More often than not, calculations of
realpolitik hold the UN Security Council back from taking action to deter or
reverse military takeovers. Yet UN member states can use the body as a platform
for efforts to keep soldiers in the barracks and away from politics.
Related Tags
In October 2021, ambassadors from the UN Security Council were
on a visit to Niger when they heard that the Sudanese military had seized power
in Khartoum, arresting civilian ministers. The diplomats briefly wondered
whether they could hold an impromptu Council meeting on the crisis in their
hotel. They decided not to do so, and the Council took a few days to hammer out
a press
statement expressing “serious concern” about the military
takeover.
If the events in Sudan caught the Council on the hop, UN
diplomats have become wearily familiar with what UN Secretary-General António
Guterres has
called “an epidemic of coup d’états”. The Council diplomats
gathered in Niger in October had previously been in Mali, where they had
met with Assimi Goïta, a colonel who took power last May in the
country’s second coup in just ten months. Over the last year, Council
members have faced considerable criticism from both other UN member states and
civil society for failing to take firm steps toward reversing the 1 February
2021 military takeover in Myanmar. The body did not even release statements regarding
two further coups – in Chad and Guinea – that took place in 2021.
The Security Council has never
been particularly adept at responding to coups.
This poor
track record is not especially surprising. The Security
Council has never been particularly adept at responding to
coups. Oisín Tansey, an
expert on international diplomacy
around military takeovers, notes
that the Council did not address coups at
all until the Cold War ended and has taken only a “highly
selective” approach to them since. It has responded to fewer than
a quarter of the coups that have taken place in this period, ignoring
military akeovers in cases including Pakistan (1999), Thailand (2006 and2014)
and Egypt (2013). Although it has acted forcefully on rare
occasions – including mandating a U.S. military intervention
in Haiti to restore the democratically
elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994 – it more often
confines itself to making statements of the type that it released regarding
Sudan.
A Record of Inaction
There is no consensus among Council members about how far the
body should go in responding to coups. Some, including China and Russia, argue
that the Council should stay out of UN member states’ internal politics
altogether and often aim to rein in Council comments on coups. Beijing and
Moscow are generally suspicious of UN sanctions in principle and oppose
applying such measures to coup plotters. Western diplomats grumble that their
Chinese and Russian counterparts also frequently water down proposed statements
– for example, refusing to use the word “condemn” regarding the military
takeover in Sudan. But non-Western Council members counter that Western
countries display double standards in response to military takeovers. Some
Asian diplomats complain that the U.S., the UK and their allies pushed hard for
the Council to speak out about Myanmar’s coup – which resonated strongly with
domestic audiences in North America and Europe – while ignoring similar events
in Chad and Guinea.
The Council’s reticence in the Chadian and Guinean cases could
be explained by neither country being on the body’s formal agenda. By contrast,
the Council could hardly avoid addressing the coup in Myanmar and the
subsequent events in Mali and Sudan, as the UN was already engaged politically
with all three countries, with a special envoy covering Myanmar, a political
mission in Khartoum and over 15,000 peacekeepers deployed in Mali. Yet the
Council response in all three cases was still tentative. Members convened
emergency sessions behind closed doors and released statements of concern. In
each case, at first they released only a press statement, one of the weakest
tools in the UN’s diplomatic armory, and avoided explicitly using the word
“coup” to describe what had happened; in Sudan’s case, at least, they inserted
a reference to a “military
takeover”. Only in Myanmar’s case did the Council eventually make a
more formal declaration – in the form of a presidential statement – condemning
the junta’s actions, although it took over a month to do so. Since then, it has
continued to put out press statements on specific acts of violence in Myanmar,
with little or no observable impact. Turning to Mali, the Council included
paragraphs on the May coup and the need to return to a democratic transition in
the standard resolution renewing the UN peacekeeping force in the country.
The Council has seemed very keen for
other actors to take the lead in responding to coups
In general, the Council has seemed very keen for other actors to
take the lead in responding to coups, although with varying degrees of
conviction and cohesion. After Mali’s military arrested the president, the Council
encouraged “all the Malian stakeholders” to work with the
African Union (AU) and the sub-regional Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) – both of which have strong stances against coups written into
their institutional guiding documents – to find a political solution. But there
are limits to how far the Council will go. When ECOWAS announced stringent
sanctions against Mali in January, Russia – which has deepening ties with the
officers in charge in Bamako – and China stopped the Council from issuing a
statement expressing its support.
Sometimes the Council’s endorsement of other actors can look
like an alibi for inaction. In October 2021, in the case of Sudan, the Council
expressed “strong support” for efforts by the AU, League of
Arab States and East African sub-regional organisation Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) to handle the crisis, although none of these
actors had a clear plan for how to end it. In debates over Myanmar earlier in
the year, Council members including Vietnam and India as well as China and
Russia insisted that the UN endorse diplomacy by the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), although Western diplomats fretted that the regional
organisation would move too cautiously to deal with the military, given its history
of non-interference in its members’ internal affairs. In the event, ASEAN has
indeed proceeded with a very light touch – although it refused to let Myanmar
participate in a recent top-level summit – and some New York-based diplomats
from the region have expressed frustration that the U.S. and other powers have
not pushed for a tougher approach at the UN.
Despairing of the Council, a group of concerned states initially
led by Liechtenstein tabled a UN General Assembly resolution in May 2021
condemning the Myanmar coup, a rare step. But this initiative also ran into
diplomatic difficulties. ASEAN members diluted references to an arms embargo
against the junta, and China and Russia refused to back the text. In the end,
119 countries voted in favour of the resolution, but it had no obvious concrete
impact, and the General Assembly moved onto other priorities. Overall, neither
the Council nor the wider UN seems able or willing to take firm action against
coups.
Reasons to Hit the
Brakes
Beyond fundamental disagreements about the Council’s remit in
countries’ internal affairs, there are three recurrent considerations that
appear to contribute to its stuttering response to this type of crisis:
confusion, geopolitics and the Council’s lack of leverage in the countries
concerned.
First, the element of confusion tends to be especially important
in the early stages of the Council’s response to a coup. In the aftermath of a
military takeover, Council members often lack good information about what is
happening on the ground. They may also have no clear instructions from their
capitals. In the first days after Myanmar’s February 2021 coup, for example,
Chinese diplomats appeared uncertain of Beijing’s priorities and were furious
when someone leaked a draft Council press statement that may not have taken
into account instructions from their home office. Under these circumstances, it
is easiest for diplomats to hedge their bets, consult in private and avoid
passing statements or resolutions that could complicate matters. Where the UN
has envoys in a country who can talk to military and civilian leaders, it is
also natural for the Council to let these officials try to resolve a crisis.
Secondly, as the initial diplomatic confusion following a
military takeover dissipates, the geopolitical interests of the Council’s five
veto-wielding permanent members are liable to hamper its long-term response.
While Beijing was surprised and displeased by events in Myanmar, where it had
developed close ties with the civilian government, China grew somewhat closer
to the junta over the course of 2021. (Anti-junta protesters’ attacks on
Chinese-owned companies may have helped tilt Beijing in this direction.) Russia
was even quicker to show support for the Myanmar junta – which is a limited but
growing purchaser of Russian arms – sending a deputy defence minister to attend
a parade in the capital Naypyitaw in March, despite signing off on the
Council’s previous statements calling for a return to democracy. Moscow has
also cultivated close ties with the Sudanese generals and has started to build
up influence in Mali, where the military authorities have allegedly invited the
Wagner Group private military contractor into the country (explaining Moscow’s
refusal to back ECOWAS sanctions against Mali).
Western powers have their own interests in the affected
countries. In a situation such as Mali, most Council members – including the
permanent five – appear to see their primary concern as limiting the risks that
jihadist groups pose to their national interests. The Council and UN officials
and peacekeepers on the ground, as well as Council members like France that
have their own national military operations in Mali, have little choice but to
work with the de facto authorities and local armed forces.
Even when Council members do make an effort to address
coup-makers directly … their leverage is
limited.
Finally,
even when Council members do make an effort to address
coup-makers directly, they often find that their leverage is
limited. One goal of the Council’s visit to the Sahel in
October was, after all, to encourage Mali’s acting
president, Colonel Goïta, to move ahead with elections
planned for February 2022. Yet the visit also underlined
the limits of the Council’s influence. Diplomats say
Goïta, pointedly wearing his military fatigues, was
extremely difficult to deal with. In December, the
Malian junta announced that it would prefer to delay new elections as late as
2026. Broadly speaking, few diplomats in New York, whatever their national
stances on coups, believe the body has the will or capabilities to take drastic
action to reverse military takeovers.
Upholding an Eroding
Norm
Against this backdrop, those diplomats who believe the Council
can do a better job preparing for similar future challenges tend to focus on
more modest goals, emphasising that the Council should keep a closer eye out
for warning signs of military takeovers. One recent senior member of the
Council told Crisis Group that the body failed to “show interest” in the
Sudanese political situation prior to the October 2021 events, perhaps missing
an opportunity to send useful signals of support to civilian politicians. In
theory, the Council has many ways to flag its interest, such as visiting
missions like the recent trip to West Africa. If such travel is too taxing, or
remains difficult because of COVID-19 variants, the Council has numerous
formats for public and private informal meetings – including videoconferences –
with politicians, officials and civil society leaders from countries that seem
at risk. Council members could convene these meetings to probe threats to
civilian government in countries on their agenda more systematically.
Still, where they are not united – and the permanent five in
particular are divided – over how to deal with a tottering civilian government
or a recalcitrant junta, such engagements will count for very little. Sudanese
military leaders assured a U.S. envoy in October that the army had no intention
of seizing power literally hours before it did just that. It is hard to believe
that the generals would have taken stern warnings from the UN more gravely.
States that want the Council to deter
or reverse a coup will in many cases be best served by seeing it as a platform
for public diplomacy around these crises.
Accordingly, states that want the Council to deter or reverse a
coup will in many cases be best served by seeing it as a platform for public
diplomacy around these crises. If and when a substantial number of Council
members express concern, they may at least create some impetus for other actors
– such as regional organisations – to take more concrete action. Limited as
ASEAN’s diplomacy regarding Myanmar has been, the group would probably have
done even less if it had not felt pressure from the Security Council and
General Assembly to step up.
Where regional organisations do favour a strong response to
coups – as in the case of ECOWAS – their members can also use the UN as a
platform to amplify their concerns. Ghana, an ECOWAS member which has backed a
tough line on Mali and a firm AU posture on Sudan, has just joined the Council
for a two-year term. It could use its tenure to focus attention on the
deleterious effects of coups on peace and security – whether in terms of
threats to civilians or the dangers of regional disruption – with formal and
informal Council meetings about the problem. The Security Council is unlikely
to respond more systematically or effectively to such challenges in the future.
But it is a venue where those states that want to see militaries stay in the
barracks and away from politics can continue to press for upholding the eroding
norm against coups.
No comments:
Post a Comment