LDC graduation delayed: Who really wins? by Anisuzzaman Chowdhury

LDC graduation delayed: Who really wins?

 The passage of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution (A/81/L.8) approving Bangladesh’s request for an extension of the preparatory period for its graduation from the least developed country (LDC) category by three more years has been greeted in Bangladesh with a sigh of relief.

Instead of the end of November 2026, as previously scheduled, Bangladesh and Nepal will now graduate from their LDC status in November 2029. There is a feeling that Bangladesh has been saved from an imminent catastrophe.

In granting the extension, the UNGA gave due consideration to the severity of the challenges faced by Bangladesh and Nepal amid heightened risks of uncertain magnitude stemming from recent conflicts and associated disruptions in international energy and supply flows, uncertainties concerning global trade, as well as the complexity and specific nature of the recent political transitions in both countries, which may affect the governments’ capacity to respond to external shocks.

A slap in the Interim Government’s face?

Readers of this column may recall that the Interim Government was in favour of Bangladesh’s scheduled LDC graduation on 24 November 2026. So, many will try to present the UNGA resolution as a slap in the face of the Interim Government.

I, who was given the responsibility as the Chief Adviser’s Special Assistant to guide the country’s preparations for LDC graduation, have an obligation to explain the circumstances and actions of the Interim Government.

First, the decision to stay on course was not taken in a vacuum or in a whimsical manner. It was based on rigorous analyses of facts and the recommendations of experts responsible for the White Paper on the state of the economy.

Second, the Interim Government did not sit idle; it prepared a “Smooth Transition Strategy” and accelerated its implementation.

Third, the UN assessed Bangladesh’s LDC graduation preparations in February 2025 and found, “The five interrelated pillars [of Interim Government’s strategy] offer a comprehensive framework to address immediate and long-term economic challenges, facilitating a smooth and sustainable transition.”

Fourth, the heightened uncertainties in the global economy due to the illegal US-Israel war on Iran and Trump’s unilateral, whimsical, so-called reciprocal tariffs were absent at the time of the Interim Government’s decision.

Fifth, the Interim Government invited the United Nations to independently assess Bangladesh’s preparations in anticipation of Trump-tariff-induced global uncertainties and in consideration of the impending change of government following the February national elections and the new government’s capacity to respond to external shocks. The UN’s assessment report has been the key document for the UNGA’s resolution in favour of the extension granted.

Sixth, the UNGA resolution explicitly endorsed the Interim Government’s preparation strategy when it “invites Bangladesh to advance domestic reforms and continue to implement, during the extended preparatory period … its national smooth transition strategy.”

The above facts clearly demonstrate that the Interim Government was on the right track. Those who are out to delegitimise the Interim Government have no leg to stand on.

A win for Bangladesh?

The extra three years for preparations could be a win for Bangladesh, provided it accelerates the implementation of the Interim Government’s reforms and Smooth Transition Strategy, as the UNGA resolution explicitly recommends.

One of the Interim Government’s key reforms has been the elimination of cash subsidies to industries according to a clear timeline. In the 2024-25 fiscal year, these amounted to approximately 16,000 crore taka in the form of direct cash subsidies and reduced taxes.

Besides being a post-LDC graduation requirement under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, the elimination of cash subsidies is an urgent imperative given Bangladesh’s low tax revenue collections, resulting in high debt accumulation.

The urgency of this measure also arises from the need to accelerate Bangladesh’s structural transformation away from overdependence on a single sector, ready-made garments (RMG).

The bulk of the cash incentives goes to the RMG sector, limiting the government’s ability to support other potential sectors, such as light engineering, electronics, agriculture and processed food, fisheries, pharmaceuticals, leather and footwear, jute and jute goods, plastics, and information and communication technology (ICT), identified by the Interim Government.

Professor Munir Quddus of Prairie View A&M University has exposed the RMG sector’s stranglehold on the economy by comparing the RMG sector’s policy support with that of the leather and other sectors, as summarised below:

The usual justification for such preferential treatment is that RMG is the “largest export sector and foreign exchange earner”. But the argument is perverse. Given that some of these subsidies have been in existence for nearly 50 years, prudent policymaking demands that scarce resources be redirected to support other potentially dynamic export sectors.

Unfortunately, this trend continues today. Out of the government’s 60,000 crore taka stimulus package for industries, announced in May this year, a paltry 3,000 crore taka has been allocated for export diversification. The first policy initiative of the new Bangladesh Bank Governor was to allow banks to advance loans to the RMG sector for paying wages. This defies the basic principle of economics, taught in the first year of undergraduate studies, that a firm’s revenue must cover variable costs, the bulk of which consists of wages, to minimise its losses.

One should seriously ask: why should this sector be protected when it cannot pay wages from its revenues despite being directly subsidised? Is this sector really helping the country by draining its scarce fiscal resources and weakening the country’s fragile banking sector, already saddled with non-performing loans owing mainly to it?

The UN resolution is a win for the RMG sector, which lobbied for a delay.

The government must withstand pressure from the RMG lobby to turn the respite given by the UN resolution into a win for Bangladesh.

It must “advance domestic reforms and continue to implement… national smooth transition strategy” developed by the Interim Government, as the UN resolution clearly advises.

Business as usual will take Bangladesh to a blind alley.

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Emeritus Professor Anisuzzaman Chowdhury is a former Special Assistant (for the Ministry of Finance) to the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government, led by Professor Yunus. He held senior United Nations positions in Economic and Social Affairs in New York and Bangkok. Email: a.chowdhury@westernsydney.edu.au; anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com.

My TV interview on Desi TV USA

 I was interviewed last week by Desi TV USA's Unzila, which you can view by clicking here:

Human Rights, Democracy & South Asian Politics | Dr. Habib Siddiqui Interview

If you like it, please, share it with others.

Thanks,

Habib Siddiqui

As Burmese Rohingya bleed, immigrants in Karachi share grief

 This is an old article, dating back to 2012, published in the Dawn, which I am resharing for readers.

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As Burmese Rohingya bleed, immigrants in Karachi share grief - Pakistan - DAWN.COM

As the world rallies in favour of non-violence and mobilises against unjust oppression, a small community in Pakistan’s largest city struggles to raise its voice: these are Karachi’s Rohingya Muslims – a small band of immigrants who managed to escape from the Burmese oppression when the time was right. Today, they helplessly look upon the citizens of the world for a gleam of hope as their kith and kin are persecuted in Myanmar’s Arakan province.

Mahmud, a Rohingya Muslim living in Karachi says that over 90,000 men, women and children have been left displaced in Arakan. “Many were pushed into the water whilst they were trying to escape to neighbouring Bangladesh and several were beaten to death. We know this because we have been using the internet to stay in touch,” he says.

Pakistan’s stance on this issue of contention remains shrouded. Following Tehrik-e-Taliban’s threat directed towards the governments of Myanmar and Pakistan, the Pakistani Foreign Office said in a brief statement on July 26 2012 that there were reports claiming that the situation in Arakan had improved.

This claim made by Pakistan’s Foreign Office goes against Amnesty International’s report on the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Arakan. The report states that ‘targeted attacks and other violations by security forces against minority Rohingyas and other Muslims have increased’ since emergency was declared six weeks ago and that ‘Amnesty International has also received credible reports of other human rights abuses against Rohingyas and other Rakhine Muslims– including physical abuse, rape, destruction of property, and unlawful killings – carried out by both Rakhine Buddhists and security forces.’

It goes on to state that the ‘authorities’ should prevent such acts from occurring. The solution proposed by these ‘authorities’, namely Myanmar’s President, runs along the lines of forcing the nation’s Rohingya Muslims numbering close to a million, into refugee camps run by UNHCR or deporting them to a third country.

But UNHCR has rejected President Thein Sein’s proposals, claiming that the solution to this conflict is that Arakan’s Rohingya Muslims should be granted citizenship of Myanmar. And third countries don’t seem to want the Rohingya Muslims either.

According to reports the Bangladeshi government has given orders to force back Rohingya refugees whilst Burma Campaign UK (BCUK) claims that Rohingya Muslims fleeing to Bangladesh “are getting no aid or protection, while thousands more are turned back by the government of Bangladesh, literally at gunpoint, in violation of international law.”

The justification put forward by the Bangladeshi government for their actions is that their country does not have the capacity to bear a large influx of refugees. Nevertheless, this does not constitute as a valid justification for forcing back destitute immigrants to a land where, according to the United Nations, they are subject to many forms of “persecution, discrimination and exploitation”.

Says Nurul Islam, Chairman of London based Arakan Rohingya National Organisation: “Under present circumstances, it is impossible to get the exact number of casualties. What is coming to the press is largely distorted. However, it is estimated that many hundreds of Rohingya Muslims have been gunned or killed down whilst thousands of homes have been destroyed. Those who are injured have no access to medical treatment. People are now dying of starvation and disease.”

“Do you know that the Rohingya settled in Arakan centuries ago?” asks Ismail, a resident of Karachi. “My grandparents migrated from Myanmar to Pakistan in 1962. That was their good fortune. The Rohingya Muslims in Arakan are fired at from helicopters. When they try to escape to Bangladesh in open boats, they are pushed back into the high seas. How can you possibly rely on a death toll that puts the numbers fatalities close to a hundred?”

Specialist in Burmese Ethnic Relations, Professor Abid Bahar’s book, Burma’s Missing Dots states that Arab traders began to settle both in Arakan and Chittagong of present-day Bangladesh from the years 785 to 957 and that Persian was made the official language of Arakan under General Wali Khan’s rule of the region in the year 1431. It goes on to mention that a British historian, Francis Buchanon Hamilton, met some Rohingya people in Burma conversing in a language they called Roinga in the year 1799. His colleague, Dr Habib Siddiqui’s book mentions similar facts.

The United Nations estimates that there are approximately 800,000 Rohingya Muslims in Arakan. Yet, Myanmar’s Citizenship Law of 1982 does not recognise the members of this ethnic group as citizens. They are thus stateless and protection-less within their own country.

A statement jointly released on this issue by 34 organizations including the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, BCUK and the International Federation for Human Rights states that Myanmar’s Citizenship Law is not compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or with Burma’s legal obligations under international treaties. Furthermore, the statement proposes that the 1982 Citizenship Law should be repealed, and replaced with a new law founded on basic principles of human rights, should honour equality and non-discrimination, and help create an inclusive and tolerant Burma.

A report published in 2006 by the Alternative Asean Network on Burma brings to light, unheard warnings sounded in the past. The report states that “the campaign of displacement, denial of culture and identity, restrictions on the right to marry and form a family, killings, rape, torture and denial of food are a slow-burning genocide”.

It also mentions United Nations Resolution 47/144 passed in December 1992 which urges the Government of Myanmar to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection of the rights of persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities. Twenty years post, the Rohingya community is languishing in Arakan.

“Official restrictions on the Rohingya including marriage and reproduction are relevant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The harsh responses by racist extremists, the traditional role of the authorities in targeting the Rohingya for abuses, the absence of independent witnesses and the UN in the area,  and Bangladesh's refusal to allow fleeing Rohingya to seek protection all point to the strong possibility of genocide,” says Debbie Stothard, coordinator of the Alternative Asean Network on Burma.

As the violence in Arakan escalates to new levels and the number of people displaced climbs, it has become increasingly evident that the time for action is ripe.

“The governments of Burma and Bangladesh need to allow provision of basic supplies to the displaced and free access to independent fact-finding teams to establish the facts. There have to be effective community relations mechanisms to resolve conflicts between individuals and groups and to prevent them from escalating,” says Debbie Stothard, regarding the path towards establishing stability in Arakan.

She adds: “Most importantly there has to be rule of law where the law is fair to all sides and is implemented impartially. Many laws must be reformed to reflect modern standards and values, including the Citizenship Law. I am extremely concerned that the lack of effective responses could lead to similar situations for other minority groups in the country.”

The government of Myanmar has allowed UN investigator Tomas Ojea Quintana to visit the volatile region from July 30 to August 4. This measure should serve as a precedent for Myanmar’s authorities. It is imperative that transparent international humanitarian organizations and journalists are granted access to Arakan in order to bring all forms of human rights abuse to a halt and provide Arakan’s impoverished inhabitants with much needed aid and protection. Only then will this crisis turn towards the path of resolution.

The author is a freelance contributor based in Karachi.

Kashmir issue cannot be addressed through security approach alone, requires political engagement: Mirwaiz

 Kashmir chief cleric Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, in his Friday sermon at the historic Jama Masjid, said the Kashmir issue cannot be addressed through a security approach alone and requires “political engagement and efforts at reconciliation”.

“Our consistent position has been that the Kashmir issue cannot be addressed through a security approach alone. Political issues require political engagement, and longstanding grievances require sincere efforts at reconciliation,” said the Mirwaiz, in his Friday (October 30, 2026) address.

Referring indirectly to the Centre’s policy in Kashmir, the Mirwaiz said, “If the situation has improved, as is being acknowledged, should it not also be an opportunity to ease restrictions, review detentions, restore civil liberties and create an environment in which people can express their views and grievances peacefully?”

He said peace cannot simply be measured by the absence of protests. “If meaningful progress has been made in improving security, the next step should be to build upon it through reconciliation, release and review of political prisoners, restoration of civil liberties and sincere political engagement,” he added.

Referring to the recent report published by the International Crisis Group, an international advocacy group, the Mirwaiz said, “The findings of the report deserve serious attention. It calls for the restoration of Statehood, meaningful powers for the elected government, a review of stringent anti-terror laws and renewed dialogue between India and Pakistan.”

The Mirwaiz said that addressing security concerns alone cannot brush aside “aspirations of the people, who are equally important and must find a place in any meaningful process towards peace.”

Referring to the 2025 war between India and Pakistan, the Mirwaiz said, “The events of last year once again demonstrated the dangers of confrontation between India and Pakistan. We have always maintained that dialogue, rather than confrontation, remains the most responsible way forward. I raise these issues not in a spirit of confrontation, but out of genuine concern for the future of our people.”

He underlined that the “real measure of peace is not merely how much violence has declined, but how much trust has been restored”. “That is the message we should take from this report too,” said the Mirwaiz

The cleric, who once headed the separatist Hurriyat, said, “The report says that militancy, street protests and violence have declined in recent years, which everyone welcomes, as no one understands the value of peace more than the people of Kashmir, who have suffered enormously over the past several decades”.

He, however, added that Kashmir remains one of the most militarised places on earth. “One of the most disturbing aspects highlighted in the report is the scale of arrests and detentions since 2019. According to the Union Home Ministry’s own figures, 3,662 people were arrested under UAPA in J&K between 2019 and 2023, while only 23 convictions were recorded during that period. These figures raise serious questions about prolonged detention, due process and the widespread use of stringent laws,” said the Mirwaiz.

He said thousands of families suffer the consequences of arrests, detentions and prolonged legal proceedings. “They continue to live with uncertainty about the future of their loved ones,” he added.

He also expressed concern over the continued incarceration of Kashmiri political prisoners, including Yasin Malik, Shabir Ahmad Shah, Shahid Ul Islam , Engineer Rashid , Asiya Andrabi, Masrat Alam, and many others.

“We have repeatedly appealed for their release, review of their cases and humanitarian consideration towards elderly and ailing prisoners. I reiterate that appeal today. Justice and compassion cannot be separated from the pursuit of peace,” said the Mirwaiz.

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKKZssitB44

 

Jeffrey Sachs on Netanyahu’s Struggle to Keep Control of the World’s Most Bloodthirsty Ethnostate

Tucker Carlson

Situation of human rights in Myanmar - Note by the Secretary-General*

                               The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Kelley Anne Eckels-Currie, submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 61/30.

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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Kelley Anne Eckels-Currie 

I. Introduction

1. The Special Rapporteur officially assumed responsibility for the mandate on 1 May 2026. She has since notified the Secretariat that, owing to her recent appointment, she would not be in a position to present a substantial report, given the deadline of 20 July 2026 for submission of the report. The present report outlines an initial vision and set of priorities to guide the Special Rapporteur’s approach to the mandate, on which she will elaborate in her presentation to the General Assembly and future reports. 

2. As noted in the reports of the previous mandate holder, the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council of August 2026 on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, 1 and the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar,2 the overall human rights situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate and is characterized by ongoing, widespread and systematic violations of human rights. The ongoing and multidimensional armed conflict in Myanmar serves as the primary driver of these violations and is rooted in the underlying denial of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Myanmar by the military regime that seized power following the coup of 1 February 2021, as well as the history of denial of full citizenship rights to all the people of Myanmar by previous Governments. 

3. In the period since the report of the previous mandate holder to the Human Rights Council in March 2026,3 the military leaders have changed their clothing and their titles but not their fundamental approach to governance. Their level of brutality towards the people of Myanmar has only increased. They are increasingly enabled with new military equipment and surveillance and other technologies of repression and encouraged by diplomatic engagements with other Member States. But neither the military’s change of clothes nor the wishful thinking of other Member States will improve the human rights situation on the ground in Myanmar as long as impunity is the order of the day. 

II. Background 

4. On 19 March 2026, the Human Rights Council appointed Kelley Anne Eckels Currie as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. She officially assumed responsibility for the mandate on 1 May 2026, succeeding her predecessor, Thomas H. Andrews. The present report therefore marks her first opportunity to engage with the General Assembly in her capacity as Special Rapporteur. 

5. Given the limited time and resources available since the Special Rapporteur assumed the mandate, as well as the continuously deteriorating situation for civilians in Myanmar and refugees from Myanmar, she has not yet had an opportunity to make official country visits. She has formally requested access for an official country visit to Myanmar and received a response from the Nay Pyi Taw regime that “owing to  extensive responsibilities and national obligations incumbent upon the new administration, it is not ready to accommodate the proposed visit”. She is pleased that Bangladesh has agreed for her to conduct an official country visit before the end of 2026.

6. In the meantime, the Special Rapporteur has had opportunities to engage with local stakeholders in Myanmar, Thailand and other countries, both in person and through online consultations, since assuming the mandate. Broader and more sustained engagement with a diverse range of stakeholders, including those inside Myanmar and across the region, will be essential as she carries out the mandate. She appreciates the cooperation of Member States in carrying out such consultations up to now and encourages Member States to continue supporting these efforts. 

7. Based on the mandate holder’s initial consultations with Myanmar civil society actors and human rights advocates, as well as desk reviews of the reports and communications submitted directly to her, she has developed an initial vision and set of priorities to guide her work as Special Rapporteur. 

8. The present report sets out the approach that the Special Rapporteur intends to take in addressing the complex and evolving human rights situation in Myanmar. It is intended to serve as a road map for the mandate holder, while remaining responsive to developments on the ground and foregrounding the perspectives of affected communities and relevant stakeholders. 

9. The Special Rapporteur will supplement the present report with an oral statement to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session in October 2026.

III. Political landscape and initial assessment 

10. Min Aung Hlaing and the military leadership have dissolved the State Administration Council formed after the coup and have appointed themselves to nominally civilian positions following regime-organized “electoral theatre” that lacked basic elements of credibility.4 

11. These developments are a transparent attempt to recast military rule under the guise of nominally civilian institutions and do not represent a genuine transfer of power away from the miliary institutionally or individually. Of particular concern is that the military has further subsumed pre-existing civilian institutions into its structure, removing even the veneer of civilian control. The military has instrumentalized institutions of State to introduce laws and regulations that institutionalize practices developed under military emergency rule and to further restrict civic space and constrain civil society under the gloss of civilian authority. 

12. This institutional reconfiguration requires corresponding changes in terminology. References to the former State Administration Council no longer accurately reflect the structures through which the military leadership exercises authority, while terminology concerning the newly constituted institutions should avoid conferring any form of legitimacy on an electoral process and so-called transition that fail to meet minimum standards of credibility and are predicated on an illegal coup. 

 13. Despite the regime’s launching of a so-called “100-day peace plan” for the period from 20 April to 31 July 2026, the human rights situation across the country has continued to deteriorate due to widespread and systematic military violence against the civilian population and the extension of martial law in 58 townships. During the “100 days of peace”, the military continued to target air strikes, artillery shelling, arson attacks and ground offensives at civilian populations, destroying civilian infrastructure, including schools, healthcare facilities, religious buildings, markets and camps for internally displaced persons, and resulting in civilian casualties and widespread repeated displacement. Credible sources have verified that, during the 100 days, at least 753 civilians were killed, with Myanmar military and paramilitary forces responsible for 89 per cent of civilian fatalities, that is, at least 668 deaths.5 Of these, at least 146 civilian deaths were due to air strikes, with media sources reporting at least 657 attacks – more than six per day. Violence on the ground also reignited concerns for civilian protection as the military advanced on the battlefield. Credible sources have verified that at least 65 civilians were killed during ground operations as a result of artillery shelling and small-arms fire, and in arson incidents, cumulatively representing a 44 per cent surge compared to the previous 100 days. 

14. The Myanmar military continues to deliberately obstruct humanitarian operations aimed at limiting the civilian suffering caused by these attacks, including through telecommunications blackouts, movement restrictions and stops at checkpoints, thereby blocking the delivery of food, medicine, fuel and other essential supplies to displaced communities. Front-line humanitarian workers providing support on the ground continue to face harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and killings. In July 2026, three humanitarian workers in Dawei were reportedly tortured and killed, allegedly due to the assistance they provide to communities in the area. The military’s attacks on civilians and weaponization of humanitarian aid during a period reportedly aimed at peace underscore the urgent need for meaningful measures to ensure the protection of civilians and unimpeded humanitarian access. The intentional deprivation and denial of aid appear to be a tool of warfare, consistent with the military’s history of using the “four cuts” strategy, whereby the regime collectively punishes communities that are perceived to be supporting the resistance. 

15. While the figures already depict a devastating situation for civilians, they represent an underestimation of the reality, whereby military-imposed restrictions on movements and telecommunication are hampering monitoring and verification activities. Protection and humanitarian concerns on the ground have continued to escalate due to military air strikes, with the resumption of ground operations leading to a new surge in burning of villages and civilian infrastructure and the persistent denial of humanitarian assistance to those in need, including during natural disaster emergencies, such as the flooding in Ayeyarwady, Sagaing, Mandalay, Bago, Rakhine, Kachin and Shan in September 2026, affecting at least 1.3 million people. 

16. Credible reporting up to and including 15 September 2026 indicates that a minimum of 8,384 civilians have been killed by the military since the coup, including 1,873 women and 1,112 children. Out of the total number of verified civilian deaths, 2,530, including the deaths of 889 women and 550 children, were due to air strikes, Sagaing being the most affected region, with 804 verified deaths. This dire situation has been compounded by the continued denial of humanitarian assistance by the military across the country, and especially in the so-called “dry zone” of Sagaing, Magway and Bago. Rakhine State, which was the area with the second highest number of recorded civilian deaths due to air strikes, with 508 verified deaths since the coup, remains under a military-imposed humanitarian blockade, which is preventing food,medicines, construction materials, communications equipment and other life -saving items from reaching those in need. This situation further aggravates the conditions of the Rohingya community, which remains exposed to widespread and systematic violations by the Myanmar military, as well as abuses by the Arakan Army, including forced conscription. 

17. The situation of political prisoners across the country remains of grave concern. Political prisoners are generally detained in inhumane conditions and continuously exposed to human rights violations and sexual violence. According to credible sources, since the coup, the military has arrested at least 31,926 political prisoners, including 6,484 women and 641 children, on political grounds. Of these, at least 14,817 remain languishing in detention, with nearly 8,000 cases in the process of verification. While the President, Win Myint, was allowed to return home in April, his conditions remain detention-like. The State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains detained in isolation, without access to family or legal assistance. In August, the military allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross to meet with her briefly and publicize the meeting in the media, responding to long-standing requests for proof of life. Recent reporting on the situation of women political prisoners has documented extreme levels of abuse, including sexual violence, on a systematic basis. 

18. The Special Rapporteur’s assessment is that the current political and human rights situation of Myanmar is not an isolated domestic crisis. In the past year, since the previous mandate holder last addressed the General Assembly, the Myanmar conflict has become increasingly internationalized in both its drivers and its consequences, and the actions and interests of external actors are increasingly shaping the trajectory of the conflict and the prospects for its resolution, mostly in an unhelpful manner. 

19. Neighbouring States, including China, Thailand and India, exercise significant political, economic and security influence, while other States, such as the Russian Federation and Belarus, have important ties with the military authorities. In particular, the Special Rapporteur has concluded that China has become a decisive enabler of the armed conflict in Myanmar, particularly with regard to the conflict economy and the provision of weapons and technologies that enable the regime and its proxies to carry out associated human rights violations. Other Member States that previously withheld support for the military regime appear to be in the process of modulating their policies towards engagement with regime actors in ways that do not account for the human rights, humanitarian and transnational crime crises that the regime’s behaviour has precipitated or the likelihood that engagement with regime interlocutors could legitimize and empower an otherwise illegitimate regime, thereby worsening the human rights situation on the ground and further undermining the five - point consensus on Myanmar of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

20. Contrary to the Myanmar military’s continued attempts at describing the human rights crisis in Myanmar as an issue of internal affairs, the situation in Myanmar clearly has significant international and regional impacts, including in relation to, inter alia: instability, violence and displacement; illicit financial flows, human trafficking and forced labour related to industrial-scale scam operations and conflict economy activities; the drugs trade and other illicit trades; cross-border environmental damage; and other transnational crimes. 

21. Civil society organizations have reported to the mandate holder that scam centres in Myanmar are linked to broader networks of human trafficking, forced labour and exploitation, including in the rare-earth mining sector. Information received alleges that some individuals forced to work in scam centres have been transferred or sold into forced labour in mining operations, including in rare -earth mines. These allegations point to a disturbing cycle of trafficking and retrafficking across interconnected conflict-enabled industries and warrant urgent investigation.

22. Of particular note is the recent refoulement of ethnic Rohingya and other Myanmar citizens from Malaysia, despite the absence of conditions allowing the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of these individuals to Myanmar as a whole or to their homelands in Rakhine State. Given the ongoing armed conflict in Rakhine and targeting of Rohingya civilians from various sides of the conflict, this refoulement marks a dangerous and disturbing turn with regard to the situation of Rohingya refugees who were dehumanized and rendered stateless by past Myanmar regimes, only to find themselves instrumentalized by these same Nay Pyi Taw authorities when they are seeking political legitimacy. Likewise, any return of refugees or asylum seekers conducted in the context of cooperation with Myanmar military authorities is of utmost concern, and Member States are strongly urged to work with the relevant offices of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to accurately assess the situation in the country in order to ensure non-refoulement of Myanmar persons. 

 23. Myanmar’s human rights crisis must therefore be understood not only through its domestic political and conflict dynamics, but also within a broader regional and international context in which external actors can contribute to either sustaining the conditions that enable widespread and systematic violations or creating incentives and pathways towards their cessation.

 IV. Proposed priorities

 24. Based on the Special Rapporteur’s initial assessment, informed by human rights reporting and consultations, improving the protection of civilians will be a central priority of the mandate. Civilian protection must be at the heart of all efforts towards de-escalation, ceasefires and conflict resolution. Within this framework, the Special Rapporteur will pay particular attention to the protection and security of women, children and marginalized communities, as well as to the gendered impacts of the conflict. She will also prioritize the protection of refugees and displaced populations, with particular attention to the Rohingya. 

25. Another priority of the mandate holder will be to examine the growing intersection between key elements of the conflict economy, including transnational organized crime, illicit financial flows, human trafficking, forced labour and extractive industries in Myanmar. The Special Rapporteur will seek to document these interconnected patterns of exploitation, identify the actors involved and assess the political and economic structures that enable them. Particular attention will be paid to cross-border networks, financial flows and supply chains that connect human rights abuses inside Myanmar to regional and international actors and markets. Within this priority, the Special Rapporteur will also examine the nexus between extractive industries, human rights violations and environmental harm, including their impacts within Myanmar and across borders. Particular attention will be given to protecting the rights of environmental human rights defenders and addressing the risks they face. 

26. Lastly, the mandate holder will examine how the Myanmar military, through the instrumental use of the legislative framework and regime-controlled mechanisms, is abusing legal systems, policies and the public apparatus to restrict fundamental freedoms, rent-seek on the backs of a population already immiserated by its misgovernance, and target repression towards civilians, political opponents and others attempting to resist its reign of terror. 

 V. Conclusion 

27. Efforts by the regime to achieve legitimacy through electoral theatre, a performative transition to sham civilian rule, and external diplomatic engagements have again served to prolong the suffering of the people of Myanmar and risk driving a more intense and destructive armed conflict. External actors taking short-term approaches that involve attempted or even unintentional legitimization of the Min Aung Hlaing regime are unlikely to produce positive results for either the Myanmar people or those who engage with the regime. The Min Aung Hlaing regime remains the greatest source of civilian death and suffering, instability, impoverishment, corruption and gross violations of human rights in Myanmar and the key driver of the wider impact on the region. Going forward, the mandate holder will continue to prioritize communities under threat and the civic actors who are supporting them, and will encourage Member States to do the same, including by providing direct support to those working on the ground to document and ameliorate the suffering of the people of Myanmar. They – not their tormentors – are the true architects of a peaceful future for Myanmar in which rights are respected, and they should be heard and supported.  

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  * The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information

26-15089 (E)   

1 A/HRC/63/21. 

2 A/81/302. 

3 A/HRC/61/58  

4 See https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/statements/20251222-stm-myanmar-office-hc en.pdf. The previous mandate holder concluded that the military-organized general election constituted “electoral theatre” designed to confer legitimacy on continued military rule, rather than a genuine democratic process, and served to mask ongoing repression behind the appearance of civilian governance (A/HRC/61/58, paras. 15–28).

5 See https://coup.aappb.org/data-explorer.