Briefing Paper – Freedom of Expression, Religion and Belief - from Burma Partnership
In the lead-‐up to the 2015 elections
in Burma, religious
minorities, especially the Muslim population, have been consistently subjected to state sponsored discrimination and violent
abuse, while simultaneously denied representation in the political sphere or in civil society.
This ongoing state of oppression, which was catalyzed
by the anti-‐Rohingya violence
of 2012, is backed by a popular
social view that uses extremely xenophobic and hateful rhetoric when speaking about the Rohingya and the greater
Muslim population, only appears to be getting
worse. At the same time, advocates for human rights and other members
of civil society
have continually reported on the shrinking
space for dissenting viewpoints in Burmese society, especially on the issue of religious
freedom and religious minorities, including for those who hold views defending the Rohingya
from persecution. A devastating hypocrisy has thus emerged in which anti-‐Rohingya and anti-‐Muslim sentiment is allowed – at times, even encouraged by the Burma Government and throughout public opinion – while nonconformist views attempting to uphold even basic rights for religious
minorities are actively shut down. The purpose of this briefing paper is therefore to explore
this contradiction between the oppression of Rohingya and the Muslim population of Burma and the suppression of freedom of expression for human rights defenders (HRDs) working
on the issue of religion
and belief, in a hope to bring about positive
change for the marginalized religious community.
In May 2015, the plight
and oppression of the Rohingya became a topic on the radar of every major global
media outlet. Sparked by a clampdown
on human trafficking in Thailand and the discovery of mass graves at trafficking camps along the border,
the Andaman Sea became a vast and watery
graveyard for thousands
of Rohingya refugees.
Abandoned by their traffickers, these refugees spent up to two months at sea in cramped boats, faced starvation and dehydration, and endured violent
abuse at the hands of their subjugators – only to be denied
the right to seek asylum from neighboring nations. While ASEAN
countries and the broader international community have since raced to take action, the refugee crisis continues to be a major
regional issue.
The scale of the exodus out of Burma – reportedly nearly 25,000
refugees in the first quarter
of 2015 – undoubtedly means that Rohingya people still
face desperate problems.1
1 United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees 2015,
UNHCR report shows sharp increase
in sea crossings in Bay
of Bengal, viewed 21 July 2015,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-‐ bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=554c8adf9&query=rohingya.
A meeting on May 29, hosted
by the Thai Government in Bangkok,
invited members of the ASEAN
community to discuss
the regional response to the crisis. The meeting confirmed that the rescue of those currently stranded at sea was to be the top priority in the short-‐term.2 Though nearby nations
initially denied opening
their borders to Rohingya refugees, Indonesia and Malaysia
have since agreed to set up temporary shelters for asylum
seekers while Thailand has stated
that it would provide humanitarian assistance to refugees
along its shoreline.3 Meanwhile, the response
from a number of civil society organizations was to prioritize the provision of humanitarian aid to the Rohingya in Arakan State.4 By addressing the factors contributing to the exodus of Rohingya, in this case the lack of adequate
food and medical
attention, these organizations hoped
to curb the refugee crisis.
While the granting
of asylum and the delivery of much-‐needed aid is undoubtedly an important priority in the regional response to the crisis, long term solutions must take into account its root cause:
the systematic oppression of the Rohingya, and the restrictions on freedom of religion
placed upon the wider Muslim community by the Burma Government.
The Arakan State Riots of 2012, which began in June, were the beginning
of a renewed and intensified level of persecution against the Rohingya. Initially confined to a series of retaliatory attacks between
the Rohingya and Rakhine
that resulted in causalities on both sides,
by October 2012 the riots quickly
became targeted against the Muslim religious minorities, which in Arakan State,
are predominantly Rohingya. Human rights violations during
this period included
rape, murder, beheadings, beatings and the burning
of Rohingya homes.5 Security Services were also complicit
in the ongoing violence
against the Rohingya.
Burma’s Nasaka border security
force, which was created
to monitor the Burma-‐Bangladesh border, subjected the Rohingya
to abuse, torture,
arbitrary arrest, and sexual violence.6 Rather
than
2 Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Thailand
2015, Press releases: summary
special meeting on irregular migration
in the Indian Ocean 29 May, 2015 Bangkok, Thailand,
viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-‐center/14/56880-‐Summary-‐Special-‐Meeting-‐on-‐ Irregular-‐Migration-‐in.html#.VWhJpLPe3H8.twitter.
3 Reuters
in Kuala Lumpur
2015, ‘Indonesia and Malaysia agree
to offer 7,000 migrants temporary shelter,’
The Guardian, 20 May, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/20/hundreds-‐more-‐migrants-‐rescued-‐off-‐ indonesia-‐as-‐pope-‐calls-‐for-‐help.
4 Burma Campaign UK 2015, International NGOs urge Ban Ki-‐Moon to negotiate aid access to Rakhine State, Myanmar,
20 May, London, viewed 21 July 2015, http://burmacampaign.org.uk/international-‐ ngos-‐urge-‐ban-‐ki-‐moon-‐to-‐negotiate-‐aid-‐access-‐to-‐rakhine-‐state-‐myanmar-‐burma/.
5 Burma Campaign UK 2015, International investigation needed into human rights violations against Burma’s Rohingya,
June 7, London, viewed 21 July 2015, http://burmacampaign.org.uk/international-‐investigation-‐needed-‐into-‐human-‐rights-‐violations-‐ against-‐burmas-‐rohingya/.
6 Teff,
M 2013, Myanmar: what will replace
the notorious Nasaka?,
Refugees International, July 16, Washington, viewed 21 July 2015,
http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/myanmar-‐what-‐will-‐ replace-‐notorious-‐nasaka.
arresting those responsible for the violence, Nasaka,7 along with the members
of the Burma Army, Navy, and local police forces,
carried out regular
atrocities against the Rohingya with complete
impunity.8
The conflict – which Human Rights
Watch classified as ethnic cleansing – resulted
in hundreds of casualties and the displacement of over 140,000
Rohingya.9 Confined
to camps and restricted in their movement, the growing population of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) will only continue to suffer without adequate international attention.10 At the Aung
Mingalar city quarter
in Arakan State’s capital, Sittwe,
barbed wire and numerous
checkpoints segregate 4,000
Rohingya from the surrounding community, limiting
their access to much-‐needed medical supplies, treatment, and food. In fact, the appalling
living conditions of the Rohingya
led the former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Burma,
Tomás Ojea Quintana, to describe the Aung Mingalar
as a “ghetto in the heart of Sittwe.”11
Of course, the persecution of the Rohingya has been occurring long before the 2012 Arakan State Riots.
The discriminatory classification of Rohingya as “illegal
immigrants” has occurred since Burma obtained independence in 1948. Under General Ne Win’s military
government, the Rohingya
faced sexual violence, abuse, and forced deportations to Bangladesh as part of the larger anti-‐immigrant Operation Nagamin.12 By 1982, discrimination of the Rohingya had become
firmly entrenched within Laws in Burma with the passing
of the controversial Citizenship Act. Under this Act, the Rohingya
were legally excluded from citizenship, which resulted
in over 800,000 of the religious minority
becoming effectively stateless.13 Now,
even temporary citizenship has been denied for the Rohingya; in April of this year the Burma Government ended the White Card identification system. Without
7 Nasaka was disbanded after international pressure in July 2013, but other security
services continue to employ similar abuses.
8 Human Rights Watch 2013, Burma: end ethnic cleansing
of Rohingya Muslims,
HRW, April 22, viewed 21 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-‐end-‐ethnic-‐cleansing-‐ rohingya-‐muslims.
9 Human Rights Watch 2013, Burma: end ethnic cleansing
of Rohingya Muslims,
HRW, April 22, viewed 21 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-‐end-‐ethnic-‐cleansing-‐ rohingya-‐muslims.
10 United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees 2015,
2015 UNHCR country
operations profile – Myanmar, UNHCR, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4877d6.html.
11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, Statement of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation
of human rights in Myanmar,
OHCHR, February 19, Yangon,
viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14263.
12 Human
Rights Watch 2000, II: historical background, HRW, viewed 21 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-‐01.htm.
13 Constantine, G 2012, Between Burma and Bangladesh: Rohingya, a stateless people, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting,
April 18, viewed 21 July 2015, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/burma-‐ bangladesh-‐rohingya-‐stateless-‐citizenship-‐act-‐refugees.
this, voting rights for the Rohingya have been effectively eliminated and most will be subject to further citizenship scrutiny.14
Freedom of Religion and Belief
In the lead up to the 2015 elections, Muslim voices
have been removed
from any involvement in the political sphere.
In early September 2015, the Union Election
Commission (UEC) dismissed dozens
of Muslim candidates seeking election
to Burma’s Parliament.15 The National League for Democracy, the main opposition to Burma’s
current government, is also refusing
to field any Muslim candidates.16 In September, the UEC also disqualified all but one of the Democracy
and Human Rights
Party’s 18 candidates, one of the main Muslim
political parties
that intended
to represent Rohingya
communities.17 This
could have led to the dissolution of the party as regulations require a party to field at least three candidates in the 2015 elections. The UEC later reinstated two candidates from the party after calls from the international community for greater
inclusivity, allowing three approved candidates to run in the elections, two of whom are Rohingya.18 Inability to field the candidates for the 2015 elections
could have effectively prevented Muslims from influencing any future discriminatory legislation that will further
disenfranchise and suppress their voice
or livelihood when the new government is formed.
Unfortunately, the policies
of the Burma Government have been supported by the pervasiveness of Islamophobia throughout public
opinion. While international media
attention began focusing
on the plight of the Rohingya “boat people” this past May, hundreds of protestors took to the streets
of Sittwe on 27 May, calling for an end to international pressure for their country to respond
to the refugee
crisis. The
14 Burmese
Rohingya Organisation UK 2015, Briefing paper:
the Rohingya, the Citizenship Law, temporary registration, and implementation of the Rakhine
State Action Plan,
BROUK, February 4, London, viewed 21 July 2015,
http://brouk.org.uk/wp-‐content/uploads/2015/04/Briefing-‐Paper-‐ on-‐White-‐Card.pdf.
15 ASEAN
Parliamentarians for Human Rights, ASEAN Parliamentarians urge international action to address escalating human rights concerns
ahead of elections in Myanmar, APHR,
September 14 2015, http://aseanmp.org/2015/09/14/urge-‐international-‐action-‐to-‐address-‐escalating-‐human-‐rights-‐ concerns-‐in-‐myanmar/.
16 Hindstrom, H, 2015, “In Myanmar, Muslim
Minority is Targeted
for Hate, Not Votes,” Al Jazeera America, September 20, viewed 21 September 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/20/muslim-‐minority-‐cut-‐out-‐of-‐myanmar-‐vote.html.
17 “Myanmar Election Body Rejects Muslim Parliamentary Candidates,” Radio Free Asia, September 01, viewed 27 September 2015.
18 “Under pressure on all sides, UEC reinstates 11 Muslim candidates,” Myanmar Times, September
25, viewed
September 27 2015,
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-‐news/16693-‐under-‐ pressure-‐on-‐all-‐sides-‐uec-‐reinstates-‐11-‐muslim-‐candidates.html
protestors claimed
that Burma could not be blamed
for the crisis, as the Rohingya were never a part of the country
in the first place.19
In 2014, an alliance of Arakanese Buddhists actively suppressed the access of Rohingya to desperately needed
humanitarian aid by forming
the “UN, INGO Watch Team.” International humanitarian organizations have since
reported immense restrictions in their operational capacity as a result of this newly
formed group.20 The most infamous face of the rising anti-‐Rohingya and anti-‐Muslim movement, however, is U Wirathu, the leader of the ultra-‐nationalist Buddhist organization, the Association to Protect Race and Religion, otherwise
known as Ma Ba Tha. Through the support of senior political
figures, including
Burma’s Minister of Religious Affairs, Wirathu’s followers have attempted to provide
a moral Buddhist justification for the violent persecution of the Rohingya.21
The success of the anti-‐Muslim
movement is exhibited
in the continuation of riots, incidents of extreme
mob violence, and the burning
of Muslim homes, which became a trend across Burma in 2013. As reported
by Human Rights Watch in the World Report 2014, communal
violence occurred most notably within the town of Meiktila
and in the surrounding Mandalay
region during March 2013, in which at least 44 people were killed
and around 1,400 Muslim businesses and homes were razed by violent
mobs of Buddhists.22 Similar anti-‐Muslim attacks
were reported across Burma, including
in Okkan, in Sagaing Region; Pegu,
the capital of the Bago Region; Lashio, in Shan State,
and Thandwe, in Arakan
State, all in the same year.
In 2014, the city of Mandalay witnessed yet another
outbreak of anti-‐Muslim violence
that left two dead and 20 injured.
Observers of the attack, including the Young Buddhists
Association, remarked that the violence
was part of a deliberate attempt to promote
religious violence
on behalf of the government and which would utilize the fear-‐mongering tactics of the 969 Movement to achieve
this aim.23 This theory is explored
in-‐depth in the report Hidden Hands
Behind Communal Violence in Myanmar. The report, which uses the Mandalay
riots as a case study, mentions, “the
19 Maung,
M 2015, ‘Monks join hundreds in Myanmar anti-‐Rohingya rally’, Al Jazeera, May 27, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/myanmar-‐anti-‐rohingya-‐rally-‐ 150527105614300.html.
20 Weng, L 2014, ‘Arakanese groups to monitor aid operations for Rohingya,’ The Irrawaddy,
May 26, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/arakanese-‐groups-‐monitor-‐aid-‐operations-‐ rohingya.html.
21 Marshall, A.R.C. 2013, ‘Special
report: Myanmar gives official blessing to anti-‐Muslim monks’, Reuters, June 27, Yangon, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-‐ myanmar-‐969-‐specialreport-‐idUSBRE95Q04720130627.
22 Human
Rights Watch 2014, Burma: communal violence
undercuts rights gains,
HRW, January 21, New York, viewed
21 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/burma-‐communal-‐ violence-‐undercuts-‐rights-‐gains.
23 Palatino, M 2014, ‘The meaning of the Mandalay
riots in Myanmar,’ The Diplomat, July 12, viewed 21 July
2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-‐meaning-‐of-‐the-‐mandalay-‐riots-‐in-‐myanmar/.
Mandalay riots were designed
to appear as a spontaneous outbreak of mob violence, but in fact were perpetrated by an organized gang of armed men brought
in from outside
Mandalay to enact a pre-‐determined script written
and stage-‐managed
by hidden hands for political ends.”24 As a means of preserving their power during the reform period, the report indicates how military hardliners exploit existing
ethnic and religious tensions by utilizing the influential ultra-‐nationalist Buddhist social
forces, such as Ma Ba Tha as a tool for spreading Islamophobia and religious
hatred.
The Du Chee Yar Tan incident
in January 2014,
in which over 40 Rohingya were killed, is particularly disturbing due to the direct
involvement of police
and other authorities throughout the violent
attacks.25 While the UN announced
it held “credible
evidence” of the Arakan State attacks occurring, a government commission set up to investigate rejected these claims,
thus failing to take responsibility.26
Ma Ba Tha and its associated 969 Movement,
along with other social and political forces,
capitalize on unfounded
existential fears to drive the persecution of the Rohingya forward. In 2014, the International Crisis Group published Myanmar:
The Politics of Rakhine State, which characterized the anti-‐Rohingya sentiment based on four perceived
threats. This included
the threat of a demographic shift in Arakan
State, cultural dilution,
shifting economic
imbalances between
the Arakan and Muslims, and the fear of Muslims
acting violently towards others.27 In reality,
the threat of a demographic shift is unfounded because there is no data supporting rapidly increasing Rohingya birth rates.28 Other perceptions of the Rohingya are deeply rooted in a violent
colonial history or exacerbated as result of competition for scarce resources
facing many of Burma’s communities, especially in Arakan State
which is one of the most impoverished states in Burma.29
24 Justice
Trust 2015, Hidden hands behind communal
violence in Myanmar:
case study of the Mandalay riots, March, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/Justice_Trust-‐ 2015-‐03-‐Hidden_Hands-‐en-‐to-‐rev1-‐red.pdf.
25 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, Pillay calls for killings in northern Rakhine State to be investigated, OHCHR, January 23, Geneva,
viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14194&LangID=E.
26 Oo, Y and Htun, N.M. 2014, ‘Myanmar
panel rejects claims
of Rohingya killings, recommends citizenship,’ Radio Free Asia, March 11, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/du-‐chee-‐yar-‐tan-‐03112014183922.html.
27 International Crisis Group 2014, Myanmar:
the politics of Rakhine State,
ICG, October 22, Brussels, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-‐east-‐asia/burma-‐ myanmar/261-‐myanmar-‐the-‐politics-‐of-‐rakhine-‐state.pdf.
28 Snaing,
Y 2015, ‘Census raises new questions over legitimacy of birthrate law,’ The Irrawaddy, June 15, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/census-‐raises-‐new-‐questions-‐over-‐ legitimacy-‐of-‐birthrate-‐law.html.
29 Brenner,
D 2014, ‘When Buddhist monks wield Kalashnikovs,’ Foreign Policy, July 2, viewed 21 July 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/02/when-‐buddhist-‐monks-‐wield-‐kalashnikovs/.
The Burma Government has used these perceived threats to push forward their own anti-‐Islam agenda, finding
influence and support amongst the extremist Buddhist community. A prime example of this is the passing of the four race and religion protection laws through
Parliament in 2015. Among the four, the Population Control Bill was enacted
as a means of slowing
infant and maternal mortality rates through the implementation of birth-‐spacing
measures, potentially allowing use on certain
communities in certain areas.30 The
Religious Conversion Bill, the Myanmar
Buddhist
Women’s Special Marriage Bill, and the Monogamy Bill also contain discriminatory language and appear to be directly
targeting the rights of the Rohingya and other ethnic and religious
minorities. For instance, under the Special
Marriage Bill, penalties
are placed on non-‐Buddhist men attempting to enter into marriage with Buddhist
women, discouraging interfaith unions.31 Since
May 2015, Burma’s
Parliament has passed all four pieces
of legislation with limited
opposition, with the Population Control Bill already
being signed into law by President
Thein Sein.32
The continued implementation of these repressive measures, coupled with the widespread public support found in movements like Ma Ba Tha, have prompted
civil society
organizations and the international community, including the European Union,
the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, Human Rights Watch, and the UN to strongly condemn
the religious persecution of the Rohingya.33
Freedom of Expression
While public support
for the persecution of the Rohingya can be overwhelming, numerous progressive democracy
and human rights activists throughout Burma and the international community have come to the defense of the religious
minority. These voices
are important for illuminating the plight
of the Rohingya and encouraging the Burma Government to reverse its discriminatory policies
that place restrictions on religious
minorities. Unfortunately, the space for civil society inside Burma to speak out is quickly shrinking, due largely
to the increased intimidation and threat
to the freedom of expression inside Burma.
At the same time, the voices
30 Physicians for Human Rights
2015, Burma’s Population Control
Bill threatens maternal
health progress, PHR,
April 22, New York, viewed 21 July 2015, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-‐releases/burmas-‐population-‐control-‐bill-‐ threatens-‐maternal-‐health-‐progress.html.
31 UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Myanmar:
UN rights experts express
alarm
at adoption of first
of four ‘protection of race and religion’ bills, UNCHR, May 21, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16015&LangID=E.
32 Human Rights Watch,
Burma: Discriminatory Laws Could Stoke Communal
Tensions, HRW, August 23 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/23/burma-‐discriminatory-‐laws-‐could-‐stoke-‐ communal-‐tensions.
33 Karen
News 2014, ‘UN experts join international condemnation of Burma’s proposed
religion laws,’ Karen News, June 22, viewed
21 July 2015, http://karennews.org/2014/06/un-‐experts-‐join-‐ international-‐condemnation-‐of-‐burmas-‐proposed-‐religion-‐laws.html/.
of those calling
for the continued persecution of the Rohingya and the wider Muslim
community persist
unabated.
In the last year, the Burma Government has consistently flouted the right to freedom of expression except in cases in which they directly benefit, such as in regards
to the hate speech of Ma Ba Tha, certain
politicians and other social forces
using inflammatory language to incite communal
violence against
the Rohingya. The peaceful
Letpadan student
protests on 10 March 2015 ended with authorities resorting
to violent crackdown
including beatings, brutality and mass arrests prompting condemnation from the UN.34 At the time of writing this paper, there are 13 journalists imprisoned for speaking
out against the Burma Government.35 This includes journalists from Unity newspaper, who were imprisoned last July for exposing a chemical weapons factory belonging to the Burma Army.36 The abduction
and murder of journalist Ko Par Gyi by the Burma Army, along with their impunity from prosecution during
the case, also demonstrates a significant lack of adherence to the right of freedom
of expression and respecting a free media.
Concern
over the “shrinking space for civil society and the media” was expressed
by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Burma, Yanghee
Lee, during her inaugural trip to Burma.37
It is therefore
no surprise that Burma’s civil society
offers very little room for dissenting opinions on the treatment of Rohingya. As the time of the General
Elections is quickly
approaching, the political environment, where the ultra-‐ nationalist Ma Ba Tha has become
increasingly influential, is even less conducive
to the promotion
of religious minority rights. For much of the political opposition, it would be disadvantageous to remark on the persecution of the Rohingya or even on the discriminatory practices towards Muslim community in general,
as the deep-‐ seated
anti-‐Muslim perception is sure to influence
voters.
For the Rohingya, the lack of representation in public dialogue
also comes from the difficulty of organizing politically. A report from Refugees International points out that the history
of marginalization of the Rohingya, namely the lack of access
to
34 UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Rights Expert Calls on Myanmar to Address Worrying
Signs of Backtracking in Pivotal Year, UNCHR, March 18, 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15714&LangID=E 35 Roy
Greenslade, “Two Burmese
Newspaper Journalists Jailed for Defaming
Military MP,” The Guardian, March 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/mar/20/two-‐ burmese-‐newspaper-‐journalists-‐jailed-‐for-‐defaming-‐military-‐mp.
36 Haigh,
L 2015, Journalists sentenced
in Myanmar – free the Unity five, Amnesty International, April 29, viewed
21 July 2015, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/04/journalists-‐ silenced-‐in-‐myanmar-‐free-‐the-‐unity-‐five/.
37 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014, Statement of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,
OHCHR, July 26, Myanmar, viewed
21 July 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14909&.
education and training,
has contributed to the lack of civil society development.38 Furthermore, severe restrictions on the Freedom of Movement
mean that Rohingya political parties are unable
to effectively campaign, conduct research,
or otherwise visit regions of Arakan
State and elsewhere.
The active suppression of Rohingya HRDs also a serious setback for emerging civil society networks. In 2013, Rohingya
activist Kyaw Hla Aung was arrested
for allegedly
taking part in a protest at an IDP camp in Sittwe.39 Human rights
groups, such as Fortify Rights,
have condemned this arrest and accused the Burma Government of attempting to silence
an educated and outspoken
Rohingya activist.40 Similar
circumstances surround
the arrest of the Rohingya community leader Tun Aung, who was detained
on the basis of inciting
violence during the 2012 Arakan State riots.41 Fortunately Tun Aung has since been released, but most of the Rohingya community continues to remain silent in order to prevent
reprisals due to their raising
voice on the situation. This past year also saw the Arakan State Divisional Court formally sentence the Rohingya
activists Ba Thar, Kyaw Myint, Hla Myint and Kyaw Khin to sentences
of five and eights years in jail for a non-‐violent protest in 2013 that called
for their recognition in a population registration exercise.42
Moderate
Buddhists, such as Monk U Pinnyasiha have also observed
their freedom of expression attacked for defending the Rohingya. Urging Buddhists
to uphold compassion above all else and to cease anti-‐Muslim
hate speech, U Pinnyasiha has since been banned
from preaching by the State
Sangha Maha Nayaka Council,
also known as Ma Ha Na, the government-‐controlled, highest
Buddhist monks council in Burma that regulates monks.43
38 Garcia,
S and Olson, C 2008, Rohingya:
Burma’s forgotten minority, Refugees International, December 18, viewed 21 July 2015, http://refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-‐report/rohingya-‐ burma%E2%80%99s-‐forgotten-‐minority.
39 The International Federation for Human Rights
2014, Burma: end the persecution of Rohingya human rights defender Kyaw Hla Aung, FIDH, July 4, Bangkok,
viewed 21 July 2015, https://www.fidh.org/International-‐Federation-‐for-‐Human-‐Rights/asia/burma/15707-‐burma-‐end-‐ the-‐prosecution-‐of-‐rohingya-‐human-‐rights-‐defender-‐kyaw-‐hla-‐aung.
40 Fortify Rights
2014, Myanmar: release
Rohingya political prisoner
Kyaw Hla Aung, August 5,
Bangkok, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.fortifyrights.org/publication-‐20140805.html.
41 The Associated Press
2015, ‘Myanmar releases
prominent Rohingya political
prisoner,’ The New York Times,
January 20, Yangon, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/20/world/asia/ap-‐as-‐myanmar-‐political-‐ prisoners.html?_r=0.
42
Amnesty International
2015, Urgent action: Rohingya community leaders
imprisoned,
ASA1613142015, March 27.
43 Popham,
P 2015, ‘Burma’s great terror moves a step closer as Taliban urges Rohingya
to take up the sword,’
The Independent, June 14, Rangoon, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/burmas-‐great-‐terror-‐moves-‐a-‐step-‐closer-‐as-‐ taliban-‐urges-‐rohingya-‐to-‐take-‐up-‐the-‐sword-‐10319254.html.
The most recent example involving the suppression of freedom of expression for a human rights
defender involves
the case of writer and former NLD member, Htin Lin Oo. In a speech in October
2014, Htin Lin Oo criticized the Ma Ba Tha for promoting
religious intolerance. For attempting to defend the ongoing
persecution of religious
minorities like the Rohingya, Htin Lin Oo received
two years in prison with hard labor.44 It could not be clearer
that the Burma Government, with the support of this hardliner Buddhist Nationalist movement, is systematically oppressing dissenting voices and actively shutting down their freedom of expression in relation
to their work on freedom
of religion and belief.
Social pressure from local communities and around
Burma’s digital sphere
also limits the space for HRDs working
on freedom of religion
and belief, and also average
Rohingya or Muslims in general
to speak out against their situation.
Amongst the climate
of state and Buddhist
sponsored discrimination, Muslim communities face calls
for boycotts of Muslim-‐owned businesses, smear
campaigns, anti-‐Muslim
reporting from
certain media
outlets, and generalized hate speech
that follows in the vein of the rhetoric spewed by the nationalist Buddhist movement.45
Furthermore, while the increase
in Internet usage in Burma has brought
about new tools of information sharing and advocacy for HRDs, including
those working on freedom of religion and belief,
it has contributed to monitoring, intimidation and harassment of HRDs that promote
religious tolerance, while also instigating hatred and violence. The Sentinel Project,
an anti-‐genocide
organization, has made note of the hypocritical use of social media
in Burma. For instance, a blog post about unproven
allegations of the rape of a Buddhist woman by Muslim
men, ferociously shared and quickly viral, prompted
the beginning of the 2014 Mandalay
riots.
Meanwhile, a man was arrested
during the same year for posting pictures on Facebook of violence against Rohingya,
and in another incident,
a human rights film festival
was banned from the showing
of a film deemed to be “sympathetic to the Rohingya” in response to an outcry on social media
platforms.46 Unfortunately, the Internet has become
yet another means of discrimination against the Muslim population; in which anti-‐Muslim
criticism is promoted and the defense of the Rohingya is stamped
out.
The suppression of freedom
of expression surrounding the treatment of the Muslim
minority, particularly Rohingya, is not only internal
to Burma, it exists
for the
44 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2015,
Press briefing notes on Myanmar,
UNCHR, June 3, Geneva, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16036&LangID=E.
45 Civil Rights Defenders
2015, Human rights in Myanmar, January 19, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.civilrightsdefenders.org/country-‐reports/human-‐rights-‐in-‐myanmar/.
46 Kiersons, S 2014, Burma update:
genocide in the age of the Internet
and social media, The Sentinel Project, July 10, viewed 21 July 2015, https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/07/10/burma-‐social-‐ media/.
international community
as well. Critics
of the Burma Government’s policies
towards the religious minority
often become targets
of abuse, either from the government or as part of the hate-‐mongering
of the Buddhist
Nationalist movement. The former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Burma,
Tomás Ojea Quintana, was himself the victim of a violent attack from nationalist Buddhists mobs after speaking
out against the communal violence
in Arakan State.47 During
the attack, the Special Rapporteur observed
Burmese police authorities standing
idly by, demonstrating a degree of complicity. The current UN Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in Burma, Yanghee
Lee, has also received a fair share of abuse from Wirathu and the Buddhist
Nationalist hardliners. Wirathu responded to Yanghee
Lee’s criticism of the Race and Religion
Protection Laws by calling her a “whore” to a crowd of supportive followers.48
The decision of the Burma Government to ban Medicines Sans Frontiers
(MSF) in May 2014 also illustrates the tightening of freedom of expression surrounding international civil society
organizations. MSF was barred from continuing
operations in Arakan State after Thein Sein’s office deemed their involvement with the Rohingya
as “favouritism.”49 Critics
of the removal
of the NGO say the move was in response to MSF stating that they had treated
22 Muslims from the Du Chee Yar Tan massacre
– an event that has been disputed by the Burma Government.50 While MSF has been allowed
to resume operations in Arakan State as of January 2015, their initial
removal has prompted concern
among international civil society organizations over their ability
to criticize the Burma Government or even publicly
share information on the situation. Amid clear warnings from the Chief Minister of Arakan State for NGOs to refrain
from criticism over the removal of the White Card, international NGOs, especially those with humanitarian and aid objectives, are likely to remain quiet.51
The 29 May Special
Meeting on Irregular
Migration in Thailand
has been criticized as evidence
that the international community has also been subjected to the suppression of freedom
of expression in regards
to speaking out about the Rohingya. The meeting, which sought to bring together
members of the ASEAN
47 Human Rights Watch 2014, Burma: country
summary, HRW, January,
viewed 21 July 2015, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/burma_6.pdf.
48 Lei Win, T and Marshall
A.R.C. 2015, ‘Myanmar
monk’s U.N. whore rant could hurt Buddhism,’ Reuters, January 21, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-‐ myanmar-‐religion-‐idUSKBN0KU0Q420150121.
49 Smith, M 2014, ‘Burma’s
ethnic persecution is state policy,’ Wall Street Journal, March 13, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.fortifyrights.org/commentary-‐20140313.html.
50 Burmese
Rohingya Organisation UK 2014, Timeline
– killings and massacre
January 2014, Maungdaw, Rakhine State, BROUK,
January 31, viewed
21 July 2015,
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/Du_Chee_Yar_Tan_Massacre_Timeline.pdf. 51 Shah, I 2015, ‘Open barbarism of Gov’t designated Arakan Chief
Minister,’ The Burma Times,
February 14, viewed 21 July 2015, http://burmatimes.net/open-‐barbarism-‐govt-‐designated-‐arakan-‐ chief-‐minister/.
community to formulate
a regional response
to the refugee
crisis in the Andaman
Sea, was initially boycotted by Burma.
In order to bring Burma to the negotiating table,
numerous members
of the international community
agreed to Burma’s discriminatory stipulation that the Rohingya
should be referred
to only as “Bengali.”52 The
use of the term reinforces the claim that Rohingya
are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, illustrating how the international community was forced to cede their freedom
of expression in exchange for any potential interaction with the Burma Government.
The lack of freedom of expression in Burma is preventing any potential shift in the discourse surrounding Burma’s Muslim population, and in particular, the Rohingya. Without the availability of dissenting voices, the Burma Government, along with the support of ultra-‐nationalist movements, will continue to persecute
the Rohingya.
The political and social
space for these views must therefore
be developed, if there is to be any hope for the abused religious
minority.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The Burma Government has not only failed
to protect the rights of the Rohingya
and the wider Muslim community, it has in many cases actively
contributed to their continued mistreatment. As such, the international community must acknowledge that the Burma Government has the responsibility to uphold the basic rights of the all religious
minorities, as outlined
under the third pillar
of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect,
which states, “The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect
populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect
its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect
populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”53
For the ASEAN
community, the responsibility to protect
requires a rethinking of the non-‐interference
policy.54 ASEAN
nations must make
use of every diplomatic measure available
to pressure the Burma Government into recognizing the Rohingya as a legitimate community and end its policy of discrimination and persecution. In the short term, the ASEAN
can encourage Burma to lessen restrictions on freedom of expression especially in the field of religion and belief,
in order to better
identify internal support
for the protection of religious
minorities.
52 Pearlman, J and Yai, H 2015, ‘Burma insists it is not to blame for boat people crisis at emergency summit,’ The Telegraph,
May 29, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/11638762/Burma-‐insists-‐it-‐ is-‐not-‐to-‐blame-‐for-‐boat-‐people-‐crisis-‐at-‐emergency-‐summit.html.
53 UN Office of the Special
Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide 2015,
The responsibility to protect, UN,
viewed
21
July
2015,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
54 ASEAN Inter-‐Parliamentary Myanmar
Caucus, The abused notion of non-‐interference, AIPMC, viewed 21 July 2015, http://www.aseanmp.org/docs/resources/noninterference.pdf.
While slow to act, the international community has begun to demonstrate its willingness to speak out against Burma. Former
Malaysian Prime
Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, at an international conference covering the plight
of the Rohingya, urged the ASEAN community to expel Burma from its regional
bloc.55 This opinion has been reflected by a number of international voices,
however the international community must not be afraid to speak out against the ongoing discrimination against Rohingya
and Muslim minorities in Burma.
The Oslo Conference to End Myanmar’s Persecution of the Rohingya, held one day prior to the 29 May regional
conference on the refugee crisis in Bangkok, can be commended for holding the Burma Government directly responsible for the treatment
of Rohingya, which will hopefully
be translated into genuine
state action.56 The treatment of Rohingya is a regional
issue; international human rights
norms are being systematically violated and it is up to the ASEAN,
along with the broader international community, to ensure
that the rights of Rohingya and Muslim religious minorities in Burma are protected.
Recommendations :
To the Burma Government:
- Cease all forms of discrimination against the Rohingya and religious minorities. This includes creating legislation that prohibits hate speech against any ethnic or religious minority.
- Provide a platform for the Rohingya community to take part in the country’s political sphere. They must be involved in all discussions that affect their livelihood. The first priority should be to negotiate how best to provide humanitarian aid for displaced Rohingya communities in Arakan State.
- Demonstrate a genuine commitment to the promotion and protection of freedom of expression, religion and belief. This includes removing any restrictions on human rights defenders who advocate for the rights of religious minorities. It also involves punishing those groups, such as the Ma Ba Tha and the 969 Movement, who wish to suppress the freedom of expression, religion and belief of others and spread hate speech and incite violence.
To the the ASEAN community:
- Understand that the persecution of the Rohingya and religious minorities in Burma is a regional problem. The continued oppression of religious minorities in Burma will only fuel further refugee crises in the region and damage the international reputation of the ASEAN to uphold human rights.
- Recognize the identity of Rohingya religious minority and refrain from self-‐ censorship when discussing the issue with the Burma Government
- Pressure the Burma Government into making considerable changes in the discriminatory policies they have against the Rohingya and the wider Muslim population and to remove the influence of the Buddhist Nationalist groups in their policy sphere.
- Demand that the Burma Government promote a greater space for freedom of expression, religion, and belief.
To the International Community:
- Recognize that the ongoing persecution of Rohingya and the Muslim population with entrenched impunity is a breeding ground for continued human rights abuses.
- Ensure that Burma’s engagement with the global economy is kept to an absolute minimum until they have demonstrated a commitment to end human rights abuses and the systematic persecution of religious minorities.
- Continue pressuring Burma into complying with and fulfilling its international obligations to promote freedom of expression and religion and belief.
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