Saturday, November 21, 2026

The Relationship Between IHL and Genocide in The Gambia v. Myanmar Case

 Much has already been written on the ICJ’s landmark judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar case (GvM), and much more will no doubt be written in the coming days. In this post, I want to focus on how the Court dealt with a specific — and admittedly narrow — issue I recently addressed in an article in the Journal of International Criminal Justice: whether genocide can be committed through acts that comply with IHL, such as killing a combatant who is a member of a protected group.

Neither of the ICJ’s two previous genocide decisions, Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia, specifically resolved that issue. They did, however, suggest that genocide could potentially be committed through IHL-compliant acts. In the Bosnia case, the Court rejected Serbia’s argument that it could not be found responsible for genocide because its deportation of the Bosniaks complied with IHL, noting in para. 334 that “no such justification could be accepted in the face of proof of specific intent.” In the Croatia case, the Court did not address the genocide issue directly, but acknowledged in para. 474 that because “a particular act may be perfectly lawful under one body of legal rules and unlawful under another… it cannot be excluded in principle that an act carried out during an armed conflict and lawful under international humanitarian law can at the same time constitute a violation by the State in question of some other international obligation incumbent upon it.”

There is no equivocation in GvM. On the contrary, the majority explicitly rejected the idea that that genocide cannot be committed through acts that comply with IHL:

305. Accordingly, the Court concludes that although compliance with another body of international law, including international humanitarian law, may inform the identification of intent with respect to the actus reus of genocide, as well as genocidal intent, such compliance does not exclude conduct from the scope of the Genocide Convention.

The majority’s analysis is extremely brief — barely two paragraphs. The first paragraph (303) simply notes, with regard to the actus reus of genocide, that “[t]he text of Article II of the Convention does not require that the acts enumerated therein be unlawful pursuant to a distinct body of international law.” The second paragraph (304), which addresses genocide’s mens rea, is a bit more substantive, pointing out that although compliance with IHL is relevant to the existence of specific intent, IHL-compliance and specific intent can nevertheless coexist in the same act:

With respect to genocidal intent, the Court likewise has considered that compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian law, including whether attacks “caused casualties and damage far in excess of what was justified by military necessity”, may be relevant in inferring the presence or absence of the specific intent to commit genocide. On the other hand, the fact that members of a protected group could be lawfully targeted or incidentally harmed under international humanitarian law does not exclude the possibility that they may be killed or harmed with genocidal intent (citation omitted).

None of the other opinions and declarations in the case conclude either that an IHL-compliant act cannot satisfy the actus reus of genocide or question the idea that an IHL-compliant act could be committed with specific intent. Indeed, in his partly concurring and partly dissenting separate opinion, Judge ad hoc Kress provided a useful scenario that demonstrates why it would make little sense to exclude IHL-compliant acts from the scope of the Genocide Convention:

Imagine a case where a State has formed genocidal intent and has begun to realize it through acts of killings against members of the targeted protected group. Now imagine that members of that group organize themselves militarily and fight back in defence of the group in such a manner that the threshold of a non-international armed conflict is reached. I would find it difficult to accept that, in such a case, the killings of fighters of the newly formed military wing of the protected group cease to qualify as acts within the meaning of Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention merely because these acts do not violate the targeting rules applicable under the law of non-international armed conflict. For this would mean that the State concerned could — to that extent — carry out its genocidal plan without thereby committing genocide, simply because the targeted group succeeded in organizing itself militarily in its defence.

The scenario assumes, of course, that we know the state in question specifically intends to destroy the protected group. There will obviously be situations in which it is unclear whether a state using violence against members of a protected group intends to destroy the group or is acting pursuant to non-genocidal motivations. When that is the case, it may be difficult — perhaps impossible — to infer specific intent from acts that comply with IHL. Indeed, it may even be difficult to infer specific intent from acts that violate IHL. Sometimes a war crime is just a war crime.

The basic point, however, remains: when the specific intent to destroy a group can be proven, there is no reason to consider acts of violence against members of that group to be non-genocidal simply because they complied with IHL. On that point, the majority in GvM and Judge ad hoc Kress are absolutely right.

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The Relationship Between IHL and Genocide in The Gambia v. Myanmar Case

  Much has already been written on the ICJ’s landmark judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar case ( GvM ), and much more will no doubt be writt...