A view of the
Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh.Credit: Department for International
Development/Russell Watkins
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a
Rohingya militant group, came to global attention once again last year after
unknown gunmen killed Mohibullah, a prominent Rohingya leader, in one of the
refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Mohibullah’s brother Habibullah
claimed that ARSA might have been responsible, angered by his advocacy of
a peaceful non-violent approach to solving the Rohingya crisis, even
though ARSA denied any involvement with the killing.
The denial of Rohingya
rights is as old as that of the Myanmar state. After Myanmar’s independence in
1948, it adopted a policy of viewing Rohingyas as illegal immigrants from
Bangladesh. Consequently, it has engaged in a series of expulsions of Rohingya
from Myanmar: Operation Nagamin (1978), Operation Pyi Thaya (1992), and a
military “clearance operation” in 2017 all saw an exodus of Rohingyas from
Myanmar to Bangladesh. The denial of the community’s rights was formally
enshrined in 1982 with the passage of the Burma Citizenship Act, which helped
transform the Rohingyas into the largest stateless community in
the world.
The origin of Rohingya
militancy dates back to the early days of the Myanmar’s
independence, when violence was a tactic of mainstream political actors in
Myanmar, including the central authorities (the national government and
military) and various political and ethnic minority groups, including
Rohingya Mujahid fighters.
Even though these Mujahid wished to be part of the then East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh), they eventually surrendered to the Myanmar central authority. This
resulted in the establishment of the Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) in Rakhine State, which brought
political legitimacy for the Rohingyas in 1961. But with the military coup in
1962, the dream of the special status of the MFA ended and a new era of
persecution and displacement began.
The post-1962
political situation in Rakhine State led to the creation of a range of Rohingya
organizations, including the Rohingya Independence Force, the Rohingya
Solidarity Organisation, the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, the Rohingya
Solidarity Alliance, and the Rohingya Patriotic Front. Some of these groups
chose the path of armed resistance, while others remained non-violent in their
approach. Access to arms and support within Rohingyas were “extremely limited and factionalized.”
The latest Rohingya
militant group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), was initially known
as the Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement). Experts contend that the group “is a
result of many years of persecution of the Rohingya people in Rakhine.” This group attracted media attention after
it allegedly attacked security forces twice in 2016 and 2017. These two attacks
acted as a casus belli for
the Myanmar government to unleash a disproportionate attack on Rohingya
civilians, including women and children, even though these ARSA militants were
not heavily armed. This resulted in the forced exodus of nearly 1 million
Rohingyas to Bangladesh in 2017 and 2018. A United Nations fact finding mission
later determined that this “clearance operation” amounted to possible genocide and foreign nations including the United
States slapped sanctions on some military personnel in 2018.
Even before the ARSA
attacks in 2016 and 2017, organizations such as the International Crisis Group, RAND Corporation, Counter Extremism Project, and individual scholars have expressed concerns about a
forthcoming wave of Rohingya radicalization. Some scholars identify internal and external factors
for the rise of Rohingya militancy. Internal factors include the trauma caused
by torture in Myanmar, the denial of basic and fundamental rights, the dream of
an independent Rakhine State, and the social structures of the refugee camps.
External causes include ideas of Muslim brotherhood, jihadism provoked by
transnational groups, prejudice against non-Muslims, and the convenient environment
for the development of such organizations. As a result of these factors, the
sentiment of ummah (Muslim
community) could well grow among Rohingyas, given that they have “long suffered suppression and
persecution by both the Myanmar government and extremist Buddhists.”
Rohingyas’ contested identity has also been identified as a catalyst
for radicalization.
These academic
prophecies became reality after the expulsions of 2017, when transnational
militant organizations started exploiting the plight of the Rohingyas. In
September 2017, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri urged “all mujahidin brothers in Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, and the Philippines to set out for Burma to help their Muslim
brothers.” Some analysts contend that al-Qaida will “try to further
expand to Myanmar, either by trying to absorb parts of ARSA or by creating its
own local jihadist network.” In its magazine Dabiq the Islamic State mentioned that it “aims to develop a stronghold in
Bangladesh and use it as a platform to launch attacks on Myanmar.” Hizb ut
Tahrir, another transnational militant group, distributed leaflets in the city
of Cox’s Bazar stating that “the only way to liberate the Muslims in
Myanmar is by establishing and expanding Arakan (Rakhine State) as a
caliphate.” It is worth mentioning here that ARSA has denied having connections
with any transnational militant groups.
Surprisingly, none of
the militant organizations have yet established a sound footing in the Rohingya
camps in Bangladesh, although Bangladesh banned some NGOs from working in the camps in 2018, due
to alleged connections to terror funding. What could be the possible reason for
Rohingya resilience against militant provocation? I think the answer lies in
the recent research exploring the drivers of radicalization in
Bangladesh. One recent book claims that the current phase of
militancy in Bangladesh is deeply influenced by the radical ideology of the
global caliphate. That means the catalyst for this wave radicalization is
global in nature and follows global trends. As a result, since 2018, as the
Islamic State has lost its physical territory and its Caliph as well, it has
not been able to attract as much attention in the Rohingya camps.
It would appear that
the refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar still offer fertile ground for radicalization,
requiring just a seed – that is, an ideology having a global or regional
element– to be fertilized. That said, Rohingya militancy has so far been more a
myth than a reality, with ARSA militants having very limited successes.
Therefore, too much emphasis on Rohingya radicalization might distract us
from sustainable solutions to the Rohingya refugee crisis. Rather, all
actors including national and international organizations must focus on finding
respectful solutions for Rohingyas before they fall prey to radical ideologies.
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