Manipuris living under the shadow of guns

 

Manipuris living under the shadow of guns

Irfan Engineer

In our recent visit to Manipur as a team of the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism to study the conflict in the state, it was not very difficult to conclude that the people of the state are living under the shadow of guns. They have long waited for elusive peace. The Meitei-Kuki conflict, which escalated on 3^rd May 2023, has brought forth wider issues faced by the people in the state of Manipur, including the fragile rule of law, and failure of the state in managing inter-ethnic conflicts. Peace, ‘rule of law’ and effective functioning of democratic institutions seems to be very remote in this ethnically polarised state.

The state has failed miserably in instilling confidence in the citizens regarding their security. Guns of the militants that are supposed to protect the ethnic community to which they belong, end up having a chilling effect on the moderates and dissenting voices within the community. Take for example, Arambai Tenggol –a Meitei militant group – which started in 2020 as a cultural organisation, but has been radicalised, and according to the Kuki groups, was allegedly involved in the Metei-Kuki riots in May 2023. The organisation ‘issued summons’ to the Meitei MLAs and the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha MPs representing valley areas of the state in Manipur, to assemble at Kangla Fort on 24th January, 2024. The ‘summons’of Arambai Tenggol were honoured by the elected representatives from the valley districts as the organisation has armed itself. All the elected representatives were made to take an oath that they would fight for the demands of the Meitei community, which included delisting of Kukis from the Scheduled Tribes list,deportation of Kuki refugees to camps in Mizoram, border fencing, replacementof Assam Rifles with other paramilitary force and revoking Suspension ofOperations (SoO) agreement between the Centre and Kuki militant groups (Explained Desk, 2024). If the elected representatives and ministers of the state government can be pressurised to sign the demands of the organisation, then no Meitei would feel free to holdher independent opinion if she wants to stay in the valley.

On September 23, 2024, following a press conference held by Meitei Leepun (ML),another radical organisation, approximately 50 individuals, identifying themselves as ML members, went to Babloo Loitongbam’s house in Imphal West district,and verbally threatened him and his family of severe consequences if he (Babloo Loitongbam) appeared in public. Earlier, on October 5, 2023, his house wasattacked by approximately 30 unidentified individuals, who vandalised his property. The attack was after Babloo criticised certain groups within theMeitei community, particularly the ML, suggesting that radical right-wingideology was becoming prevalent among them (FIDH, 2024). Babloo is forced tostay outside Manipur.

ArambaiTenggol attacked not only the Kukis, it also attacked Naga community leaders. InJune 2023, a 57-year-old Naga woman was allegedly shot dead by the group inImphal East district. On 31^st October 2024, members of Arambai Tenggol allegedly assaulted two Naga men in Imphal when they were returning after purchasing livestock in Imphal Valley’s Thoubal district. After torturing them (the Naga men), they allegedly seized Rs. 61,400. The Naga men were threatened and assaulted with automatic rifles, according to Naga People’s Organisation, Senapati District Students’ Association and Senapati District Women’s Association (The Hindu Bureau, 2024).

Arambai Tenggol has not spared even the Manipuri police, even though they are known tobe partial towards the Meiteis and Meitei radical organisations. On 27^thFebruary 2024, members of Arambai Tenggol allegedly assaulted and brieflyabducted the additional superintendent of police (A.S.P.) Moirangthem AmitSingh along with one of his security escorts from his home in Manipur’s ImphalEast district. According to the state police, at least 200 armed miscreants stormed Singh’s home and vandalised the property. This action was in response to the A.S.P. arresting 6 Members of the radical outfit for their alleged involvement in vehicle theft (Scroll Staff, 2024). No Meitei,who is critical of the ideology and violent acts of Meitei radical organisations, can feel safe if the radical organisations continue to have lethal capabilities and wield automatic assault rifles.

The militant radical outfits are able to set the dominant social narrative of the conflict by instilling fear and silencing alternative narratives. The dominant and influential media is in the valley. We scanned the English print media and found only pro-Meitei news and narratives, which exclusively blame the Kukis for the conflict. Kukis in the media narrative are depicted as illegal immigrants from Myanmar, involved in narco-terrorism. These illegal immigrants encroach into the reserved forests, grow poppy, and establish new villages.They are armed with sophisticated weapons, or are overground supporters or the underground militants, and all their illegal activities are protected by theAssam Rifles. The tone and tenor of these narratives may differ. Unfortunately, as we do not know the Manipuri language, we could not personally scan the print media and the social media. It was therefore not surprising that even the human rights activists and civil society had more or less the same opinions.

We interacted with ajournalist who differed with the dominant pro-Meitei narrative but had tomoderate himself to be in the profession. According to this journalist, the BJPis unpopular but there is fear of the state and the deep state (militant organisations like the Meitei Leepun and Arambai Tenggol). More than 5,000 firearms of the state security forces were looted in the valley by Meitei organisations and the state has not been able to recover most of them. Some say, according to the journalist, that the arms were handed over to the deep state. The journalist further said that the looted firearms are now used to extort money from the Meiteis as well as Nagas living in the valley. According to a report in the Hindustan Times, mobs had looted around 4,000 weapons and50,000 rounds of ammunition from police stations and armouries since the conflict began. In a separate incident, around 500 people in more than 40vehicles looted arms and ammunition from the Indian Reserve Battalion (IRB)camp at Naraseina in Bishnupur district on 4^th August 2023.  According to a 6^th August 2023report, 1057 arms and 14201 ammunition had been recovered in the valleydistricts and 138 arms and 121 ammunition had been recovered in the hill districts. (Gupta, 2023).

Selectiveprotection by state armed forces

The commandos of the Manipur police who are largely from the Meitei community are perceived by the Kukis as a ‘partisan armed force of the Meiteis’. Meitei politicians andarmed militants in turn consider the Assam Rifles as partisan towards the Kukis. They guard the buffer zones separating the Meiteis and Kukis to ensuret hat Meiteis and Kukis do not cross over to each other’s areas. There is very little traffic on the highways joining the valley and the hill districts. Every vehicle and all individuals are checked as if they were crossing international border. Only Meitei Pangals (Muslims) are allowed to drive across the buffer zones by both sides transporting essential goods and non-Meitei, non-Kuki passengers like us. There are no Kuki police officers left in the valley. However, the state is refusing to withdraw the Meitei police commandos from Moreh, aKuki dominated strategic town in Tengnoupal district with prospering trade dueto its borders with Myanmar. The volume of trade in Moreh was worth Rs. 350crores in the pre-pandemic year. It is also a gateway to drug trade.

TheKuki Women’s Union and Human Rights told us that on 3^rd May, 2023,three Kukis were killed by the commandos, although no Meitei was killed in Moreh town. The homes of Meiteis were vandalised to scare them to leave the town and partly as a reaction to what was happening to the Kukis in the valley. According to the Kuki women, the Meitei police commandos used excessive force being inimical to the Kukis. Kukis feel that the Meitei commandos have been imposedto control them and maintain Meitei hegemony over this border town. A KukiInpiTengnoupal (Apex body of Kuki tribes) leader told us that they are atrisk if the Meitei police posted in Moreh town join the Meitei undergroundmilitants based in Myanmar, if they decide to cross the border and attack them.More than 150 elite Manipur police commandos from the Meitei community were flowninto Moreh by the Manipur government by the second week of January 2024 (Saikia, 2023).

Therewas intermittent fighting between the Meitei commandos and the Kuki militants that resulted in the death of a SDPO and two commandos. The casualties on theKuki side are not known. The commandos have shifted out of the police stationand are functioning from another building - SBI. On 26^th July, 2023,the Kuki women blockaded the highway to demand withdrawal of Meitei commandosfrom Moreh town. They have been agitating since July 2023 with their demandthat the Meitei commandos be transferred (Express News Service, 2023). The Kuki women allegedlypillaged remaining Meitei properties in the town. The Meitei commando officers steppedout of their self-imposed confinement and fired 4,000 to 5,000 rounds on theagitating women (Saikia, 2023).

TheMeitei commandos were engaged in constructing a helipad in Moreh, which wouldenable the Meitei police officers to be flown in and out of Moreh withouthaving to cross the buffer zone. A Kuki delegation met the police head of the Morehtown to stop construction of the helipad. As it did not have any effect, theKuki militants killed the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) on 31^stOctober 2023. This led to more Meitei commandos being flown in. on 15^thJanuary, 2024, the Manipur Rifles arrested two Kuki protestors – PhilipKhaikholai Khongsai and Hemkholai Mate. The Indigenous Tribal Leaders’ Forumclaimed that they were arrested merely for protesting, while the police claimedthat they were arrested for the murder of SDPO Chingtham Anand Kumar. Thistriggered a fierce battle between the Kuki militants who started firing inthe wee hours of 17^th January and the Manipur Rifles, dominated by Meiteiofficers retaliated. The battle raged for 15 hours, leading to the death of twoPolice commandos on 17^th January, 2024, one of them being WangkhemSomorjit Meetei (Express News Service, 2024a). Assam Rifles had tointervene to bring about cease fire between the two warring sides. The Manipurpolice were moved to another location within Moreh. During the 15 hour long ‘battle’,the Meitei police burnt three schools and 17 Kuki homes. Ironically enough, theMeitei commandos, who are supposed to protect the people, had to be protectedby the Assam Rifles.

AnAssam Rifle Commandant, who is not authorised to speak, told us that the Meiteicommandos and police in Moreh burnt down three schools and eleven houses. Theseproperties, according to him, were burnt down in revenge. The principal of oneof the schools told us that the police commandos must have targeted theeducational institutions with the intention to deprive the community of the abilityto acquire knowledge.

Accordingto the AR Commandant, the Kukis did attack Meiteis on 3^rd May, 2023 outof feeling of revenge for what had happened in the valley, which they learntfrom the social media. However, they were not as brutal as the Meiteiextremists were. The AR Commandant revealed to us his dilemma – whomshould they act against, if the Meitei police commando or the Kuki extremists –both are violating law and are targeting each other, whom should they protectat such a moment.

The security apparatus of the state is sharply divided. Manipur Rifles areperceived as partisan towards the Meiteis, while the Assam Rifles are perceivedby the Meiteis to be protecting the Kukis militants. The Assam Rifles do engagewith the Kuki chiefs and community leaders, and are familiar with their issues.Most of the time they are able to get them to comply with their legal ordersand security needs. However, when they need to, they use force. AR Commandanttold us that during the conflict, not a single Meitei has died because ofbullet fired by them, although Kukis have been killed by their bullets. Theyhave not recovered more arms from the Kuki militants and arrested more Kukis thanthe Meiteis. Even then they are unfairly accused of being partial to the Kukis.One reason may be that the AR is not as brutal, and using excessive force asthe Meiteis and the Manipuri Rifles may want them to.

Bottom of Form

Peace cannot be established by the security forces, no matter how brutal, repressive  and lethal they turn in order to silence communitiesinto abject submission. People seemed determined to fight perceived injusticeand give their life for the honour of their community. The ceasefire in Morehappears to be only temporary. The Manipur Rifles too cannot be ejected fromMoreh by force, and the Kuki militants have plenty of firepower, grit anddetermination left to fight another battle another day. Use of excessive force bythe Manipur Rifles only ensures that the Kuki militants keep getting new recruits.The Kukis and Meiteis, both have lost faith in the ability of the state toprotect them, leading to militarisation of both communities. The Chief ministerof Manipur N. Biren Singh demonised the Kukis even before 3^rd May2023 calling them encroachers into reserve forests, poppy growers, illegalimmigrants from Myanmar and narco-terrorists. He demonised them on one hand andpatronised the deep state – militant Meitei outfits on the other hand to consolidatehis base amongst the Meiteis, who form 53% of Manipur’s population and unitethem into a permanent majority. However, such an approach will only escalatethe conflict.

Thecasualty in the conflict is not only the Kuki and Meitei community. The greatercasualty is democracy, democratic institutions and rule of law and developmentof Manipur, particularly of the hill areas. This is leading to growing militarisationof all ethnic communities and dependence of members of the community on its undergroundarmed fighter. The underground fighters are not accountable to any law, normsor a body. There is often fratricidal internecine struggle within the armed groups.Manipur needs a political solution to the conflict. The political solution willemerge only through a sustained dialogue process in which all communitiesunderstand and empathise with each other’s needs and reconcile their “no compromise”stand.

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