Bangladesh’s Energy Crisis By Saleque Sufi and Habib Siddiqui

 Bangladesh today stands at the edge of an energy precipice. Despite developing more than 30,000 MW (Megawatt) of grid-connected generation capacity, the country cannot consistently produce even 15,000 MW. During peak summer months, the deficit exceeds 3,000 MW, and citizens outside Dhaka endure 10-12 hours of crippling load shedding. Industries are suffocating, fertilizer plants remain idle, and nearly 40% of gas-based power generation capacity sits unused. The root cause is unmistakable: a chronic shortage of primary fuel, especially natural gas.

The present demand for gas stands at roughly 4,000 MMCFD (Million Cubic Feet per Day), yet Petrobangla — despite adding 900–1,000 MMCFD of imported LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) — can supply only 2,700 MMCFD. The resulting 1,200–1,300 MMCFD shortfall has cascaded across the economy, triggering production losses, unemployment, and severe social distress. Bangladesh’s energy crisis is no longer a technical problem; it is a national emergency.

This emergency did not emerge overnight. It is the product of decades of inadequate planning, misplaced priorities, and an overreliance on imported fuels. Unless the government acts with urgency, professionalism, and strategic clarity, Bangladesh risks sliding into a prolonged era of energy insecurity.

The Missed Decades: Coal, Gas, and the Failure of Exploration

Bangladesh possesses one of the world’s richest untapped coal deposits — 70 Tcf (Trillion Cubic Feet) equivalent of high-quality coal lying at mineable depth. Environmentally responsible mining technologies exist today that allow 80% land recovery, safe water management, and full rehabilitation of affected communities. Yet successive governments have refused to mine coal, bowing to misinformation, bureaucratic inertia, and vested interests.

The story of natural gas is equally troubling. Bangladesh is the largest riverine delta on Earth, with enormous geological potential for hydrocarbons. But after extracting the “low-hanging fruit” from only one-third of the landmass, exploration slowed to a crawl. Vast regions — Chattak, Tengratila, Potiya, Sitapahar, Kasalang, and much of the western zone — remain virtually untouched. Some of these prospects lie near the Indian border, where geological continuity strongly suggests additional reserves.

The offshore situation is even more disappointing. After resolving maritime boundary disputes with India and Myanmar, Bangladesh had a historic opportunity to explore the Bay of Bengal. Both neighbors moved swiftly, discovered resources, and began extraction. Bangladesh, meanwhile, remained stuck in bureaucratic loops, half-hearted bidding rounds, and weak investor outreach. As a result, offshore exploration has barely progressed.

The consequences are now visible: declining proven reserves, rising import dependence, and a widening gap between demand and supply.

The LNG Trap: Overreliance on Imports Amid Global Turbulence

Bangladesh currently imports 900–1,000 MMCFD of LNG through two FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) at Moheshkhali. But global LNG markets have become volatile due to geopolitical conflicts, supply chain disruptions — including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — and soaring prices. The country is now trapped in an expensive and unreliable import regime.

Policy missteps have worsened the situation. The interim government of Dr. Muhammad Yunus canceled a signed contract with Summit Group for a third FSRU — an error that cost Bangladesh an additional 500 MMCFD of regasified LNG capacity that could have been operational by 2026. Several advanced‑stage LNG procurement discussions were also abandoned. For nearly 18 months, no meaningful initiative was taken to expand LNG import capacity.

The new government is negotiating with a Chinese company for an additional FSRU, but concerns about competence and transparency linger. The dispute with Summit must be resolved in the national interest. Bangladesh cannot afford further delays.

Moreover, proposals for FSRUs at Khulna and Barishal appear overambitious, and ideas such as importing LNG in ISO tanks are technically unrealistic. Even if LNG imports increase, the transmission system is inadequate. The two existing Moheshkhali–Anowara pipelines can evacuate 1,600 MMCFD, but doing so would drop inlet pressure to 500 PSI, destabilizing the grid. A new parallel pipeline from Feni to Bakhrabad is essential and must be fast‑tracked.

Bhola: A National Failure That Must Be Corrected

Perhaps the most glaring example of policy paralysis is the stranded gas of Bhola. While the nation suffers from a gas famine, Bhola’s proven reserves remain disconnected from the national grid. Shockingly, the Prime Minister recently suggested it may take seven years to evacuate Bhola’s gas.

This is simply incorrect.

Pipeline experts confirm that a 120‑km Bhola–Barishal–Khulna pipeline can be completed within three years, provided land acquisition, procurement, and contractor mobilization begin immediately. Converting Bhola’s gas to CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) or LNG for transport would be wasteful and inefficient.

Connecting Bhola would not only ease the gas crisis but also stimulate green industrialization in Barishal and Khulna. It would also encourage international oil companies (IOCs) to invest in nearby blocks, especially Block 7, which remains underexplored.

Institutional Weakness: The Achilles Heel of the Energy Sector

Bangladesh’s energy institutions — Petrobangla, BAPEX, SGFL, BGFCL, GTCL — are staffed with dedicated professionals, but decades of bureaucratic dominance have eroded their effectiveness. Many senior officials are nearing retirement, and a dangerous vacuum of technical expertise looms.

The DPP (Development Project Proposal) approval process is notoriously slow, often taking more than a year due to unnecessary queries from inexperienced officials. Land acquisition for drilling projects is equally sluggish. These delays cripple exploration and development.

Bangladesh must move away from exclusive reliance on bureaucrats for energy planning. The sector requires petroleum geologists, reservoir engineers, pipeline specialists, and project managers — not generalist administrators. Institutional memory must be preserved by retaining experienced professionals.

A Note on Other Energy Sources: Promise, but Limited Relief

While this essay focuses on Bangladesh’s gas and coal crisis — the core driver of today’s emergency — it is important to acknowledge other energy options. Bangladesh has explored nuclear, solar, wind, battery storage, and fuel‑cell technologies, but none can meaningfully offset the immediate shortfall in primary fuels.

Nuclear power, through the Rooppur plant, will eventually add significant baseload capacity. But nuclear projects are slow, capital‑intensive, and dependent on imported fuel. Rooppur will not solve the current crisis.

Solar energy has grown, yet Bangladesh’s land scarcity, monsoon climate, and low capacity factors limit utility‑scale deployment. Rooftop solar can help, but it cannot replace thousands of megawatts of gas‑based generation.

Wind power remains constrained by low wind speeds across most of the country, except limited coastal pockets.

Battery storage is still too expensive at grid scale, and fuel‑cell technologies are not commercially viable for national deployment.

These technologies must be part of Bangladesh’s long‑term energy transition. But they cannot compensate for the immediate collapse of domestic gas supply or the paralysis in coal development. The crisis Bangladesh faces today is fundamentally a primary fuel crisis, and only primary fuels can resolve it.

The Way Forward: A National Energy Rescue Plan

Bangladesh can still reverse its energy decline — but only through bold, urgent, and professional action. The following steps are essential:

1. Launch an Aggressive Domestic Exploration Program

• Conduct intensive 2D and 3D seismic surveys across the entire landmass.
• Deploy at least 10 exploration rigs by 2028.
• Prioritize drilling in Surma Basin, Chattagram Hill Tracts, western zone, and other unexplored prospects.
• Initiate a new PSC (Production Sharing Contract) bidding round for land blocks outside BAPEX’s ring‑fenced areas.

If executed properly, Bangladesh can add 5 Tcf of new recoverable gas by 2031.

2. Accelerate Offshore Exploration

• Replace foreign roadshows with a high‑level investor conference in Dhaka.
• Engage IOCs directly and offer competitive fiscal terms.
• Strengthen Petrobangla’s technical and managerial capacity.

3. Mine Bangladesh’s Coal Responsibly

• Adopt modern, environmentally safe mining technologies.
• Use domestic coal for power generation to reduce pressure on gas.
• Rehabilitate affected communities with global best practices.

4. Expand LNG Capacity — But Wisely

• Resolve the Summit FSRU dispute.
• Ensure transparency in new FSRU contracts.
• Build the Feni–Bakhrabad pipeline urgently.

5. Connect Bhola Within Three Years

• Begin land acquisition and contractor mobilization immediately.
• Engage international reservoir assessors and subsea pipeline experts.

6. Reform Energy Governance

• Reduce bureaucratic control.
• Empower sector professionals.
• Implement economic pricing for fuel and electricity to ensure financial sustainability.

Conclusion: A Call for National Resolve

Bangladesh’s energy crisis is not inevitable — it is the result of choices. For too long, the nation has relied on imported fuels, ignored its own resources, and allowed bureaucratic inertia to stifle progress. The consequences are now severe: power shortages, industrial stagnation, rising debt, and public suffering.

But Bangladesh also possesses extraordinary potential: vast coal deposits, promising gas basins, offshore prospects, and a capable technical workforce. With decisive leadership, professional management, and strategic investment, the country can regain energy security within a decade.

The government must treat the energy and power sector as a top‑priority national mission. The time for hesitation is over. Bangladesh must explore, develop, and utilize its own resources — boldly, urgently, and professionally.

Only then can the nation emerge from crisis and build a resilient, prosperous future.

About the authors: 

Saleque Sufi is widely regarded as Bangladesh’s foremost expert on the energy and power sector. Over several decades, he has accumulated hands‑on experience in planning, managing, and implementing major energy‑infrastructure development projects, as well as in system operation and maintenance. Before relocating to Australia, he served as Director of the Gas Transmission Company Limited (GTCL), where he played a key role in expanding and modernizing the national gas grid. He is currently a Contributory Editor of Energy & Power Magazine, published from Bangladesh.

Dr. Habib Siddiqui is associated with Esho Desh Gori – Let’s Build Bangladesh, a platform dedicated to national development and institutional reform. He is author of more than 25 books, including Operational Excellence in the Process Industry (Taylor & Francis, 2026), co-authored with his son, Hassan; and Inventory Control and Management: How Professionals Can Improve Performance (Taylor & Francis, 2027).