the enclave's coast, was also put forward. The proposal was called "G 4 G," Gas for Gaza.
By summer 2023, it seemed that all economic matters had been resolved, and only the most sensitive issue remained on the agenda – the release of Israeli prisoners and the bodies of soldiers held in the Strip. In exchange for the return of Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, and the bodies of Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, Sinwar demanded that 500 Hamas prisoners be freed. He later agreed to reduce the number to 250 prisoners, and after tough negotiations, consented to the release of only 50 prisoners. The Shin Bet was inclined to accept the release of 30 prisoners, including 20 serving life sentences, from a list deemed "palatable" for Israel, in exchange for the return of the four Israelis.
The atmosphere was so optimistic that Coal Eyes repeatedly reported that an agreement with Israel was closer than ever and that both sides viewed the proposals as "feasible options." One of the Hamas officials involved in the arrangement initiatives testifies that "he would come out enthusiastic every time and report to his colleagues, 'It's happening.'"
An Israeli security source involved in preparing the talks confirms that "by the end of August 2023, Netanyahu approved the release of 30 prisoners, including 20 serving life sentences, to be chosen by the Shin Bet." According to him, "all that was required at this stage was the approval of the ministerial committee for hostages and missing persons, whose consent is needed for the release of prisoners, especially those serving life sentences."
However, Netanyahu repeatedly postponed convening the committee. Perhaps he did so out of fear of reaching an agreement with Hamas, or perhaps out of fear of the reaction from his extremist partners in his new government. To the Shin Bet representatives, who managed the channel with Hamas, he used to say he feared the story leaking to the media. "And so it got stuck week after week," the source describes.
When Sinwar began to show signs of displeasure with the lack of progress, Ghazi Hamad and Coal Eyes tried to reassure him that the reason for the delay was Netanyahu's preoccupation with the major turmoil then unfolding in Israel – the advancement of the judicial overhaul and the massive public protest that erupted in its wake.
Amid the ongoing internal upheaval in Israel, the perception grew within the Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah axis of resistance that Israel had become much more vulnerable, and that they could unite fronts and launch a coordinated campaign to defeat it. Internal documents show that senior Hamas officials at that time began to accelerate their appeals to Iran, requesting assistance in funding the attack.
Then, in early September 2023, Sinwar suddenly cut off all contact with the negotiating team. "He simply vanished from our radar, evaporated," says a senior Shin Bet official. A Hamas source explains that Sinwar lost patience with the Israelis' pace.
Thus, the direct channel established between a Shin Bet official and Hamas official Ghazi Hamad, which was managed under Netanyahu's approval, was severed. This channel, incidentally, would resume full activity a year after the October 7 massacre, in September 2024, when an urgent need emerged to extract the stalled hostage deal from the mire.
In September 2023, just before the die was cast, Sinwar arranged a private meeting with Fatah official Coal Eyes. "Tell the Israelis that if they don't make progress, I'm preparing a huge surprise for them," he declared emphatically. Here, he dropped a key word for the first time, one that should have triggered red flags: "Tell them to expect a 'zilzal,' an earthquake."
Coal Eyes left the conversation shaken. He decided to consult a close friend, the same Palestinian who had emigrated from Gaza to Abu Dhabi and served as a close adviser to bin Zayed.
"Coal Eyes was agitated," the adviser recounts. "It was clear to him that the operation Sinwar was talking about could affect the entire Middle East, but he was afraid to report the information directly to the Shin Bet. On the other hand, he was even more afraid that if he didn't update the Shin Bet, the Israelis might accuse him of collaborating with Sinwar. He genuinely feared for his life. Therefore, he decided to convey the message to bin Zayed."
"What is the meaning of this?" bin Zayed asked the adviser, who conveyed Sinwar's warning.
"If he says 'zilzal,' he means war," the adviser replied.
"Are you sure?" the emir asked.
"No, that's my interpretation," the adviser responded, "and that's also how Coal Eyes understood it."
Hamas' Yahyah Sinwar, and bin Zayed.
The Emirati ruler thought it over, uncertain. He was troubled by the possibility that, amid the regional tensions, the mere warning about Hamas' intentions to start a war could ignite the flames, perhaps with a preemptive strike by Israel. He finally decided: "If we are not sure, we will not convey any warning to the Israelis for now. We will investigate the matter thoroughly until we are certain."
To understand the seriousness of Sinwar's threat, Coal Eyes was asked to hold another meeting with him in Gaza. The meeting took place in mid-September 2023.
"Well?" Sinwar asked. "Did you convey the message to the Israelis?"
"No," the mediator replied.
Sinwar took a deep breath, and in a chillingly quiet voice told him: "Convey a message to them that I am preparing the mother of all surprises. A terrifying operation. Something extraordinary." Again, he rolled the word "zilzal," earthquake, on his tongue. "Please convey to the Israelis what I am saying word for word," he demanded.
Coal Eyes called bin Zayed's adviser from Gaza to relay Sinwar's words. "I asked him for all the details," the adviser recalls, "including Sinwar's body language, his precise tone of voice, and the context in which the words were spoken, especially regarding the 'zilzal' warning.
"I suggested he leave the Gaza Strip quickly and meet me at my home for a private conversation. By the end of the meeting, I understood that neither Coal Eyes nor I had erred in understanding the message: Sinwar intended to go to war."
The adviser briefed bin Zayed on his impression of the conversation with Coal Eyes. The Emirati ruler understood the magnitude of the threat and decided that "Sinwar's message must be conveyed to the Israelis, to the highest ranks there, as soon as possible."
Netanyahu and then Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar.
Indeed, on September 15, Coal Eyes and the adviser conveyed the warning to the Shin Bet. The head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, requested an immediate phone call with the prime minister, which was arranged by Netanyahu's military secretary, Avi Gil. During the call, Bar briefed Netanyahu about Sinwar's "earthquake" threats, and it was decided to hold a security meeting involving all relevant security agencies.
"Why did Sinwar send us a warning?" a senior intelligence official rhetorically asks now. "Either it was because he grew tired of Israel's foot-dragging, wanting to pressure us into an arrangement and not so eager to start a war. Or, as we prefer to think, it was part of his 'Great Deception' plan, and he wanted to test the IDF's readiness."
Either way, the defense establishment took no unnecessary risks. The security meeting took place two days later, on September 17, with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Military Intelligence representatives participating. At the end of the discussion, it was decided to hold a working meeting at the prime minister's bureau later that same day. Representatives from the Mossad and the National Security Council were also invited. Shin Bet representatives at the meeting estimated, based on cross-referencing with new intelligence materials, that Sinwar might be planning to get his hands on Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Israeli researcher who was abducted and held in Iraq at the time, so he could raise the number of Palestinian prisoners he would receive in an exchange deal.
The head of the Shin Bet qualified that this was only an initial assessment, and that the warning should be taken seriously, as it indicated a lack of deterrence on Israel's part and that "we are on a collision course." Bar recommended an operational method of "a fire-extinguishing bomb" – a code name for a powerful and sudden attack designed to quickly neutralize a major threat – or at least implementing "strong defensive efforts" in Gaza and the West Bank, if only as preparation for the approaching Jewish holidays. No decisions were made at the end of the meeting.
Seeing that Israel was not responding to the clear warning conveyed to the Shin Bet, the Emirati ruler decided to hold a conversation with Israel's prime minister himself. Thus, that 45-minute conversation took place at the end of September, in which he conveyed an explicit warning to Netanyahu about Sinwar's intentions.
A similar call reached the prime minister's bureau in those days from the Egyptian intelligence chief, Gen. Abbas Kamel, who warned Netanyahu of "something unusual, a terrifying operation," about to be launched by Hamas. Journalist Smadar Perry, who published the details of the conversation in the Yedioth Ahronoth daily, recounts that Netanyahu also told Kamel: "In Gaza, we are in the picture, we are in control. Our problem is with the West Bank, and that's where we are also diverting forces."
On October 1, in a discussion about the Gaza border riots and the identification of Hamas' intentions to carry out a terrorist attack in the West Bank, the head of the Shin Bet again recommended targeting senior Hamas officials, including Sinwar, who "was showing signs of arrogance."
As in previous instances when the proposal was brought before him, Netanyahu replied: "Prepare plans for me and I will consider them."
"He never said 'no'," explains a senior defense official. "That was always his way of postponing dealing with the problem." Another senior official present at the discussion recalls that in summing up the meeting, the prime minister said: "Continue to work on the capability, but for now, calm the situation."
Throughout the entire meeting, the prime minister did not mention the warning calls he had received.
"If we had known about the warnings, there's a chance it would have given more weight to the first message we received from Sinwar," says a senior Shin Bet official. "Perhaps it would also have clarified what was behind his sudden withdrawal from the talks in early September. It's possible we would have put two and two together and reached a completely different conclusion from the one we did, one that would have changed our entire assessment picture."
Netanyahu and Sinwar.
The roots of the complex relationship between Netanyahu and Sinwar can be traced back many years, to Sinwar's release from Israeli prison in the 2011 Shalit deal. After ruthlessly seizing all power centers in the Strip, Sinwar began to formulate a new, two-pronged strategy designed to extricate Gaza from its predicament.
"From an early stage, perhaps even in prison, Sinwar had two alternatives in mind," says a senior intelligence official who was closely familiar with Sinwar at the time. "On the one hand, he accelerated the development of Hamas' military capabilities, turning it into a powerful terrorist army that repeatedly clashed with Israel. On the other hand, he let the realization sink in that in all rounds of fighting, Gaza has been decisively defeated. Therefore, despite all his hatred for Israel, a chance should be given to an attempt to reach an arrangement that would allow for normal life in Gaza, even before putting the Hamas army into action if the arrangement did not materialize."
In 2017, Sinwar decided to take a surprising step. He contacted his sworn rival, former Fatah official and current businessman, Mohammed Dahlan. The two peers from Khan Yunis knew each other from their university days in Gaza, and even then, intense animosity existed between them. The tension escalated when Dahlan, head of preventive security in the Palestinian Authority during its rule in the Gaza Strip, waged an all-out war against Hamas leaders. When Hamas forcibly seized power in Gaza, Dahlan was placed at the top of the assassination list.
But now Sinwar believed he could use Dahlan and the connections he had established with both the Egyptian government and Israeli security services. In summer 2017, after almost 40 years of estrangement and animosity, Sinwar met with Dahlan at his home in Cairo, along with several other senior Hamas officials, including Mohammed Deif, head of the military wing, and Moussa Abu Marzouk, a member of Hamas' political bureau.
Sinwar.
Sinwar described to Dahlan the severe suffering in Gaza and asked him to convey messages to Netanyahu about his desire for a satisfactory arrangement. Its core elements were easing the blockade and boosting the Gazan economy, primarily by creating jobs.
Dahlan brought the Egyptians into the picture to help mediate between Sinwar and Netanyahu. The initiative created a network of indirect working relations between Israel and Hamas. A glimpse of these contacts would be revealed retrospectively in 2022, when then-National Security Council head Meir Ben-Shabbat disclosed in an interview with Yedioth Ahronoth the negotiations conducted with Sinwar. Ben-Shabbat presented a note that Sinwar had written in Hebrew and sent to Netanyahu in 2018: "Calculated risk."
"That was one of the beautiful moments in the process," Ben-Shabbat said. "I understand from this that Sinwar is very attentive to what is happening on the Israeli side, analyzes every utterance from politicians, understands the dilemmas and introduces his own input into them."
In August 2018, the contacts matured into a meeting of senior Israeli officials on the matter, in the presence of the prime minister. During the meeting, a structured plan was presented for formulating a deal in which the four prisoners would be returned in exchange for a mutual cease-fire and an Israeli agreement to an arrangement and significant easing of the blockade on Gaza.
The next stage concerned the exchange deal itself. In exchange for Hamas releasing the four Israelis, Israel agreed to release Hamas prisoners, including those arrested in the 2014 Gaza war (Operation Protective Edge), with the exception of those involved in significant terrorist activity. The meeting's summary document stated that "postponing a captive and missing persons exchange deal, and separating it from the arrangement process, could lead to delaying the solution for the return of captives and missing persons for years to come."
Senior defense officials concluded that the conditions were the most conducive for Israel to reach a prisoner exchange deal at reasonable costs. Netanyahu summed up the discussion and committed to making a decision. However, time passed, and Netanyahu began to hesitate and delayed approving the arrangement process.
On the other hand, when security agencies identified excessive operational activity by Hamas, Netanyahu repeatedly refused to authorize initiating a powerful operation against them. "It was already routine," a senior officer recounts. "They fire rockets, we respond, there's a round of fighting, residents of [Israel's] Gaza border area are exhausted, and it costs a lot of money. The army wanted to launch a broad and thorough military operation in Gaza several times, but the very government of the person who promised before his election 'to be strong against Hamas' insisted on not escalating and diligently preserving the 'asset' named Hamas. 'Calm down,' they would tell us, 'let us focus on the north and Iran.'"
A former IDF major general testifies that he heard "more than once the chief of staff, Herzl Halevi, criticizing Netanyahu's containment policy." He would describe it in vivid terms in meetings: "It's like having a nail sticking out of the wall at home, and instead of pulling it out, you gather all the family members, including the children, and tell them: 'Every time you pass here, beware of the nail.' When we agreed to live with the nail, we didn't understand that what would happen in the end is that instead of removing it from the wall – we would be impaled on it."
Then the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, and contacts between Hamas and Israel were severed. Israel focused on addressing the new problems brought by the pandemic and, at the same time, was swept into five consecutive election rounds. Within the axis of resistance, a new strategic idea began to take hold: that the day was near when a decisive blow could be dealt to Israel in its weakness. Sinwar, for his part, continued to invest much effort and money in developing the tunnel project in Gaza and in training and arming the Hamas army for the day of reckoning.
Almost three more years would pass before the day of reckoning arrived. "When you read these words of ours, thousands of jihad fighters from the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades will emerge to attack targets of the criminal Zionist occupation, and will bomb enemy outposts, its concentrations [towns] and its junctions in the southern area of occupied Palestine," Sinwar and his associates Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa announced in a letter they sent to Hezbollah on the morning of October 7, in an attempt to persuade the organization's leader at the time, Hassan Nasrallah, to join the operation. "They will breach the separation fence to confront and fight against the occupation forces and seize military and civilian positions in the area and capture many occupation soldiers."
At 6:29 A.M. on October 7, the "zilzal" arrived. By noon, social media in Israel and worldwide were already flooded with horrific footage of the massacre – live-streamed killings, arson and destruction. Dozens of videos showed civilians being abducted into the Gaza Strip.
When the Israeli security cabinet convened with some delay, at 2:45 P.M., there was still no clear idea of the number of people abducted. "Currently there are 14 soldiers and 28 civilian hostages, and dozens more with whom there has been no contact," the head of the Shin Bet said. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich demanded that the captives be ignored, stating that "it's impossible to operate with such a mindset."
"I instructed the IDF: No negotiations whatsoever," Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared. "They will only talk to us when they are on the ground, with their heads underwater."
Qatar's Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani and Mossad Director David Barnea.
By evening, the world was flooded with horrifying information about the abduction of hundreds of men and women, children and elderly. At 7 P.M., Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani called Mossad Director David Barnea, with whom he had a friendly relationship. "Dedi Boy," the Qatari ruler used to affectionately call the Israeli intelligence official. The two had met just a week earlier, at the end of Yom Kippur. Barnea had traveled to Doha then on Netanyahu's behalf to ask the Qataris to increase financial aid to the Strip.
Al-Thani was agitated. "I just finished a conversation with Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy Khalil al-Hayya, who had only recently arrived in Doha," he briefed Barnea. "I explicitly threatened them that if all civilian hostages are not released immediately, I will personally order their expulsion from Qatar. I would like to inform you that Hamas is ready to release all civilians now, and we are prepared to mediate."
The Israeli Mossad director's response left al-Thani confused. "If they want to release the civilians, let them release them," Barnea replied. "We are not prepared to speak with Hamas." "These are not the Israelis I know," the Qatari leader told his associates. "This is not the Dedi Barnea I know."
Rawhi Mushtaha, Sinwar's right-hand man, and former Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan.
Barnea, his associates admit, did hear from Qatar's prime minister in their first conversation that Hamas was willing to release the civilians, but that the terrorist organization set unacceptable conditions, such as halting the IDF's incursion into Gaza and new rights for worshippers on the Temple Mount. Qatar's prime minister denies the claim. "On the first day, Hamas leaders did not set any draconian conditions," his adviser says, "because our threat to them was real, and they were not in a position to impose conditions at all."
Al-Thani did not give up. He called U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. "Listen," he told him, "there are hundreds of hostages in Gaza, and among them, in my estimation, dozens of civilians. They need to be released now. I offered the Israelis to mediate a quick deal for their release, but they are not interested."
Blinken informed al-Thani that he planned to fly to Israel within three days. "Let's wait," he reassured him. "I will speak with Netanyahu personally." Al-Thani pressed on. "You know that time is an important factor. We need to act now." Blinken stopped him: "Right now, the situation is complex. Israel is still under attack, and there's no one to talk to. We will wait three days."
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The next morning, far from the diplomatic talks between Israel and Doha, Rawhi Mushtaha, Sinwar's right-hand man, called Dahlan's associate, Samir Mashharawi. In a phone call from Gaza, Mushtaha, on behalf of Sinwar, asked Dahlan to help them quickly find a mediator to advance a cease-fire deal. To lend weight to his request, Mushtaha added: "Our friend is listening," referring to Sinwar, who was tuned in to the conversation.
Mashharawi reported the call to Dahlan. According to him, Dahlan told him that "'first and foremost, they need to release all the civilians, the children, the elderly and the babies.' Without that, there's nothing to talk about. What they did was madness. They didn't cross a red line; they crossed a black line. If the civilians are released, there will be a feeling in the Israeli public that there is something to talk about. If not, let them eat what they cooked."
Mashharawi conveyed Dahlan's message to Hamas. "Give me 24 hours and I'll get back to you," Mushtaha replied. Surprisingly, he returned just one hour later. He had a message: Sinwar was ready to release all civilians. It should be noted that when Sinwar refers to civilians, he means only those up to 18 years old and over 50 years old.
"He told me that in the first stage, they had no problem releasing all civilians without anything in return," Mashharawi recounts. "I swear, those were his exact words: all civilians, without anything in return. They had only one condition: They wanted us to bring in an agreed-upon mediator as quickly as possible, so that negotiations could immediately begin over everything else – the release of soldiers and officers in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and then the issue of the blockade on Gaza."
Dahlan activated his contacts with the Shin Bet and conveyed the information to them. According to Mashharawi, "the unofficial response Dahlan received from them was: 'Netanyahu doesn't want to talk about anything. He only wants war and the elimination of Hamas.'" The Israelis' perception was: First, we eliminate Hamas, and then we'll retrieve the hostages by force."
A senior defense official admits that at least some of the proposals for the release of civilian hostages reached the Mossad, the Shin Bet and the prime minister. But according to him, even if they were concrete, the military establishment, which needed 24 hours to gain control of the situation, and even more so the stunned political leadership, were unable to discuss the matter in the first few days.
"To be honest," the senior official says, "the issue of the hostages was not seriously on the agenda at this stage, and no one at the military or political level was open to discussing the proposal. The release of the hostages did not even enter the list of war objectives formulated by the government on the night of October 7. Could the proposal have been properly discussed and a decision reached? In substantive terms, the answer is yes. But the prevailing mood was like after Pearl Harbor: We had just suffered a brutal blow, we were in the midst of war, who had the bandwidth to talk about stopping the fighting and starting negotiations now, even if it was to save the lives of dozens of people, whose final number was still unknown?"
Mashharawi recounts that on October 10, Mushtaha called him again, on behalf of Sinwar, to find out if an Israeli response to Hamas' proposal had been received. "I told him: I am still waiting for a response from Israel," Mashharawi says. "I waited a few more days for a response, and I approached the Israelis again, but they were not in a state to talk at all. Meanwhile, within a few days, the bombing of Gaza intensified, and contact with Mushtaha and Sinwar became impossible."
Blinken eventually arrived in Israel after six days. Immediately upon his arrival on Thursday, October 12, he met with Netanyahu, and the next day he continued to Doha for a meeting with Qatar's prime minister. "I raised the issue of the hostages' release with Netanyahu, but I did not receive a clear answer from him," the U.S. secretary of state told al-Thani. "Netanyahu is not there yet!"
Al-Thani reiterated his assessment that as days passed and Israeli attacks in Gaza intensified, claiming many lives, especially among civilians, Hamas' agreement to release hostages might expire. Blinken promised to try and speak with Netanyahu again. On October 14, shortly after his plane departed Doha for Washington, Blinken sent al-Thani a text message: "Netanyahu is ready for you to mediate. The Mossad director will arrive soon." The next day, eight days after al-Thani offered his services to the Israeli Mossad director, Barnea arrived in Doha.
Meanwhile, as could be expected, Hamas raised its price. A senior Shin Bet official who understood where things were headed recalls that as early as October 18, after the deadly barrage Israel unleashed on Gaza in those first days, he expressed his view that they should stop. "We should have taken a breath, bitten our lips, steeled ourselves and taken the blow of releasing all the prisoners Hamas demanded. Then, we should have found the first opportunity to re-enter the war."
According to him, "the first hours and days after the abduction are the most critical. As the days pass and the military response intensifies, both sides tend to entrench themselves in their positions, and the price of the hostages rises. 'We also need to act with stratagems,' I said. But when the idea reached the prime minister, he said: 'The moment a stratagem comes to light, it is no longer a stratagem,' and that was the end of it."
Hints of Hamas' willingness to engage in flexible talks also reached Col. (res.) Doron Hadar, who for many years commanded the IDF's General Staff negotiation unit. "I started receiving messages, collecting intelligence and other data, and the picture began to clarify: Given the situation, with the other side also stunned, with Hamas alarmed by the international public relations damage created by the images of hundreds of hostages, elderly, frightened women, and crying children, we could create an agreement framework within which, if we wished, it wouldn't be difficult to later argue that Hamas violated it, and launch an attack.
"It is clear to me, of course, that our side is in complete shock, and no less than that, raging with anger. But ultimately, you expect the leadership to know how to separate emotional processes from rational ones, and take a moment to consider what is actually the right thing to do at this point. Like making a deal with this devil, and then killing him."
In mid-October, Hadar attended a meeting held in the office of Ophir Falk, Netanyahu's foreign policy adviser, which dealt with the emerging order of war objectives. Hadar asked to present his perspective to the forum. "I asked Falk: 'Tell me, do you understand what's happening here?' Hadar recounts. 'We can bring back the women, the children, now. This is a one-for-one exchange. We can initiate a move.'"
Falk stopped the discussion and asked the other attendees to leave the room. "I continued," Hadar recalls, "and I told him: 'Let's advance a deal. We'll offer them a thousand prisoners, even two thousand if we have to. The world is with us now, let's exert international pressure and advance a deal.'"
But Falk stopped Hadar. "There will be no deal here," he told him. "This is ISIS. They are murderers. They will get nothing. Change your mindset, Doron."
"The basic problem was that Hamas was looking for a 'permanent end to the conflict,' as they called it," concludes William J. Burns, the former CIA director, in his characteristically measured manner, summing up the labyrinth into which the hostage issue would become entangled. "Netanyahu was only willing to consider a 'first phase' deal, but claimed he had to constantly reserve the option 'to continue destroying Hamas later,' as he defined it. And that, for us, was always the challenge: How do we square this circle and manage to bring everyone back?"
The result was that, when it came to dealing with its citizens and soldiers held captive by the enemy, the State of Israel did indeed change its mindset. And so, another two years of war would pass before an agreement was signed that would bring back the last of the hostages from Gaza, alive or dead, with Hamas still standing.
The prime minister's bureau called the investigation an "absolute lie."
"Prime Minister Netanyahu didn't speak to the president of the UAE during the period in question and received no warning from him," the response said.
Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and former IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi said that they had not been informed of the warning delivered by the president of the UAE.
Haaretz reached out to President bin Zayed for comment, but didn't receive one.
