Senegal: Anti-French sentiment on the rise as protests continue

Scores of French-owned businesses across the Senegalese capital, Dakar, are still coming to terms with the devastation of smashed windows, broken liquor bottles and burned-out premises after days of nationwide anti-government protests in the West African country. French supermarkets, petrol stations and mobile phone booths were torched and looted as largely peaceful protests against rampant inequality, government corruption and stringent coronavirus restrictions morphed into anger against the former colonial power. The latest protests were sparked after the arrest of an outspoken opposition leader who had been accused of rape. Ousmane Sonko, who is popular with the country’s youth, has since been released on bail but the rape charges remain. The French presence is an everyday reality for the Senegalese people, with French troops visibly garrisoned in the capital, which is also home to France’s largest embassy in sub-Saharan Africa. The country still uses the colonial-era CFA franc currency and retains French as an official language. If you sabotage things in Senegal you have a high probability of sabotaging French property and business. We are a Franco-African country. NDONGO SYLLA, AN ECONOMIST AT THE ROSA LUXEMBOURG FOUNDATION Some critics say this arrangement, known as “Franceafrique”, is at the root of anti-French discontent because it benefits France at the expense of Senegal, where nearly 40 per cent of the population lives in poverty. Other observers point instead to the political rise of opposition figure 46-year-old Sonko, whose arrest en route to court on March 3 triggered the protests. Critics allege that his fiery rhetoric may have whipped up his young supporters into a frenzy of anti-French rage. French businesses targeted by protesters included TOTAL petrol stations, Orange mobile phone booths, Eiffage toll gates, and 21 Auchan supermarkets in Dakar, all part of a French sector that accounts for 25 percent of Senegalese gross domestic product (GDP). France is the leading investor in Senegal and its number one trading partner. ‘We are a Franco-African country’ Ndongo Sylla, an economist at the Dakar branch of Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, explained that the sheer number of key French businesses across the capital made them an easy target for looters. “If you sabotage things in Senegal you have a high probability of sabotaging French property and business,” he said. “We are a Franco-African country.” Sylla said that French businesses were perceived as much as virtual monopolies edging out the local competition as powerful symbols of the country’s stark inequalities. The Auchan supermarket chain, accused of using its foothold in the food distribution sector to undercut locals, is viewed by many as affordable for the middle classes, said Sylla, who added that impoverished looters appeared perplexed at the tubs of yoghurt that fell into their hands. Meanwhile, toll roads, managed by French engineering firm Eiffage, he said, have “created an economic divide between those who could afford them and others who have to endure long hours in traffic jams”. “People have destroyed them and are now circulating frequently,” he added. Senegal’s uneasy relationship with France stretches deep into the colonial era, a major flashpoint being the massacre in the Dakar suburb of Thiaroye in 1944 of hundreds of West African soldiers who fought to liberate France in World War II. Meanwhile, successive Senegalese presidents have enjoyed impeccably close ties with Paris, most notably the poet-president, Leopold Senghor, who was the first African to be elected to the French academy, and who lived out the last decades of his life in the northern French region of Normandy. Colonial resentments Colonial resentments and suspicion of elite collusion with France have become heightened in recent years, as a younger generation enters the political fray faced with the stark inequality in the country. Marame Gueye, Associate Professor of African and African Diaspora Literatures at East Carolina University, said an incendiary 2007 speech given by French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar marked a turning point. “The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history,” Sarkozy said. “They have never really launched themselves into the future.” The speech caused an outrage in Senegal, with a leading newspaper Sud Quotidien calling it “an insult”. Writers, intellectuals and politicians from across Africa joined in the condemnation of the address, which they said was based on long-discredited stereotypes. Meanwhile, the faith Senegalese youth had placed in Macky Sall in the 2012 election that brought him to power, faded fast, Gueye said, as he failed to stem rocketing youth unemployment and a crumbling education system. Additionally, she says: “People criticised Sall for supporting France during the [2015] Charlie Hebdo massacre when he went to France to offer his condolences but did not say a word when young people in Senegal died trying to board boats toward Europe.” 2018 saw the emergence of “France Degage” (France Go), a major grassroots movement focused on disengaging from the CFA franc, used by 14 mainly former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and regarded as the most poignant symbol of French economic neocolonialism. “The debates around the CFA franc have been an important part of the fight to develop a consciousness to decolonise the relationship with France,” said Sylla, coauthor of Africa’s Last Colonial Currency. Rise of Sonko The following year, the CFA franc debate, hitherto a taboo subject in Senegalese political discourse, entered the mainstream, as Sonko, a tax inspector-turned whistle-blower ran for president in 2019. Sonko took 15 percent of the vote, electrifying young voters with a slick social media campaign as well as fiery speeches denouncing the CFA and Senegal elites’ cosy relationship with France. “Our politicians are criminals,” Sonko said in a video in 2018. “Those who have ruled Senegal from the start deserve to be shot!” Lamine Niang, a researcher at Dakar’s School for International Training, thinks that such bombast from Sonko has been responsible for an uptick in anti-French sentiment. “French-owned businesses were targeted because of the rhetoric that Ousmane Sonko has been using,” he said. “He has been denouncing the French neocolonial attitude towards Senegal.” Niang said that Sonko had characterised Macky Sall as a “puppet”, leading his young supporters to “believe that Macky Sall serves French interests, not Senegalese ones”. For his part, Sonko struck a more conciliatory tone when he spoke to Al Jazeera on Wednesday, denying he had incited supporters. “Our relationship with France like any other countries need to be more balanced, it has to be a win-win relationship – not a one-way relationship,” he said. “People are looting not because they support me but because they need provisions…The looting shows the failure of the state.” Asked about the strength of feeling some in Senegal have towards France, Ndongo Sylla from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation said: “I would not call it “anti-French” sentiment, it’s just African desire for emancipation, for liberation from neocolonialism.” SOURCE : AL JAZEERA

Jewish Settlers Open Fire at Two Palestinian Children in Masafer Yatta

Jewish settlers opened fire at two Palestinian children near the town of Yatta in the southern West Bank, according to the Palestinian news agency WAFA. Rateb Jabour, the coordinator of the Wall and Colonization Resistance Commission in Hebron, told WAFA that armed settlers opened gunfire towards two children from the Hrezat family while they were grazing sheep in the area of Masafer Yatta. The two children, said to be 12 and 13 years old respectively, survived the attack and were able to leave to a safe haven. In the meantime, Israeli occupation forces raided the village of Karmel, one of the hamlets of Masafer Yatta area, and stormed and searched the homes of local Palestinian residents, wreaking havoc behind. The area of Masafer Yatta, a collection of about 19 nomadic Bedouin hamlets, has been a frequent target of almost daily assaults by the Israeli military and settlers, who wish to empty the area of its indigenous population for settlement expansion purposes. Almost every day, attacks by the Israeli occupation forces or settlers on Palestinians are reported in the area. (WAFA, PC, Social Media)

‘Engaging the World’: The ‘Fascinating Story’ of Hamas’s Political Evolution by Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud

by Romana Rubeo and Ramzy Baroud Posted onMarch 13, 2021 On February 4, representatives from the Palestinian Movement, Hamas, visited Moscow to inform the Russian government of the latest development on the unity talks between the Islamic Movement and its Palestinian counterparts, especially Fatah. This was not the first time that Hamas’s officials traveled to Moscow on similar missions. In fact, Moscow continues to represent an important political breathing space for Hamas, which has been isolated by Israel’s Western benefactors. Involved in this isolation are also several Arab governments which, undoubtedly, have done very little to break the Israeli siege on Gaza. The Russia-Hamas closeness is already paying dividends. On February 17, shipments of the Russian COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, have made it to Gaza via Israel, a testament to that growing rapport. While Russia alone cannot affect a complete paradigm shift in the case of Palestine, Hamas feels that a Russian alternative to the blind and conditional American support for Israel is possible, if not urgent. Recently, we interviewed Dr. Daud Abdullah, the author of Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas’s Foreign Policy, and Mr. Na’eem Jeenah, Director of the Afro-Middle East Center in Johannesburg, which published Dr. Abdullah’s book. Abdullah’s volume on Hamas is a must-read, as it offers a unique take on Hamas, liberating the discussion on the Movement from the confines of the reductionist Western media’s perception of Hamas as terrorist – and of the counterclaims, as well. In this book, Hamas is viewed as a political actor, whose armed resistance is only a component in a complex and far-reaching strategy. Why Russia? As Moscow continues to cement its presence in the region by offering itself as a political partner and, compared with the US, a more balanced mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, Hamas sees the developing Russian role as a rare opportunity to break away from the US-Israel imposed isolation. "Russia was a member of the Quartet that was set up in 2003 but, of course, as a member of the (United Nations) Security Council, it has always had an ability to inform the discourse on Palestine," Abdullah said, adding that in light of "the gradual demise of American influence, Russia realized that there was an emerging vacuum in the region, particularly after the (Arab) uprisings." "With regard to Hamas and Russia the relationship took off after the (Palestinian) elections in 2006 but it was not Hamas’s initiative, it was (Russian President Vladimir) Putin who, in a press conference in Madrid after the election, said that he would be willing to host Hamas’s leadership in Moscow. Because Russia is looking for a place in the region." Hamas’s willingness to engage with the Russians has more than one reason, chief among them is the fact that Moscow, unlike the US, refused to abide by Israel’s portrayal of the Movement. "The fundamental difference between Russia and America and China … is that the Russians and the Chinese do not recognize Hamas as a ‘terrorist organization’; they have never done so, unlike the Americans, and so it made it easy for them to engage openly with Hamas," Abdullah said. On Hamas’s ‘Strategic Balance’ In his book, Abdullah writes about the 1993 Oslo Accords, which represented a watershed moment, not only for Hamas but also for the entire Palestinian liberation struggle. The shift towards a US-led ‘peace process’ compelled Hamas to maintain a delicate balance "between strategic objectives and tactical flexibility." Abdullah wrote, "Hamas sees foreign relations as an integral and important part of its political ideology and liberation strategy. Soon after the Movement emerged, foreign policies were developed to help its leaders and members navigate this tension between idealism and realism. This pragmatism is evident in the fact that Hamas was able to establish relations with the regimes of Muammar Gaddhafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, both of whom were fiercely opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood." In our interview, Abdullah elaborated: "From the very beginning, Hamas adopted certain principles in respect to its international relations and, later on, in the formation of a foreign policy. Among these, there is a question of maintaining its independence of decision-making; non-alignment in conflicting blocks, avoidance of interference in the affairs of other states." Mr. Jeenah, an accomplished writer himself, also spoke of the "delicate balance." "It is a delicate balance, and a difficult one to maintain because, at this stage, when movements are regarded and regard themselves as liberation movements, they need to have higher moral and ethical standards than, for example, governments," Jeenah said. "For some reason, we expect that governments have to make difficult choices but, with liberation movements, we don’t, because they are all about idealism and creating an ideal society, etc." Jeenah uses the South Africa anti-apartheid struggle which, in many ways, is comparable to the Palestinian quest for freedom, to illustrate his point: "When the liberation movement in South Africa was exiled, they took a similar kind of position. While some of them might have had a particular allegiance to the Soviet Union or to China, some of them also had strong operations in European countries, which they regarded as part of the bigger empire. Nevertheless, they had the freedom to operate there. Some of them operated in other African countries where there were dictatorships and they got protection from those states." Hamas and the Question of National Unity In his book, which promises to be an essential read on the subject, Abdullah lists six principles that guide Hamas’s political agenda. One of these guiding principles is the "search for common ground." In addressing the question of Palestinian factionalism, we contended that, while Fatah has failed at creating a common, nominally democratic platform for Palestinians to interact politically, Hamas cannot be entirely blameless. If that is, indeed, the case, can one then make the assertion that Hamas has succeeded in its search for the elusive common ground? Abdullah answers: "Let me begin with what happened after the elections in 2006. Although Hamas won convincingly and they could have formed a government, they decided to opt for a government of national unity. They offered to (Palestinian Authority President) Mahmoud Abbas and to (his party) Fatah to come into a government of national unity. They didn’t want to govern by themselves. And that, to me, is emblematic of their vision, their commitment to national unity." But the question of national unity, however coveted and urgently required, is not just controlled by Palestinians. "The PLO is the one that signed the Oslo Accords," Abdullah said, "and I think this is one of Hamas’s weaknesses: as much as it wants national unity and a reform of the PLO, the fact of the matter is Israel and the West will not allow Hamas to enter into the PLO easily, because this would be the end of Oslo." On Elections under Military Occupation On January 15, Abbas announced an official decree to hold Palestinian elections, first presidential, then legislative, then elections within the PLO’s Palestine National Council (PNC), which has historically served as a Palestinian parliament in exile. The first phase of these elections is scheduled for May 22. But will this solve the endemic problem of Palestinian political representation? Moreover, is this the proper historical evolution of national liberation movements – democracy under military occupation, followed by liberation, instead of the other way around? Jeenah spoke of this dichotomy: "On the one hand, elections are an opportunity for Palestinians to express their choices. On the other hand, what is the election really? We are not talking about a democratic election for the State, but for a Bantustan authority, at greater restraints than the South African authority." Moreover, the Israeli "occupying power will not make the mistake it did the last time. It will not allow such freedom (because of which) Hamas (had) won the elections. I don’t think Israel is going to allow it now." Yet there is a silver lining in this unpromising scenario. According to Jeenah, "I think the only difference this election could make is allowing some kind of reconciliation between Gaza and the West Bank." Hamas, the ICC and War Crimes Then, there is the urgent question of the anticipated war crime investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Yet, when the ICC agreed to consider allegations of war crimes in Palestine, chances are not only alleged Israeli war criminals are expected to be investigated, but the probe could potentially consider the questioning of Palestinians, as well. Should not this concern Hamas in the least? In the Israeli wars on Gaza in 2008, 2012 and 2014, Hamas, along with other armed groups had no other option but to "defend the civilian population," Abdullah said, pointing out that the "overriding concept" is that the Movement "believes in the principle of international law." If Hamas "can restore the rights of the Palestinian people through legal channels, then it will be much easier for the Movement, rather than having to opt for the armed struggle," Abdullah asserted. Understanding Hamas Undoubtedly, it is crucial to understand Hamas, not only as part of the Palestine-related academic discourse, but in the everyday political discourse concerning Palestine; in fact, the entire region. Abdullah’s book is itself critical to this understanding. Jeenah argued that Abdullah’s book is not necessarily an "introductory text to the Hamas Movement. It has a particular focus, which is the development of Hamas’s foreign policy. The importance of that, in general, is firstly that there isn’t a text that deals specifically with Hamas’s foreign policy. What this book does is present Hamas as a real political actor." The evolution of Hamas’s political discourse and behavior since its inception, according to Jeenah, is a "fascinating" one. Many agree. Commenting on the book, leading Israeli historian, Professor Ilan Pappé, wrote, "This book challenges successfully the common misrepresentation of Hamas in the West. It is a must-read for anyone engaged with the Palestine issue and interested in an honest introduction to this important Palestinian Movement." [Dr. Daud Abdullah’s book, Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas’s Foreign Policy, is available here.] Romana Rubeo is an Italian writer and the Managing Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. Her articles appear in many online newspapers and academic journals. She holds a Master’s Degree in Foreign Languages and Literature and specializes in audio-visual and journalism translation. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle.

Sri Lanka to ban burqa, shut many Islamic schools, minister says

Reuters: Minister for public security Sarath Weerasekera told a news conference he had signed a paper on Friday for cabinet approval to ban the full face covering worn by some Muslim women on “national security” grounds. “In our early days Muslim women and girls never wore the burqa,” he said. “It is a sign of religious extremism that came about recently. We are definitely going to ban it.” The wearing of the burqa in the majority-Buddhist nation was temporarily banned in 2019 after the bombing of churches and hotels by Islamic militants that killed more than 250. Later that year, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, best known for crushing a decades-long insurgency in the north of the country as defence secretary, was elected president after promising a crackdown on extremism. Rajapaksa is accused of widespread rights abuses during the war, charges he denies. Weerasekera said the government plans to ban more than a thousand madrassa Islamic schools that he said were flouting national education policy. “Nobody can open a school and teach whatever you want to the children,” he said. The government’s moves on burqas and schools follow an order last year mandating the cremation of COVID-19 victims - against the wishes of Muslims, who bury their dead. This ban was lifted earlier this year after criticism from the United States and international rights groups.

The Myanmar coup-2021 and Aung San Suu Kyi by Dr. Shwe Lu Maung

By Shwe Lu Maung Prologue This article is written to mark the 2nd March 1962, the day the Myanmar Armed Forces seized power and enslaved the peoples under the military colonialism. On that very night, a meeting of the Rangoon University Students Union was held. About 300 students attended the meeting. Some 50 of them pledged to oppose and fight the junta. I was one of them. Now, after 59 years, I am the only one surviving and talking. With this humble article, I honor my comrades who sacrificed their lives in our fight for freedom from the military colonialism. You can find the brief account of the student meeting in my book (http://www.shwelumaung.org/BNI) Burma: Nationalism and Ideology, University Press Ltd., Dhaka, 1989, page 45, Note 1. Déjà vu On the 1st day of February 2021, there was a "coup" in Myanmar, again! The military takeover in Burma, aka Myanmar, is nothing new. As a matter of fact, calling it a "coup" is a misnomer because the Burmese military has been in power since 1962. It never left power. The Revolutionary Government of the Union Burma (1962-1974), the Socialist Government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974-1988), the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, 1988-1997), and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, 1977-2010) were the military governments. As per the Constitution-2008, the Myanmar military stays at the "backstage" behind the curtain rather than at "frontstage" in front of the curtain. Now, the Myanmar military comes out to the "frontstage." The word "coup," though, is catchy and easy to use, with a punch. Suu Kyi's dilemma In 2010, a general election was held as per Constitution-2008, and the so-called "democracy transit" took its first step. However, the very essence of the Constitution-2008 is the military rule. The constitution itself was approved by a national referendum held at gunpoint by the SPDC. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), boycotted the 2010 election. It did not accept the constitution and did not recognize the 2010 Naypyitaw government led by President Thein Sein, a former general and chair of the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). However, Aung San Suu Kyi changed her mind in 2015, took part in, and won the election to form the Naypyitaw government. As such, Aung San Suu Kyi recognized the Constitution-2008 and legitimized the military power in the Myanmar government. Aung San Suu Kyi voluntarily entered into the trap laid by the Myanmar military. This was her big mistake. She should have remained aloof from the party politics and power struggle. She should have let the NLD go into the power struggle while she remains as the "democracy icon" opposing the Constitution-2008. After a momentary refusal, she accepted the "dinner invitation" and then criticized the host for the "bad dinner." This is a bad policy. Suu Kyi's struggle for presidency Suu Kyi won the 2015 election with over 60% majority in both houses of the parliament. After the win, her struggle was to revoke Constitution-2008 Section 59(f) that makes Suu Kyi ineligible for the presidency due to her marriage to a foreigner so that she can be the president of the country. Her adviser Ko Ni, a lawyer by profession with specialization in the constitutional laws and a Burmese Muslim of Indian ancestry, charted out the office of State Counsellor. Suu Kyi took his advice and bypassed the president in her capacity as the State Counsellor, becoming the de facto ruler. Ko Ni was assassinated in the broad daylight at Rangoon Airport on Sunday, January 29, 2017. The mastermind of the assassination was a retired Lt. Colonel who vanished into the thin air, as per media reports. Despite becoming the de facto ruler, her power remained limited due to the various constitutional provisions. Constitutional gameNine objectives of the SAC Feb 2021A The most known part of the Myanmar Constitution-2008 is the Section 109 that gives the 25% of the parliamentary seats to the military representatives at all levels from the state and regional to the union or central legislature. However, the key is that the Myanmar armed forces known as the Defence Services or Tatmadaw is a totally independent body and is not under the government. Although the Constitution-2008 Section 342 says, "The President shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services," the President is required to appoint the person "proposed and approved" by the Tatmadaw-controlled "National Defence and Security Council." In short, Tatmadaw is a state within the state that controls the state. The term "the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services" appears 51 times in the Myanmar Constitution-2008 in contrast to only one time in the US Constitution. The Myanmar president is not the commander in chief. The Ministries of Defence (MoD), Home Affairs (MoHA), and Border Affairs (MoBA) are completely under Tatmadaw. The other ministries are under the president. Nevertheless, the catch is here. Under the Ministry of Home Affairs is the General Administrative Department (GAD). No administrative or government business can be done without the knowledge and approval of the GSD in the entire Myanmar. In order to be the real power holder, Suu Kyi wanted to bring the GAD under her command. A technical move Aung San Suu Kyi successfully removed the General Administrative Department (GAD) from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) to place it in the newly created Suu Kyi-controlled Ministry of the Office of the Union Government (MoOUG) by a law adopted by the NLD-led union parliament in December 2018. The GAD, a copy of the British colonial public administration or Indian Civil Service (ICS), is the key of the Myanmar civil administrative machinery. Her success in bringing the GAD under her control was hailed as a major achievement of Suu Kyi's democratization. In reality, it is hard to call it "democratization" because the GAD is a copy of the British colonial ICS system of 1858, which was a child of the East Indian Company Act 1853. It was and still is not a civil service but a surveillance system. Therefore, the oppression and exploitation go on as usual. The most known example is the conviction of the two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, for their 2018 exposure of the Myanmar military 2017 massacre of the Rohingya people at Inn Din village. Aung San Suu Kyi called the journalists "the traitors." The thought of the Myanmar military's coming to the "frontstage" was born when the GAD was revoked from the military-controlled MoHA and invoked in the Suu Kyi-controlled MoOUG in 2018. As mentioned earlier, the GAD is a copy of the 19th century British colonial administration system. Without it, the Bama majority will not be able to rule the 134 non-Bama minorities. For example, the world witnessed the rise of the Arakan Army (AA) in the Rakhine State, in 2018. All through from December 2018 to December 2020, the Myanmar military had to engage in deadly battles with serious losses. The question is: how the Arakan Army was able to field more than 5,000 well-trained fighters in Arakan while it was headquartered and trained in the Northern Kachin State? One explanation is that the Myanmar army was devoid of intelligence since the GAD was taken away from its hand in 2018. I believe it was just a sheer coincidence of the time in the rise of the Arakan Army and the GAD transfer. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that the GAD under Suu Kyi deprived the Myanmar military of the intelligence to a considerable extent in 2019 and 2020. The Myanmar military considers the GAD the crucial instrument in the intelligence collection for "the non-disintegration of the Union, nondisintegration of National solidarity, and perpetuation of sovereignty" as highlighted in the Preamble of the Constitution-2008. The Constitution-2008 Section 20(e) says, "The Defence Services is mainly responsible for safeguarding the nondisintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty." There it goes. The Defence Services is just doing its duty! In bottom line, the GAD must be shredded and trashed. A brand new citizen-friendly, decentralized and transparent public service system to meet the need of the 21st century must be introduced. The game of election The "changing hands" of the GAD is a drastic change of the personnel of the pro-military to pro-Suu Kyi. Rigorously, Suu Kyi reshuffled the GAD with her people and prepared for the great 2020 election victory. In Myanmar, since the days of U Nu, the elections are "made" by the ruling party through their faithful. Strictly speaking, in Myanmar, the election fraud is a common feature though it is done using the various loopholes of the law. Bribes such as a government job, a promotion, a business license, a business loan, and intimidation such as arrest with the charges of insurgent-connection, sedition, and corruption are very common. Irregularities can hardly be seen on the election-day. Suu Kyi government and her NLD party did the same "Myanmar customary election business." On the top of that the NLD was quite successful in changing the "demography," especially in the Chin, Kachin and Karen States, in favor of her and the NLD. In addition, the NLD-controlled Election Commission fully or partially cancelled the election in a number of ethnic constituencies, amounting to 15-20 parliamentary seats, in the Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Mon States, where NLD was sure to lose. The result was that her NLD won 315 of 440 or 71.5% in the House of Representatives and 161 of 224 or 71.8% of the House of Nationalities. This amount of majority is not large enough to change the Constitution-2008 Sections 6(f), 109(b), and 141(b) that enable the military participation in politics and allotment of 25% of parliamentary seats to the military. Similarly, it is not good enough to change the Constitution-2008 Section 59(f) that makes Suu Kyi ineligible for the presidency due to her marriage to a foreigner. It needs a 75% majority and a national referendum to repeal these sections. Such a national referendum will never happen because the military will surely stop it for reasons of national security. The election 2020 result is not the main cause of the military coming out to the "frontstage," but a convenient excuse. It is true, though, that Tatmadaw is deeply concerned of Suu Kyi's ambition for the presidency. So, why wait until the moonless midnight? Street protests Throughout the history of the 20th century, in no country, the street protests changed the government. The Myanmar new military government, known as the State Administrative Council (SAC), has made the prisons ready for the new prisoners by releasing nearly 24,000 old prisoners. It appears to be a well-calculated plan, and many protestors will end up in the jail for up to 20 years, and many may get killed on the streets and in detention. It is a story of heartbreaking anguish. I went through it in my days, and I ended up as a revolutionary in the armed insurrection. I am still carrying on the revolution, though unarmed, with a heavy cost on my scientific career. The big question is to create a condition that will make Tatmadaw withdraw from the politics. This is a very big task. It needs a philosophy, a strategy, and the tactics as well as the techniques. A street protest is simply symptomatic and emotion-driven. It is philosophy-less, strategy-less and tactics-less. It has some techniques only. In Myanmar, it was not successful in 1962, 1974, and also in most famous 1988. It will not be successful in 2021 either. Ethnic politics Unfortunately, the ethnic tension, that is Bama-nonBama tension, grew in the days of Suu Kyi government. Serious human rights violations of the Rohingya, amounting to ethnic cleansing and genocide, occurred in 2017 under the watchful eyes of Suu Kyi, and she, regardless of the Nobel Peace Prize, defended Myanmar at the ICJ in December 2019. The rise of the Arakan Army in the Rakhine State in 2018 and the serious battles with great loss to the Myanmar military is another significant failure of Suu Kyi. The "terrorist" classification of the Arakan Army by the Suu Kyi government keeps the peace-talk impossible. In 2015, Tatmadaw and Thein Sein government planned out a 7-point Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and invited the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to enter into the ceasefire agreement. The most significant part of the NCA is that the term EAOs is used and such conventional terms as "insurgents," "rebels," or "minorities" are completed discarded. The NCA was signed by the eight EAOs, and the government (President Thein Sein) and Tatmadaw (Senior General Min Aung Hlaing) at Naypyitaw on October 15, 2015 and with another two EAOs on February 13, 2018, bringing to total of 10 EAOs into the NCA. The agreement was also signed by China, India, Japan, Thailand, the EU, and the United Nations, as the international witnesses. There are 21 EAOs in Myanmar. Among the remaining 11 EAOs are the powerful groups like United Wa State Army, Kachin Independence Organization/Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and United League of Arakan/Arakan Army, five of which together make up a fighting force of 60,000 under the banner of the Northern Alliance. When Suu Kyi came into power in 2015, she undermined the NCA by initiating her own peace program known as the Panglong-21, citing her father Aung San's initiative of the 1947 Panglong Agreement that brought in the Chin, the Kachin, and the Shan into the Union of Burma. This action of hers visibly annoyed Tatmadaw. The result was that neither the NCA nor the Panglong-21 made any progress in the last five years. The peace process was completely stalled. Only the cosmetic once-a-year celebrative meetings were held for publicity with no substance. It is interesting to note that on the 9th of December 2020, Tatmadaw had an "informal" meeting with the Arakan Army at Wa Self-Administered Zone’s capital, Panghsang, Northern Shan State, near the China border. They agreed to an "informal" unconditional ceasefire as long as needed to reach a "formal" agreement. To my amazement, the meeting was facilitated by a Japanese mediator and the United Wa State Army, a friend of China. When asked why the Tatmadaw talked with the terrorist organization, Arakan Army, Tatmadaw replied that it never called "AA, terrorist," implying that the "terrorist" designation is the job of Aung San Suu Kyi. The "informal" ceasefire happened at a snap, much unexpected and much out of the way. I was totally puzzled. Only when the coup took place on the 1st of February 2021 the reason for the rush of the ceasefire with the Arakan Army was enlightened. Tatmadaw cannot afford a war while taking over power at Naypyitaw. Soon after the coup or assuming the duty assigned by the Union President as per Constitution-2008 Section 413(b), the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing formed the State Administrative Council (SAC) consisting of 17 members, with him in the Chair or Chief Administrator. Out of the 17 members, eight are the soldiers, and nine are the civilians. All soldiers are ethnic Bama, but among the civilians, 6 are non-Bama, from the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kaya, Rakhine, and Shan ethnicity. Except for one banker, the rest of the civilians are seasoned politicians with their own parties that compete with the NLD, Suu Kyi's party. This is the first time in the history of Myanmar that the top state administrative body is constituted with the inclusion of the non-Bama ethnic peoples, up to 35%. After formation of the SAC, the new junta announced nine objectives in three categories: 1. Political affairs, 2. Economic affairs, and 3. Social affairs. Each category has three objectives. In the political affairs, the two top objectives are (1) formation of a federal union, and (2) establishment of peace through the NCA. Obviously, Tatmadaw is making alliance with the non-Bama ethnic forces to counter Aung San Suu Kyi. The Arakan Army (https://www.arakanarmy.net) As described earlier, the rise of the Arakan Army is phenomenal. It started with 15 youths in 2009, and in November 2018, it fielded some 1,000 fighters in the Northern Arakan, it increases to 3,000 in 2019 and to more than 5,000 in mid 2020. In March 2020, the Arakan Army wiped out one whole company of Tatmadaw airborne soldiers and captured some 40 men, including its commanding officer, a major. Only the heavy air raids saved the Tatmadaw field command headquarter. At present, in the Northern Arakan, Tatmadaw controls only the city municipal areas, which is only 20%. That means the Arakan Army controls 80% of the Northern Arakan or the Rakhine State. Bordered with Bangladesh and India, it creates a worrisome situation for Tatmadaw. In particular, the Arakan Army is making good progress in forging a friendship with the Arakan Muslims. History evidenced the rise of Arakan and Mrauk-U glory with the Buddhist-Muslim alliance from 1430 to 1784. Map of Northern Arakan showing the area occupied by the Arakan Army (AA) as of November 2020. The label AA....AA indicates the Arakan Army-occupied Areas.Map of the AA-occupied Northern Arakan Tatmadaw believes that Aung San Suu Kyi, in the last five years of her in power, had every opportunity to cooperate with Tatmadaw in the NCA peace process to achieve the goal of a federal union, but Aung San Suu Kyi simply wasted her time with her struggle to become the president of the country. The weakening of the NCA peace process due to her launching of Panglong-21 excluding the "terrorist Arakan Army" was a contributing factor to the rise of the Arakan Army. It also believes that Suu Kyi's cancellation of the election in the ethnic areas where she was sure to lose, in particular in the Rakhine State, created a grave situation that can escalate the ongoing deadly armed conflict to an unmanageable level. In November 2020, with the guarantee of peace and smooth election, the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw both called for the Rakhine State cancelled elections to be held. Unfortunately, Suu Kyi and her Election Commission turned down the call. Also, in the same time, the Rakhine State Parliament, including the military representatives, unanimously presented an official request to the Suu Kyi government to repeal the terrorist designation of the Arakan Army in order to enable a ceasefire talk. Suu Kyi turned it down. In the given situation, Tatmadaw made an "informal" ceasefire with the Arakan Army and also set free the top Rakhine politician Dr. Aye Maung and his young colleague historian-writer U Wai Hin Aung from the infamous InSein prison on the 15th of February, just two weeks after the coup. The duo was arrested by the Suu Kyi government in January 1918 on the charges of high treason and connection to the "terrorist" Arakan Army under the Penal Code Articles 122 and 505, and sentenced to 20-year imprisonment in March 2019. At present, the Rakhine State is peaceful and quiet, while Rangoon and Mandalay boil with the protests. The protests in the Kachin, Karen, and Shan areas are minimal while there are no protests in the Chin, Kaya, and Rakhine States. The Arakan War is the major factor in the coup-2021, just like the Shan factor was in the coup-1962. In a short time in late 2020, the Arakan Army strength went up to about 10,000 with a combat force of more than 7,000. This is the main concern. Military withdrawal from politics Now and then, Tatmadaw had said it would withdraw from politics when the ethnic armed conflict ends and no more internal danger to "the Union integrity, the National solidarity, and the sovereignty." Myanmar needs to create a condition that will make Tatmadaw withdraw from the politics. Tatmadaw came into politics with the 1962 coup d'état putting up a strong reasoning that the Union of Burma was at the brink of disintegration due to the ethnic tension. Since then, the army stays on in power. The Constitution-2008 Section 20(e) says, "The Defence Services is mainly responsible for safeguarding the nondisintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty." On this ground that Tatmadaw again comes out to the "frontstage" that we conveniently call a "coup." Tatmadaw put the blame on the politicians and the EAOs for creating a condition that endangers the very existence of the Union of Myanmar. In response, the EAOs have announced and promised that their fight is for a genuine federal union, nothing more, nothing less. In return, in 1990, Tatmadaw admitted that it was wrong to equate federalism with secessionism. Tatmadaw stops calling the EAOs secessionists, separatists, insurgents, or rebels and honors them with a respectful nomenclature of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). Tatmadaw, also in 1990, erased out the term "minorities" and introduced "ethnic peoples" or "Taiyinthar" that was happily welcomed by the ethnic peoples. At that time, General Than Shwe told the nation that Tatmadaw knows the ethnic peoples more than anybody else because of the Tatmadaw's long experience in the ethnic areas in the civil war. His wife, Daw Kyaing Kyaing, is a Pa-O. They have eight children, a large family in Myanmar. Then and again, Tatmadaw highlights that it is the Tatmadaw that initiated the peace process with the first peace-talk in 1964. The main objective of the present Tatmadaw-led State Administrative Council (SAC) is to build a genuine federal union through the NCA peace process. What shall we do? In light of the above discussion on the core issue, though it does not cover many other important aspects of Myanmar life, it will be reasonable for us to help Myanmar, in particular her Tatmadaw and the EAOs, achieve a federal union with genuine democracy through the NCA peace process. It is especially so because Aung San Suu Kyi's politics is filled with "personality cult," casting a shade on the post-Suu Kyi era. It is also a fact that under her rule Myanmar witnessed increased armed conflicts and atrocities, and poverty escalation in the ethnic areas. Without peace and adequate social-economic security in the ethnic areas, Myanmar's "democracy transit" is meaningless. How to help? 1. To accord international recognition of autonomy struggle of the Myanmar ethnic peoples and their armed organizations in accordance with (1) the promise of the UN Charter Preamble objective 2: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small," and (2) the UN Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1.2 "the principle of equal rights and self-determination." 2. To hold a UN-sponsored all-inclusive peace conference with all openness and fairness to help the Myanmar peoples formulate a new peaceful and lasting peace and federation in accordance with the promise of the UN Charter Preamble objective 3: "To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Italics are my highlights to draw the attention of relevancy. Epilogue Myanmar is in crisis for more than 70 years. The world is wrong to lock it up in the conventional, outdated, and rotten dungeon of "domestic affairs." Jumping and shouting only when the fire flares up is sheer stupidity. The problem is not just a question of a power struggle between Tatmadaw and Aung San Suu Kyi or democracy and authoritarianism. It is a struggle of all Myanmar peoples "for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

India: Farmers mark 100th day of protest, block highway

Indian farmers have blocked a six-lane expressway outside New Delhi to mark the 100th day of protests against the deregulation of agriculture markets, to add pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Farmers young and old headed in cars, trucks and tractors to the highway for a five-hour roadblock on Saturday to oppose three farm laws enacted in September 2020 that they say will hurt them and destroy their livelihoods by opening up the agriculture sector to big private companies. Modi has called the laws much-needed reforms for the country’s vast and antiquated agriculture sector, and painted the protests as politically motivated. “The Modi government has turned this protest movement into an ego issue. They are unable to see the pain of the farmers,” Amarjeet Singh, a 68-year-old farmer from Punjab state, told Reuters news agency. “They have left us no option but to protest.” Their movement has gained international attention and support, including from celebrities such as climate activist Greta Thunberg and US singer Rihanna, but several rounds of negotiations between farmer leaders and the government have failed. Modi’s government has lashed out at supporters of the protests and stands accused by rights activists of using heavy-handed tactics to curb the demonstrations. While the protests have been mostly peaceful, a brief spate of violence on January 26 led to the death of a protester, and the police have filed criminal charges against eight journalists over alleged misreporting of the events of the day. “The Indian authorities’ response to protests has focused on discrediting peaceful protesters, harassing critics of the government, and prosecuting those reporting on the events,” Human Rights Watch said in a statement last month. As the capital braces for harsh summers and the harvesting season begins, farmers gathering on Saturday said they had no plans to turn back until their demands were met. “Bitter cold didn’t affect our movement, and neither will deathly heat,” said Raja Singh, a 58-year-old farmer from Punjab state.

Justice Finally Catches up With Sarkozy BY PHILIPPE MARLIÈRE

On Monday, a criminal court in Paris handed down its verdict in Nicolas Sarkozy’s corruption trial. The former French president was sentenced to three years in jail – two of them suspended – for bribery and influence-peddling. This is a legal landmark for the French judicial system for two main reasons. First, no former president had been sentenced to an actual prison sentence since France’s collaborationist leader Marshal Pétain in 1945. (This said, Sarkozy’s one-year jail sentence will probably not be spent behind bars, but under house arrest with an electronic tag). The former president Jacques Chirac received a two-year suspended sentence in 2011 for embezzling public funds when he was Paris mayor. And second, the French judicial system has long been seen as being deferential to the government of the day in sensitive political cases. This court decision definitely runs counter to this tradition. It took a lot of tenacity on the part of the Parquet National Financier (the judicial institution in charge of tracking down complex financial crimes) to counter attempts by Sarkozy and his allies to undermine its authority. In the end, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law prevailed. It was also the triumph of democracy: evidence that no citizen, however powerful he or she might be, is above the law. The case centred on phone conversations between Sarkozy and Thierry Herzog, his former lawyer. These calls were monitored by French police from September 2013, as part of an investigation into claims Sarkozy had received an illegal and undeclared donation to his 2007 presidential campaign from Muammar Gaddafi, then leader of Libya. (Sarkozy has denied any impropriety.) At the same time, a separate police investigation was under way into allegations that Sarkozy had received illegal payments from the ailing L’Oréal heiress Liliane Bettencourt for the 2007 campaign. (These charges against Sarkozy were dropped in October 2013.) The court heard that conversations between Sarkozy and Herzog in 2014 suggested that Sarkozy had promised a senior magistrate, Gilbert Azibert, a top job in Monaco in return for inside information about the Bettencourt inquiry. Judge Christine Mée ruled that compelling evidence demonstrated a “pact of corruption” between Herzog, Azibert and Sarkozy himself. She concluded that Sarkozy, a former lawyer, “knew that he was doing something wrong”. His actions and those of his lawyer had given the public “a very bad image of justice, and this called for a criminal sanction”. She also added that Sarkozy’s crimes were “extremely serious because they had been committed by a former president who, constitutionally, should guarantee the judiciary’s independence”. The damning verdict did not silence Sarkozy’s political supporters. They rushed to the broadcast studios to denigrate the decision and lambast the judges, questioning the fairness and independence of what they regard as a “political verdict”. This reaction is reminiscent of Silvio Berlusconi’s attacks on Italian magistrates – whom the former Italian president labelled “red judges”. More worrying, though, was the reaction of Gérald Darmanin, the rightwing interior minister, whose role is to fight corruption. Though in Emmanuel Macron’s government, he’s a former member of Sarkozy’s party. Minutes after the verdict was released, he declared his “friendly support” for the ex-president. Such a statement could be a massive boost to the far right – whose support feeds off the sense that France’s elite are all in it for themselves. The public reaction on social media was incandescent. Several of Sarkozy’s friends and associates have also separately been convicted of financial wrongdoing, including his political mentor Charles Pasqua, his former prime minister François Fillon, his former chief of staff Michel Gaudin and a former close adviser, Boris Boillon. Yet, despite such baggage, Sarkozy was recently being touted as the potential conservative candidate for the 2022 presidential election. And, further fuelling distrust of the political elite, Macron is said to have been on cordial terms with Sarkozy before his conviction. In 2018, the current host of the Élysée Palace even asked Sarkozy to deputise for him in a state ceremony. How could Macron, the once feted young liberal leader, have been so reckless and entertained the most polarising president of the postwar period? How could he have befriended someone who epitomises “bling” and who once launched an astonishing attack on the “moral and intellectual permissiveness of May 1968” and the progressive, liberal attitudes it heralded? Leftwing critics may argue that the men are two sides of the same neoliberal-authoritarian coin. However, what they indeed have in common is that they were both elected to the presidency of the Fifth Republic – the “Gaullist Republic”, born in 1958 as a reaction to the ongoing French colonial war in Algeria. It allocates extraordinary constitutional powers to the president but imposes little accountability on him. As a consequence, French voters elect a “hyper-president” or a “republican monarch” with all the pomp that goes with it. It is no surprise that presidents, once in office, are rapidly perceived as out of touch. The Sarkozy brand is now irreversibly contaminated, and his political career is over. He is due to appear in court again later this month over the so-called Bygmalion affair, in which he is accused of having overspent in his unsuccessful 2012 re-election campaign. The Sarkozy trials may be heralding a change of political culture in France. The era of arrogant and aloof presidents who seem untouchable and above the law may be about to end. This criminal conviction is happening at a time when the French have grown exasperated at the lack of accountability of their president. With presidential elections taking place next year, and the left and the far right eager to capitalise on public discontent with the system, who knows what the political consequences might be? Philippe Marlière is a Professor of French and European Politics at University College London (UK). Twitter: @PhMarliere