Comments on 1975 Coups and General Moin’s Book
Ms. Ranu Chowdhury's comments only prove that he is a BNP partisan who has serious problem with General Moin's account of the history in the post-75 era that he wrote about in his recent book. Truly, R. Chowdhury's is an insulting piece (and not an analysis) and adds little value to our understanding of the events in 1975 or around 1/11. While the writer questions every piece of information that is put forth by the young officer - then a Second Lt. - Moin, she fails to tell us why we should believe her side of the truth and not Moin's. Who was she then, how did she know what truly happened back then? Did she have first-hand info, or second or third-hand info? From whom? How reliable is such info?
I see many such BNP-diehards these days that are upset with Gen. Moin and ex-President Iajuddin simply because they failed them to satisfy their evil desires in the post-1/11 era. Mind that it was the BNP that had put them in those high positions – deservedly or undeservedly. They are the ones that put Gen. Moin over some other officers that may had a better record within the Bangladesh Military (including my classmate Lt. Gen. Zahir) - hoping all along that he could be misused when needed. The same goes for Prof. Iajuddin. When Moin failed to carry out their evil intention in the pre-1/11 era that is when he became the 'bad' guy in their dictionary. And not surprisingly, Moin is now ridiculed as a 'tiny', 'shorty' officer who was “no-body important” and “only to be seen” and “not heard” during the coup of 1975; and his account of the history as a pro-Awami League rendering! That is like illegal punching below the belt. We could have been spared of this demeaning punditry from R. Chowdhury.
R. Chowdhury mentions about learning of the 1975 coup from "the horses' mouth." Can she disclose who those horses were? Her 'analysis' also lacks common sense. She says: “Zia instructed Nawazish to protect Khaled. But the angry troops killed their prize shortly afterwards.” What does it tell us about Zia's own leadership standing amongst his subordinate officers?
She questions the rationale behind long meetings of Sk. Mujib with the Pakistani leaders: "Yet, I fail to understand why he went and engaged himself in lengthy negotiations with the Pakistanis, following his master speech on March 7, 1971?" It is really interesting and makes one wonder where the writer was back in 1971! Does she assume that the March 7 speech of Mujib was sufficient to declare Independence from Pakistan and that Mujib needed not to meet with Yahya subsequently? It is always easy to blame any leader for a decision that went wrong or unintended consequences of one's decision made at the heat of the moment. But let's face facts about what would have happened if Mujib had done so. Was Major Zia ready to defend Bangladeshis in their struggle in Mid-March of 1971? Let R. Chowdhury answer this question honestly. How about Col. M. R. Chowdhury who was stationed in Ctg. Cantt.? How about Brig. Majumdar who was also stationed in Chittagong? Were these and other high ranking Bengali officers ready to lead us in the ensuing battle against the Pakistan army?
Based on what I read from the historical accounts of other officers and Freedom Fighters and what I was told by friends of some top-ranking AL leaders from Chittagong - Abdul Hannan, Dr. Zafar and M.R. Siddiqui – I am sorry to state that there were not too many Major Rafiqs in those days. Zia and Chowdhury were absolutely against fighting against their fellow "Pakistani" brethren. [See, e.g., Major Rafiq's "The Tale of the Millions"]
If Mujib had declared independence on March 7, it would have been not only suicidal for our nation, but worse still, our nation would not have garnered outside support from the international community, which, as we know, had been critical to gaining our independence. Yahya’s extermination campaign would have been rightly interpreted an “internal” affair, not that he did not try to sell it as such even after March 25 (but with little success). At the behest of Army orders, it would have been our own Ziaur Rahman, M.R. Chowdhury and Majumdar that would have bayoneted and shelled our own guys for trying to secede from Pakistan and violating the Constitution. The on-going negotiation also proved that Mujib cared more about the lives of the ordinary people than many hothead “Nidhiram Sardars”, some of whom actually were working as pro-Chinese and Pakistani agents [See in this regard: Dr. G.W. Chowdhury’s book - The Last Days of a United Pakistan – and the article: "Bangladesh: Why It Happened." International Affairs. (1973). 48(2): 242-249]. It is now so convenient to criticize Sk. Mujib for his decision to negotiate with Yahya Khan.
The writer fails to mention that the appointment for Rezzaqul Haider Chowdhury to replace Moin as the new army chief came from the BNP leader, while the party was no longer in power, and that decision was illegal and should have come, if at all, from the President. Well, Moin was smart enough to see what was happening and understand why he was getting replaced by the same power that had put him in the first place. So, he did what he felt he should have done to counter the BNP-orchestrated coup. The rest is history today. As any keen observer of the incident would notice in the early stage of the military backed government of Dr. Fakhruddin there was no special privilege shown to Awami League and its corrupt leadership. Many guys from all walks of life were booked under various charges. Of course, there were more culprits from the BNP than there were Awami Leaguers. Given the fact that the erstwhile government was of BNP and not from AL, it is not difficult to understand the reason for such arrests.
R. Chowdhury disagrees with Moin's version of 1975 history of coups. She believes that the August coup had support within the top officers, probably including Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, the army chief of general staff. According to her, the latter when told that the tanks that were taken out on the night of the coup did not have the ammunition for their main guns, immediately sent out a hand written note to issue shells for the cannons. And yet Khaled is mentioned as a pro-India guy and was killed in the Nov. ’75 coup. How does R. Chowdhury reconcile such anomalies?
If the reader has problem with Moin's account of history, there are dozens of books that are available on the subject today in Bangladesh – written in Bengali and English, some written based on accounts given by military officers like Shafat Jamil, Shafiullah, Faruq and others. Such would better serve our interest to get to the truth and nothing but the truth rather than a revisionist attempt by Ms. R. Chowdhury that faults anything that is at odd with her pro-BNP line, even that of a personal account of a young officer who had claimed to share his knowledge of the events honestly.
I see many such BNP-diehards these days that are upset with Gen. Moin and ex-President Iajuddin simply because they failed them to satisfy their evil desires in the post-1/11 era. Mind that it was the BNP that had put them in those high positions – deservedly or undeservedly. They are the ones that put Gen. Moin over some other officers that may had a better record within the Bangladesh Military (including my classmate Lt. Gen. Zahir) - hoping all along that he could be misused when needed. The same goes for Prof. Iajuddin. When Moin failed to carry out their evil intention in the pre-1/11 era that is when he became the 'bad' guy in their dictionary. And not surprisingly, Moin is now ridiculed as a 'tiny', 'shorty' officer who was “no-body important” and “only to be seen” and “not heard” during the coup of 1975; and his account of the history as a pro-Awami League rendering! That is like illegal punching below the belt. We could have been spared of this demeaning punditry from R. Chowdhury.
R. Chowdhury mentions about learning of the 1975 coup from "the horses' mouth." Can she disclose who those horses were? Her 'analysis' also lacks common sense. She says: “Zia instructed Nawazish to protect Khaled. But the angry troops killed their prize shortly afterwards.” What does it tell us about Zia's own leadership standing amongst his subordinate officers?
She questions the rationale behind long meetings of Sk. Mujib with the Pakistani leaders: "Yet, I fail to understand why he went and engaged himself in lengthy negotiations with the Pakistanis, following his master speech on March 7, 1971?" It is really interesting and makes one wonder where the writer was back in 1971! Does she assume that the March 7 speech of Mujib was sufficient to declare Independence from Pakistan and that Mujib needed not to meet with Yahya subsequently? It is always easy to blame any leader for a decision that went wrong or unintended consequences of one's decision made at the heat of the moment. But let's face facts about what would have happened if Mujib had done so. Was Major Zia ready to defend Bangladeshis in their struggle in Mid-March of 1971? Let R. Chowdhury answer this question honestly. How about Col. M. R. Chowdhury who was stationed in Ctg. Cantt.? How about Brig. Majumdar who was also stationed in Chittagong? Were these and other high ranking Bengali officers ready to lead us in the ensuing battle against the Pakistan army?
Based on what I read from the historical accounts of other officers and Freedom Fighters and what I was told by friends of some top-ranking AL leaders from Chittagong - Abdul Hannan, Dr. Zafar and M.R. Siddiqui – I am sorry to state that there were not too many Major Rafiqs in those days. Zia and Chowdhury were absolutely against fighting against their fellow "Pakistani" brethren. [See, e.g., Major Rafiq's "The Tale of the Millions"]
If Mujib had declared independence on March 7, it would have been not only suicidal for our nation, but worse still, our nation would not have garnered outside support from the international community, which, as we know, had been critical to gaining our independence. Yahya’s extermination campaign would have been rightly interpreted an “internal” affair, not that he did not try to sell it as such even after March 25 (but with little success). At the behest of Army orders, it would have been our own Ziaur Rahman, M.R. Chowdhury and Majumdar that would have bayoneted and shelled our own guys for trying to secede from Pakistan and violating the Constitution. The on-going negotiation also proved that Mujib cared more about the lives of the ordinary people than many hothead “Nidhiram Sardars”, some of whom actually were working as pro-Chinese and Pakistani agents [See in this regard: Dr. G.W. Chowdhury’s book - The Last Days of a United Pakistan – and the article: "Bangladesh: Why It Happened." International Affairs. (1973). 48(2): 242-249]. It is now so convenient to criticize Sk. Mujib for his decision to negotiate with Yahya Khan.
The writer fails to mention that the appointment for Rezzaqul Haider Chowdhury to replace Moin as the new army chief came from the BNP leader, while the party was no longer in power, and that decision was illegal and should have come, if at all, from the President. Well, Moin was smart enough to see what was happening and understand why he was getting replaced by the same power that had put him in the first place. So, he did what he felt he should have done to counter the BNP-orchestrated coup. The rest is history today. As any keen observer of the incident would notice in the early stage of the military backed government of Dr. Fakhruddin there was no special privilege shown to Awami League and its corrupt leadership. Many guys from all walks of life were booked under various charges. Of course, there were more culprits from the BNP than there were Awami Leaguers. Given the fact that the erstwhile government was of BNP and not from AL, it is not difficult to understand the reason for such arrests.
R. Chowdhury disagrees with Moin's version of 1975 history of coups. She believes that the August coup had support within the top officers, probably including Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf, the army chief of general staff. According to her, the latter when told that the tanks that were taken out on the night of the coup did not have the ammunition for their main guns, immediately sent out a hand written note to issue shells for the cannons. And yet Khaled is mentioned as a pro-India guy and was killed in the Nov. ’75 coup. How does R. Chowdhury reconcile such anomalies?
If the reader has problem with Moin's account of history, there are dozens of books that are available on the subject today in Bangladesh – written in Bengali and English, some written based on accounts given by military officers like Shafat Jamil, Shafiullah, Faruq and others. Such would better serve our interest to get to the truth and nothing but the truth rather than a revisionist attempt by Ms. R. Chowdhury that faults anything that is at odd with her pro-BNP line, even that of a personal account of a young officer who had claimed to share his knowledge of the events honestly.
Comments
Post a Comment